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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Nicole Kessell 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of International Studies 
 
September 2017 
 
Title: Migration, Identity, and the Spatiality of Social Interaction in Muscat, Sultanate of 
Oman 
 
 
Utilizing Henri Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space as a framework for 
exploration, this research is concerned with the social and cultural impacts of 
modernization and international migration to Muscat, Oman focusing on the production 
of space and its role in the modification and (re)construction of culture and identity in the 
everyday. While the Omani state is promoting a unifying national identity, Muscat 
residents are reconstructing and renegotiating culture and identity in the capital city. 
Individuals are adapting and conforming to, mediating, and contesting both the state’s 
identity project as well as to the equally, if not more, influential social control that is the 
culture of gossip and reputation. What’s emerging is a distinctly Muscati culture. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This research is concerned with the impact of modernization and labour migration 
to Muscat, Oman on the state’s nation-building efforts, focusing on production of space 
and its role in the modification and (re)construction of culture and identity. Utilizing 
Henri Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space as a framework for exploration, I am 
concerned with the daily spatial practices, perceptions, preferences, and social behaviours 
of city residents, Omanis and expatriates alike, and how, and to what extent, culture and 
identity are affected by these everyday spatial encounters, specifically socialization, in an 
increasingly cosmopolitan urban setting. 
Significance of the Study 
Globalization and Migration 
Though migration is not a new phenomenon, its character has changed. “The 
world is experiencing unprecedented interconnectedness in terms of the speed of such 
connection, their extensity (the reach of these connections), and their intensity (the 
density and strength of those connections)” (Samers, 2010, 71). Migration has become 
more politicized, and its impacts are more widely experienced. Castles and Miller (2009) 
identify six trends in international migration. The globalization of migration increases the 
number of countries affected by migration and “countries of immigration have entrants 
from a broad spectrum of economic, social, and cultural backgrounds” (p. 10). The 
volume of international migrants is accelerating worldwide, and there is increased 
differentiation of migrant types and motivations. The feminization of global migration, 
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particularly labour migration, is a trend that could be attributed to increased economic 
participation, or the preference for female workers in destination countries.  The above 
trends result in growing politicization of migration in domestic, regional, and 
international politics and policies, making the study of migration, and its social and 
cultural impacts, pertinent and practical. 
Existing literature suggests that the biggest impact of globalization will not be 
from top-down implementation of neoliberal policies, but the biggest impact on culture 
and identity will happen at the daily level, through day-to-day interactions and cultural 
exchanges with the other. Thus, a spatially-oriented research endeavor examining the 
everyday, lived experiences of individuals would prove a useful alternative to the 
traditional state-centric, systemic and fragmented approach to the study of migration, 
identity, and social transformation. 
Space and Place 
Space is fundamental to understanding the impact of globalization. “At the 
crossroads between individual agency, collective imagination, and global migration, 
space is [the] point of entry into analyzing migration.” (Bruslé and Varrel, 2012, p. 2) 
At its core, migration is a spatial phenomenon, and the nature of globalization and 
transnational mobility has altered the already complex interactions between space, 
migration processes, and individual migrants. In the context of this increased mobility 
there are new forms of relationships with space. Individuals are part of both a global 
network of social/spatial relations as well as social/spatial relations in their current 
location of residency. Multi-locality is a normal part of life, and migrant identity is 
founded on experiences had in multiple, sometimes distant, places.  
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There is a growing trend in the study of globalization, transnationalism and 
migration to treat space as a social construct rather than an immaterial background. In 
addition to state-building, migration processes and migrants themselves are involved in 
place-making and the production of space. Places, created through social interactions and 
the attachment of value and meaning, are never fixed and incredibly dynamic. People 
form attachments to place and modify it in various ways. This dynamism is definitely the 
case in the context of globalization, characterized by increased communication and 
exchange of ideas, goods, and people. “The specificity of place also derives from the fact 
that each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations.” 
(Massey, 1994, p. 146) 
Urbanization and the Scale of the City 
The city is a fitting scale in the study of transnational migration and space for two 
main reasons. Firstly, global rates of urbanization have been rapidly increasing since the 
20th century. Urbanization is defined as the increasing proportion of the population that 
resides in urban areas as opposed to rural areas. According to a publication from the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, over half of the world’s total 
population (54%) resided in urban areas in 2014, compared to 30% in 1950. By 2050, the 
UN has projected that 66% of the world’s population will reside in urban areas. 
(UNDESA Population Division, 2014) Though urbanization rates vary spatially, at all 
scales, the overall global trend of urbanization elevates the importance of the city-level 
scale of analysis in social scholarship.   
Secondly, cities, not states, are the core of economic, cultural, political, and social 
activities, further highlighting the importance of this scale in the investigation of social 
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change and the role played by migration and urban development in the transformation. 
Because the majority of the world’s population is urbanized, the city is, and will continue 
to be, the site of significant social transformation. Lefebvre (1991), like Karl Marx, sees 
modern urban life, characterized by domination, monotonous labour and routine, as 
alienating but views urbanization as a trigger for social transformation and the production 
of a new society.  
The potential for societal transformation is particularly heightened in the face of 
transnational migration. Brickell and Datta (2011) consider cities, 
“as site of translocality par excellence, harbouring places of origins, settlement, 
resettlement and transit. Situated within the intersections between place and 
displacement, location and mobility, settlement and return, cities are critical to the 
construction of migrant landscapes and the ways in which they reflect and influence 
migratory movements, politics, identity, and narratives.” (p. 16) 
 
Everyday lived experience 
Henri Lefebvre (1991) argued that the dominant western conception of space 
“mandated a notion of space as a Euclidean geometric space” that continues to inform 
scientific explorations of space, characterized by identification, distinction, and 
classification. (Watkins, 2005, p.210)  The spaces created in this manner, though, are 
abstract mental constructions, and have therefore “become disassociated from the 
physical and social realities of lived experience.” (Watkins, 2005, p.210)  
Defined by Henri Lefebvre (1991), the everyday is a set of functions connecting 
systems that otherwise appear distinct and unrelated. He described the everyday as “the 
sole surviving common sense referent and point of reference” and defined everydayness 
as “a denominator common to existing systems…” (p. 9) He concludes, 
 “the everyday is therefore the most universal and the most unique condition, the most 
social and the most individuated, the most obvious and the best hidden.” He argued that 
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the repetitive and dynamic modern everyday can be analyzed as “the uniform aspect of 
the major sectors social life.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 9)   
Emphasizing the importance of exploring and critically analyzing the everyday, 
Lefebvre writes “it is monstrous to reduce ‘lived experience’” and, “that a recognition of 
the inadequacy of pious humanism does not authorize the assimilation of people to 
insects.” (p. 11) Research on labour migration to the Gulf had tended to view migrants as 
“an ‘apolitical,’ ‘transient,’ and ‘disposable’ workforce convenient for patrimonial rulers 
trying to overcome the dilemmas of modernization” (Chalcraft, 2012, p. 67). This global 
systemic approach to the study of migration effectively collapses migrant lives into 
economic terms. The economically-focused, collective approach to the study of migration 
and migrant communities “ ignores the agency exercised in the daily lives of migrants, 
and removes possibilities of community formation, political agency, and cultural 
hybridity, emotional attachment, consumption, leisure activity, and other forms of 
belonging from South Asian experiences in the Gulf” (Vora, 2013, p. 11). 
Exploring the daily lives of migrants and their lived experiences in specific places 
(location, locale, and sense of place) is a counterpoint to the “…inflationary tendencies of 
some writings on globalization” (Bruslé and Varrel, 2005, p. 5). As Watkins (2005) 
describes it, “an abyss has opened up between the theories of space and the empirical 
world of actions, interactions, and understandings, leaving our lived experiences 
estranged from the conceptions that purport to represent them.” (p. 210)  
Oman 
There has been significant academic interest in the role of globalization in urban 
transformation, but “cities drawn into the undertow of global developments do not, as 
might be expected, become immersed in placeless uniformity, but constantly develop 
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new differentiations.” (ETH Studio Basel, 2013, p. 7)  The rapid development in the 
Arabian Gulf, commencing in the 1970s with the discovery and extraction of oil and gas 
resources, has “created new types of urban environments with new meanings and goals.” 
(ETH Studio Basel, 2013, p. 7)   In this regional context, Oman stands apart in both its 
historical context and approach to modernization and development, and context matters. 
Oman has a rich and sustained history of global connectivity, more so than any other state 
in the Gulf. Oman had a widespread trading network across the Indian Ocean, including 
colonies on the western coast of Indian and, more extensively, East Africa. As the hub of 
Oman’s seafaring and trade-related activities, cosmopolitan mercantilism is a defining 
feature of Muscat’s history. This has influenced not only the ethnic composition and 
culture of the city, but also the national narrative that affects contemporary popular views 
of diversity and belonging amongst the local population.  
With the rise of British dominance in the Indian Ocean, Oman fell into a state of 
economic decline. Coupled with the benign neglect of several sultans and the imposition 
of stifling domestic policies, development essentially halted. It wasn’t until the former 
Sultan’s forced abdication in 1970 that development resumed. Thus, urban and social 
transformation in Muscat, Oman can be more or less temporally delineated making it a 
good case study for the subject. Through the context of Muscat, we can gain more insight 
into urban transformation in the context of globalization more broadly. In addition, 
because the importation of foreign labour is a critical component of Oman’s 
development, we can more gain more insights into the role of migration in social 
transformation more broadly. 
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Research Questions 
To reiterate, this work is concerned with exploring the social and cultural impacts of 
modernization and international migration to Muscat, Oman through an exploration of the 
everyday and the role of social space in the modification and (re)construction of culture 
and identity. To explore the influence of migration to Muscat and the state’s identity 
building project upon culture and identity, the following questions must be addressed: 
- What is the role of the state in the production of space and identity?  
- How are residents engaged in the production of space and challenging the 
conceived/dominating space of the state? 
 
Methodology 
Research Design 
The research design reflects the exploratory intent of the research endeavor. The 
design is partially naturalistic, given that the goal was to uncover reality, whatever may 
emerge, without manipulation, controls, or constraints. In a similar vein, the research was 
also designed to be flexible, so that as new avenues of inquiry emerged they could be 
further explored. It is qualitative rather than quantitative so that interactions, perceptions 
exceptions, alterations, and experiential plurality, all of which produce space, are not 
overlooked. The methods employed are largely ethnographic in order to analyze lived 
experience and explore individual attitudes, perceptions, and conceptualizations of 
cultural elements (and the relationships between them). This research focuses on the role 
of social space in the transformation of culture and identity, and is structured with Henri 
Lefebvre’s theory of the Production of Space in mind. In his work, Henri Lefebvre (1991) 
outlined three separate but inseparable and interrelated aspects of space that comprise 
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social space: spatial practices, being perceived space, representations of space, or 
conceived space, and spaces of representation, lived space. Lefebvre (1991) emphasized 
that these three aspects of space are continuously informing and being informed by the 
others, and that all three aspects of space must be considered as a whole.  
Spatial practices, or perceived space, relates to individuals’ spatial performances, 
and “…ensures the levels of cohesion and competence required for the everyday 
functions of society…” (Watkins, 2005, p.213) According to Watkins (2005), “these 
spatial practices include everyday routines and evolved social conventions of tolerable 
behavior.” (p. 213) 
Representations of space, or space that is conceived, is “the conceptualized space 
constructed out of symbols, codifications and abstract representations” including forms of 
power, ideology and ideological content in codes and symbols, and is “…the manifest 
representation of our mental constructs of the spaces of our rational, abstract 
understandings.” (Watkins, 2005, p. 212)  
Spaces of representation refers to the space of lived experience “that forms, 
informs and facilitates the deviations, diversity and individuality that are a fundamental 
aspect of any social encounter” and “this distinctiveness is achieved in conjunction with, 
while not being completely constrained by, the stricture of the representations of space 
and the spatial practices that have developed to provide the necessary cohesion and 
competence for successful social interaction.” (Watkins, 2005, p.213) 
According to Lefebvre’s (1991) conception, “social space simultaneously 
1. Has a part to play among the forces of production, a role originally played by 
nature, which it has displaced and supplanted; 
2. Appears as a product of singular character, in that it is sometimes simply 
consumed (in such forms as travel, tourism, or leisure activities) as a vast 
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commodity, and sometimes, in metropolitan areas, productively consumed (just as 
machines are, for example), as a productive apparatus of grand scale; 
3. Shows itself to be politically instrumental in that it facilitates the control of 
society, while at the same time being a means of production by virtue of the way 
it is developed (already towns and metropolitan areas are no longer just works and 
products but also means of production, supplying housing, maintaining the labour 
force, etc); 
4. Underpins the reproduction of production relations and property relations (ie 
ownership of land, of space; hierarchical ordering of locations; organization of 
networks as a function of capitalism; class structures; practical requirements); 
5. Is equivalent, practically speaking, to a set of institutional and ideological 
superstructures that are not presented for what they are (and in this capacity social 
space comes complete with symbolisms and systems of meanings – sometimes an 
overload of meaning); alternatively, it assumes an outward appearance of 
neutrality, of insignificance, of semiological destitution, and of emptiness (or 
absence); 
6. Contains potentialities – of works and of reappropriation – existing to begin with 
in the artistic sphere but responding above all to the demands of a body 
‘transported’ outside itself in space, a body which by putting up resistance 
inaugurates the project of a different space (either the space of counter-culture, or 
a counter-space in the sense of an initially utopian alternative to actually existing 
‘real’ space).” (pp. 348-349) 
Multiple ad-hoc ethnographic methods were used in order to holistically explore 
the these six attributes of social space, and attempt to mitigate the potential for error in 
analysis on part of the researcher in that the data collected through the use of one method 
can be corroborated  or contradicted by the findings uncovered through the use of  
another method. The various methods were employed to uncover the three fields in 
Lefebvre’s trialectic model of the production of space. Interviews, photos, mental maps 
and observatory walks were employed to explore the physical (perceived space: spatial 
practices, daily routines, buildings and monuments, symbols, etc). Archival research, 
interviews, and mental maps were used to explore the mental (conceived space: 
prejudices, opinions, attitudes, etc). Finally, participant observation, with some support 
from interviews, was employed to uncover social space (lived space: interactions, etc).  
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Data Collection Instrumentation 
The theoretical framework of data collection relates to Lefebvre’s conception of space 
and its production as a triad: 
- Perceived Space/Spatial practices: Mental maps, oral interviews, and participant 
observation 
- Representations of Space/Conceived Space: Archival research, mental maps, and 
interviews  
- Spaces of representation/lived space: Interviews and participant observation 
 
Data Collection Approach and Procedure 
Archival research. Archival research was first employed to explore global, 
regional, and state migration trends and figures, including which states are predominantly 
labour-importing or labour-exporting, the flow of remittances, and migrant population 
sizes. For the global migration trends, for example, data compiled and presented by the 
United Nations (UN), the International Organization on Migration (IOM), and the World 
Bank were referenced. For migrations trends and figures specific to the Gulf states, The 
Gulf Research Center’s Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) database was the 
chief source referenced. 
Archival research was then an avenue to gain insight into the production of space 
through historical dialectics and cultural accumulation, and the formation of the state. 
Archival research was also employed to uncover the contemporary political, economic 
and social environment of Oman with regards to nation-building and state-building 
methods and immigration policies. Demographic information, including the 
governorate’s total population, the ratio of migrants to national residents, age, gender, 
occupational fields, and migrant national origins was explored. The same information 
was gathered for Muscat city in particular. Archival sources for such information 
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included surveys the state census, and other data compiled by the state and subsequently 
produced state reports. The Ministry of Manpower, Royal Oman Police, and the National 
Center for Statistics and Information were the primary archival sources used to explore 
state and city trends and figures. Given the spatial dimension of my research, data from 
Muscat’s Geographic Information Systems office was explored. This source of spatial 
data provided specific locations for sites of social and cultural importance in the 
traditional sense, like community-specific (largely meaning national origin, like Filipino, 
or Indian) schools and religious institutions and prominent civic sites. 
To guide my understanding of the local context, local news like Times of Oman 
and Muscat Daily were repeatedly referenced to explore the social environment. Articles 
relating to immigration, including changes in visa requirements, visa bans, and other 
residency-related policies were considered. Similarly, articles that pertain to the 
Omanization of the workforce, and developments in labour nationalization policies were 
included. News relating to state-building and or discussing recent infrastructural and 
institutional developments were explored for the same reason.  Local news articles 
providing insight into the social and cultural environment of the city were also explored. 
Articles relating to cultural and artistic events were read, as well as those relating to 
crime prevention, from drug-busts and the deportation of expatriates for obscene acts.  
Facebook and Instagram were also archival sources of information. I followed 
Times of Oman on Facebook and Instagram, and read through conversation threads to 
gain familiarity with current developments and the various perspectives held. Similarly, I 
followed and perused entertainment-oriented social media pages like Muscat Tips and 
Muscat Memes, which are tailored for young city ‘locals’.  
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Given the level of state censorship and control of local media, the local news 
articles have to be considered critically. However, understanding the state influence in the 
media allows one to identify elements of both state and nation-building strategies and the 
dissemination of that narrative to the general public. The level of state censorship and 
surveillance limits the reliability of the information gathered from conversations and 
comments on social media. This might be mitigated a bit by the anonymous nature of 
digital media, but I think it is insignificant with regards to reliability. In any case, 
discourse analysis and reading between the lines can uncover underlining threads. 
Interviews. Semi-structured interviews are one of the primary sources of data for 
this research endeavor. Through this method, insight into representations of space 
(conceived), spatial practices (perceived space), and representational spaces (lived space) 
can be achieved. In designing and structuring the interview, consideration was given to 
questions that would elicit information about the participants’ individual attributes, 
perceptions, behaviours, routines, and personal beliefs. The design and schedule of the 
interview will reflect this grouping. The interview schedule was somewhat of a pyramid 
structure, beginning with easy-to-answer questions about their attributes, and ending with 
questions that solicit critically reflective answers. The types of questions varied, and 
include descriptive, opinion, and structural. Some secondary questions will likely be 
prompts for clarification, nudging, and categorizing. 
The primary interview questions relate to four broad themes:  
1) individual attributes relating to age, country of origin, length of residency, level of 
educational attainment, local presence of family, and whether the participant is 
second or third generation 
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2) spatial practices, patterns, perceptions, and preferences for both national and 
foreign participants, including areas of conspicuous migrant residency, initial 
migrant settlement and the presence of social networks, and areas avoided or 
preferred by Muscat residents for social, economic and recreational activities;  
3) cultural interaction, including the frequency and context of these interactions, 
perceptions of others’ that arise from such interactions, and cultural transmission. 
Lastly,  
4) identity and belonging, relating social interactions with perceptions of self and 
self-identification, identification of ‘home’. 
Participant selection. Participant selection was a combination of purposive, snowball, 
and convenience sampling. Because of the dynamic and temporal nature of the research 
themes as well as a desire to make this project more projective and foretelling, younger 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 were ideal participants. Given that the 
production of space is a process, a younger group of city residents would allow for some 
speculation on syncretic identities and the nature of social relations in the next few 
decades. Older individuals with longer residencies in Muscat who could convey their 
knowledge about temporal changes to the social, cultural, and political environment were 
also sought. Because of the comparative and intercultural orientation of this research, an 
even number of participants of foreign and national origins was an objective. 
Additionally, given the gendered nature of the society, a group of participants with an 
even ratio of males and females was also an aim. 
Participant solicitation. Initial contact with most participants occurred in social 
settings. I extended a request for participation after some degree of informal social 
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engagement. For other participants, the arrangement was more impersonal, given that 
local friends would approach their friends or colleagues on my behalf with requests for 
participation. Invitation to participate were extended in an individualized manner. To 
foster comfort and ease, I provided participants with insight into my research during the 
invitation so as to remove any anxiety that might be the result of ambiguousness and 
unknown motivations. I briefly conveyed the nature of questions that I would ask, and the 
rationale behind asking them.  
Interviews were conducted during the summer of 2015 between the 4th of July and 
the 28th of August. Interviews were largely conducted in public spaces, like coffee shops, 
restaurants, and shisha cafes. Five interviews were conducted at the participant’s place of 
employment. Two interviews were conducted in the private residences of the participant. 
The majority of the interviews were conducted one-on-one, with three interviews being 
held with two participants simultaneously for contextual and cultural reasons, specifically 
gender-related.  The duration of interviews lasted between 25 minutes to upwards of two 
hours. The length of a typical interview was roughly an hour. 
At the start of all interviews, I introduced myself, reintroduced the project, 
outlined my research objectives, and explained the confidential nature of the conversation 
and how the confidentiality of the interview content and any relating notes or files would 
be maintained, in strict accordance with the Protection of Human Subjects protocol 
regarding anonymity and informed consent.  For those meetings arranged through a 
mutual acquaintance, more time was spent warming up and establishing rapport prior to 
conducting the interview. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for 
dialogue and follow-up questions. Though I had my structured interview questions in 
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hand, the interview evolved into something more conversational once the individual 
attributes, like age and occupation, were recorded and we got into more meaningful 
questions of personal importance to the participants. Given the formal nature of societal 
interactions, I intentionally kept the vibe of the interviews as informal as possible for the 
comfort of the participants, just to reaffirm my liberal and tolerant orientation and lack of 
judgment so as to elicit further honesty. 
Because I was introduced to the majority of these individuals by others in the 
same social network, the participants in this study may not be representative of the city’s 
population in terms of national origin, age, lifestyle or interests. Attempting to make the 
group of participants more representative of Muscat’s residents, other avenues of 
participant solicitation were taken, tapping into the professional network of local friends. 
As a means to increase validity and reliability, rather than relying on a specific contact 
and gaining access to his or her particular social circle, I purposefully sought out those 
who appeared to have different backgrounds, beliefs, and lifestyles than participants I had 
interviewed thus far in my data collection.  
Content analysis of transcriptions was used to identify terms and phrases 
frequently repeated or those reiterated by other participants.  Descriptive and categorical 
codes were used to uncover manifest messages. Broader concepts and themes were used 
as codes to analyze more latent information conveyed. Individual attributes give context 
to participants’ perceived (spatial practices), and conceived space. There are many 
variables that effect the extent of social and cultural interaction between migrant and host 
communities, beginning with individuals’ attributes, including their ethnic origins, age, 
length of residency, level of educational attainment and occupation. An individual’s 
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country of origin or ethnic background can influence their reception amongst the local 
population which has its own pervasive perceptions of ‘others’. This reception will also 
influence their willingness to assimilate into or associate with the local population, in turn 
effecting the level of cultural transmission. Age is also an important individual attribute. 
Because of the cultural identity confusion and increased assimilation is typically 
demonstrated by second and third generation immigrants, specifying sequence is a 
fundamental element to be included. The younger foreign residents will have not made 
the initial decision to migrate to Oman, and will likely lack, or at least have weaker, ties 
to the family’s country of origin, especially if the individual has always resided in the city 
of Muscat. Similarly, length of residency for migrants could potentially increase cultural 
exchange and assimilation. If residency in Muscat has been lengthy, transnational identity 
could account for the maintenance of culture of origin and limited acculturation. 
Educational attainment impacts the socioeconomic standing of migrants within the host 
community, which would entail different reception than that experienced by an unskilled 
labourer. Likewise, the occupation held by migrant workers would influence the 
frequency and extent of professional interaction with the local population. 
Spatial practices, preferences, and perceptions of the city (including its 
inhabitants) can give insight into popular sentiments, existing social and cultural 
conflicts, and conceived space, both in the minds of the participants and the urban 
planners. Perceptions of the Others’ culture could also identify which aspects of culture 
are being adopted or transmitted, dependent upon their perceived value. Similarly, the 
behavioural accommodations made to respect the local culture or adhere to societal 
expectations can potentially impact the individual’s identity ascription. Perceptions of 
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Self and self-identification can assist in the evaluation of cultural change occurring, and 
the importance to the individual of belonging, or not belonging, to a broader community. 
It can be argued that the need to belong to a larger community is necessitated by 
marginalization and discrimination of migrants, or sentiments of vulnerability and the 
sociocultural threat of a significant foreign population. 
The importance of participatory research cannot be understated. Any chance to 
increase the level of involvement of city residents who are more knowledgeable than 
myself, and therefore any chance to increase the validity of knowledge produced, was 
seized. Oral methodological approaches involve the participants in the production of data 
and the construction of knowledge, and therefore contribute “to the redistribution of 
power between the researched and the researched.” (Jung, 2014, p. 987)   
With regards to the study of identity and migration, the methods employed to collect 
data are often verbal, and usually oral. These approaches include interviews, focus 
groups, questionnaires, and the collection of narratives. However, considering issues 
associated with language familiarity and proficiency, for both the participant and the 
researcher, verbal communication has the potential to be limited and misinterpreted. 
Attempts were continuously made to be somewhat repetitious, asking similar questions or 
rewording questions to gauge consistency in responses. This was an attempt to address 
both misinterpretation and variation in participants’ presentation of self. 
Oral approaches to data collection, as previously mentioned, have faults relating 
to language familiarity and proficiency. This can result in limited communication and the 
information provided has the potential to be misinterpreted. Some participants may have 
found it easier to express themselves through the sketching of a mental map than through 
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verbal communication. In his discussion of the utility of mental sketch mapping, Jack Jon 
Gieseking (2013) cites the work of Howard Gardner and his theory of multiple 
intelligences. Gardner (2011) theorized that individuals have a dozen different types of 
intelligences, including linguistic, logical-mathematical, and spatial. He states that 
society generally values linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligences above others. 
Gieseking (2013) postulates that “it is inevitable that researchers have ignored a wealth of 
data by not considering these multiple intelligences.” (p. 714). 
Mental Mapping. Given the spatial nature of this project, it is imperative that a 
tool is employed that elicits geographic conceptions and perceptions of place. Mental 
maps are the most effective visual method to reveal such geographic information. Mental 
maps were sketched the summer of 2015 between the 4th of July and the 28th of August. 
Maps were drawn following the conclusion of the interview, and therefore the locations 
of this method are the same as for the interviews. The mapping exercise was largely 
conducted in public spaces, like coffee shops, restaurants, and shisha cafes. Five maps 
were produced at the participant’s place of employment. Two maps were drawn in the 
private residences of the participant. The majority of the interviews were conducted one-
on-one, with three mapping exercises being held with two participants simultaneously.  
The duration of map sketching was short, lasting anywhere between 10-30 minutes. 
After the conduction of the verbal interview, participants were provided sketch 
paper with dimensions of 11 inches by 14 inches and a weight of 70lb. Participants were 
also provided a set of drawing pencils of various softness and an eraser. Fearing too much 
influence on the produced map, very little direction was provided, and participants were 
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simply asked to draw a map of Muscat and to include places they consider important or 
frequent regularly. 
Because the intended goals for the spatial component of this research project is to 
uncover spatial practices and identify spaces wherein interaction between expatriates and 
Omanis occur, and the fact that the maps are supplementary to participant interviews, I 
use few analytics in my reading of the mental maps. What I consider in reading the maps 
will be limited to what features, physical and human-built, are included and excluded, as 
well as the labels and comments written by the participants. These features include paths, 
landmarks, nodes, districts and edges. The size of the drawn features, and the orientation 
of map elements and the map in its entirety will also be considered. A comparison of 
participants’ produced maps will identify areas of overlap, and spaces within which 
contact, brief or extensive, between city residents of various origins occur.   
Once spaces of interaction were identified, a review of interview content allowed 
for these spaces to be categorized in terms of the extent of the interactions within these 
spaces as conveyed by the research participants. These categories of extent include 
spaces characterized by high, moderate, or low levels of interaction. Within these 
categories, the general nature of the interactions will serve as subcategories. Those 
subcategories include social and professional interaction. Within each categorized space, 
the meaningfulness of the interaction in terms of collective identity development and 
cultural syncretization will be considered. 
 As mentioned, interviews involve participants in the production of data and the 
construction of knowledge, and therefore contribute “to the redistribution of power 
between the researcher and the researched” who are experts on the subject of their lived 
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experience. (Jung, 2014, p. 987)  The inclusion of a visual method to supplement the oral 
interviews further involves these experts in the research process through the production 
of that visual data.  
Mental mapping is a methodology that has been employed to retrieve participants’ 
perceptions and conceptions of place.  Mental maps have also been used to explain how 
perceptions of place influence individuals’ preferences and spatial choices and behaviors 
(Gould and White, 1974). Kevin Lynch (1960) pioneered the tool of data collection and 
analysis to understand how people perceive relationships between space and both the 
physical and social elements contained within. Lynch outlined five mental map features: 
landmarks, paths, points of interest which he termed nodes, boundaries he referred to as 
edges, and sections of coherence, which he termed districts. (Powell, 2010, p. 540).  
In an attempt to further involve participants directly in the research project 
through the production of visual data, mitigate problems associated with oral 
methodologies, and, mostly importantly, in an attempt to adequately capture participants’ 
realities and truths, mental mapping, or mental sketch mapping, was employed as a 
supplemental data source. This approach can assist in uncovering spatial practices 
(perceived space) and help identify places of social importance. Mental mapping is both a 
visual and spatial method that allows one to view the participants’ realities from another 
vantage point. Participants draft tangible maps derived from their cognitive maps of 
space and the information, emotions, and ideas they hold, whether real or imagined. 
(Downs and Stea, 1974) 
Mental mapping provides another instrument to measure the spatial patterns, 
perceptions, and preferences disclosed in the interviews. Evidence of settlement 
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clustering and relatively demarcated community formation would give insight into the 
robustness of migrant networks. The presence and size of social networks would sustain 
‘home’ culture, or, at least, lessen the level of acculturation or assimilation of migrants 
into the dominant culture. 
Settlement patterns can also be indicative of negative migrant reception and 
separation. The residency preferences and areas avoided by the local population would 
also aid in understanding the nature of reception or foreigners, as well as the extent of 
social and cultural exclusion. Spatial separation of local and foreign populations within 
the city would be indicative of limited daily interactions, and therefore cultural 
transmission, perhaps facilitating the maintenance of ‘original’ identity, or dual identity. 
The avoidance of foreign neighbourhoods would be indicative of social and spatial 
exclusion, and, of course, the frequency of cultural exchange. The identification of 
migrant neighbourhoods as those participants tend to avoid may be indicative of 
discriminatory social and spatial exclusion based on perception.  
The analysis of the data provided by mental maps has traditionally been 
quantitative. A mental map is assumed to “transparently reflect people’s cognitive worlds 
and each part of a map can be separated, resorted, and extracted selectively,” leading 
research towards statistical analysis (Jung, 2014, p. 989). The information contained 
within a mental map is too contextual and its construction too experiential for statistical 
analysis to be sufficient in extracting the information existing within. Similarly, the 
sketching of these mental maps is influenced by the participants’ interpretation of the task 
prompt, allowing for discrepancies in the intended and understood significance or 
meaning of map features, resulting in flawed conclusions. Mental maps “are subjective 
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texts that differ greatly from other kinds of maps such as thematic maps produced by the 
technologies of geographic information systems: the elements, layout, inclusion and 
exclusion in the mental map as a whole represent the subjectivity of the drawer.” (Jung, 
2014, p. 989) 
The analysis of mental maps limits the participatory nature of the research, 
considering that “it positions the researched as a passive information giver, while the 
researcher is an initiator, processor, and interpreter.” (Jung, 2014, p. 989) Given the 
contextual, experiential, and meaningful character of the information conveyed through 
mental mapping, quantitative analysis sustains the patriarchal researcher-researched 
dynamic more so than a qualitative approach. Jung (2014) emphasized intertextuality and 
reflectivity in the analysis of mental maps, given that meaning is determined contextually 
and in reference to other elements, including the researcher. Awareness of oneself as a 
researcher, and the understanding that my knowledge is the product of power, definitely 
impartial, and potentially wrong, may improve the accuracy of map interpretation. 
Participant Observation. Participant observation is an approach to more fully 
understand the context of place, and the daily experiences of foreign and Omani 
communities in Muscat: the social space. Observatory walks through different 
neighbourhoods was employed to take in the built environment, including architecture 
and signage. Participant observation was undertaken between the 4th of July and the 28th 
of August in 2015. I would sit and observe in high traffic public areas in various 
neighbourhoods of the city. I would do my grocery shopping at all the supermarkets 
mentioned with frequency during interviews. I would accept invitations to private 
gatherings, and invitations to accompany participants to social gatherings in both public 
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and private spaces. Some sites of observation include recreational or leisurely social 
spaces like bars, nightclubs and hotel lounges as well as restaurants, coffee shops, shisha 
cafes. Sites of observation also included public and private beaches, parks, shopping 
malls, supermarkets, and private residences.  
During these observational situations, I behaved as if I was a disciple of 
experience and all attempts at assimilation were undertaken. For the most part, not 
wanting to make myself conspicuous, and suspicious, I waited to take notes on my 
observations until arriving back to my residence. The social context had informed me that 
such documentation of activities would without question cause individuals to adjust their 
behaviour and edit their conversations. 
Throughout my participant observation, I would consider the social dynamics of 
those also occupying the space firstly. I would also consider style of dress, preferences of 
music, movies, food and drink. I would listen for vernacular language use, and note 
instances interpreted as being indicative of cultural syncretism and identity 
reconfiguration amongst participants. With regards to the mundane everyday routines of 
city residents, like grocery shopping for example, I would consider the products available 
(link the country of origin), and pricing. I would also gauge the customer crowd, with 
consideration given to behavioural adaptations and accommodations, languages used or 
preferred, dress and attire. 
For the analysis of observed social interactions, my approach was largely similar. 
I would first gauge the crowd, any behavioural adaptations witnessed, languages used and 
preferred, and what style of dress and attire was worn. I would then consider musical 
preferences, food and beverages being consumed, and the company kept and preferred by 
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individuals. I would then attempt to evaluate the nature and extent of social interactions 
and how meaningful they may have been, based on body language, facial expressions, 
and enthusiasm.  
Participant observation is a socially informative ethnographic method that allows 
for more extensive understanding in a social context.  It provides a lens to identify spatial 
behaviour separate from the verbal responses of participants, and presumably, more 
objective. Taking note of the residents frequenting these locations, the style of dress, and 
languages heard in the spatial context can corroborate the stated spatial behaviours and 
attitudes from interview participants. Participant observation is limited by lack of 
familiarity and context. One cannot discern place of origin for people observed based on 
their appearances, or languages spoken. I’m certain culturally and geographically-specific 
jokes went unnoticed. In addition, when acceptable behviour in public is controlled, is 
what I’m observing in some spaces natural or prescribed behaviour? It is sometimes 
difficult to discern. 
Research Limitations 
The limitations of this research can largely be attributed to the researcher. With 
only three years of non-immersive study, my Arabic language skills are conversational at 
best, which put limitations on verbal communication. I am white and Western, which 
alone greatly affected the way I was perceived, received, and accommodated by those 
encountered, including research participants. In my experiences living and working 
abroad, I understand that, though I was treated more hospitably than necessary, the 
information (hopefully initially) disclosed to me may not be wholly candid, given the 
uncertainty stemming from my exclusion from the community. I am also female, which, 
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in a society where a defining characteristic is a segregation of the genders, is significant. 
That influenced how I was received and perceived, by both men and women, as well as 
my own behaviour, particularly during participant observation. My gender excluded me 
from some private spaces and required most interviews to be conducted in public spaces, 
or, if conducted in a private setting, with a second participant, which in turn influences 
the content of the interviews. 
In the spirit of positionality, the fact that I am a migrant myself had a positive 
influence and strengthens my research. More blatant and practical is the ease of entry into 
social networks. Luckily, I had some exposure and experience in the local context prior to 
field research. Between 2009 and 2011, I resided in Muscat for six-months out the year. 
My father’s occupation brought our family there, and so between university semesters I 
would ‘go home’ for several months at a time. I had kept in touch with a couple of former 
work colleagues, and they warmly assisted me, even introducing me to a participant or 
two. In addition, two of my most important social connections were Omani females with 
whom I attended high school in Johannesburg, South Africa. They too assisted in the 
recruitment of participants. Our connection to South Africa ended up being helpful. I met 
one South African who then continuously introduced me to other South Africans at 
functions and gatherings, as if I had some connection to them because of our past 
residency there. In social situations, when asked why I was visiting Oman, disclosing my 
transnational migratory upbringing seemed to change the character of those encounters. I 
hesitate to say it was a form of collective identity, but there was a sense of solidarity from 
that shared experience.  In any case, it definitely created a rapport.  
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Fundamentally though, my migratory background afforded insights and 
understanding that I’m not certain a researcher without that experience would have. This 
topic is my life and I know it well because I lived it. However, because of the error 
inherent in interpretation and perception, I take care to acknowledge my positionality 
when discussing findings uncovered through observational methods. All attempts were 
made to mitigate the limitations of this research, beginning fundamentally with the 
variety of approaches to and methods of data collection, as discussed. It was an attempt to 
overlap methods and corroborate findings to ensure validity and reliability of this 
research endeavor.  
However, Henri Lefebvre (1991), in his attempt to unify theory and practice (both 
of inhabitants and architects) through the reconstruction of a shared spatial ‘code’, states 
that “the working out of the code calls itself for an effort to stay within the paradigmatic 
sphere: that is, the sphere of the essential hidden, implicit and unstated oppositions” as 
opposed to “the sphere of explicit relations…of operational links between terms… 
ordinary discourse…” (p. 65) Lefebvre argues that this code must correlate with a system 
of knowledge that, 
“situates itself…vis-à-vis non-knowledge (ignorance or misunderstanding); in other 
words, vis-à-vis the lived and the perceived. Such a knowledge is conscious of its own 
approximativeness: it is at once certain and uncertain. It announces its own relativity at 
each step, undertaking self-criticism, yet never allowing itself to become dissipated in 
apologias for non-knowledge, absolutely spontaneity or ‘pure’ violence. This knowledge 
must find a middle path between dogmatism on the one hand and the abdication of 
understanding on the other.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 65)  
 
With this in mind, instances where I do not understand the intended meaning of a 
participants’ statements, are am unsure of how collected data should be interpreted, 
feelings of uncertainty and ignorance and blatantly stated. 
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Thesis Overview 
Lefebvre (1991) discusses the problematic of space and states that the in the 
analysis of space and the social interactions embedded within space “the ideologically 
dominant tendency divides space into parts and parcels in accordance with the social 
division of labour” and because of these “partial representations….knowledge is 
confounded, integrated unintentionally into existing society’s framework. It is continually 
abandoning any global perspective, accepting fragmentation and so coming up with mere 
shards of knowledge.” (p. 91) Also, because the concept of space denotes and connotes 
all possible spaces, real or conceived, he also states that observation isn’t enough in that 
it doesn’t consider “the representational space that inhabitants have in their minds, which 
plays an integral role in social practice.” (p. 93) Lefebvre proposes that the mental, 
physical, and social components of space must be understood together, but “for the 
mental and the social to be reconnected, they first have to be clearly distinguished from 
one another, and the mediations between them reestablished…” (299) 
This thesis is an attempt to distinguish between the mental, physical, and social 
components of space in order to reconnect them to approach space in a unitary manner. 
The thesis will begin with a review of relevant literature, followed by a discussion of 
migration and development at the global, regional, and state scale in chapter 3. Following 
Henri Lefebvre’s guidelines for understanding social spaces, representations of space at 
the level of the city will be examined in chapter 4, including both the representations of 
the state and individual participants. Chapter 5 examines the representations of space at 
the neighbourhood level, again including the conceived space of both the state and 
Muscat residents. This includes also the physical/material elements of the state’s 
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production of space. Chapter 6 discusses the spatial practices of participants, and includes 
an examination of the mental maps, more active representations of space. Social space, 
particularly locations of socialization, will be discussed in chapter 7, and, finally, the 
impact of nation-building and migration upon identity will be discussed in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Space, Place, and Culture 
John Agnew defined place as location, locale, and sense of place. Locale refers to 
“the material setting for social relations – the actual shape of place within which people 
conduct their lives as individuals.” (Cresswell, 2004, p. 7) Drawing from the philosophy 
of phenomenology, Yi-Fu Tuan (1977)contributes to the discourse of human attachment 
to place with the emphasis on biological sensory experience. Concerned with how people 
come to know the world through the senses, Tuan stresses the emotional nature of 
humans, and challenges the positivist approach to human geography that separates the 
feeling being from the inhabited physical environment. Tuan underscores the role of 
human experience in differentiating space and place through the attachment of meaning 
to the latter.  
Tuan defines experience as “a cover-all term for the various modes through which 
a person knows and constructs a reality” (Tuan, 1977, p. 8). Included in this term are 
passive and active modes of reality construction, notably the senses. Experience involves 
both learning from the external world, which is passive, and actively seeking out “…the 
unfamiliar and experiment[ing] with the elusive and the uncertain” (Tuan, 1977, p. 9). 
Tuan further discusses the role of both emotion and thought in human experience. Stating 
that emotion affects thought, and thought affects experience, Tuan emphasizes the 
subjective nature of reality by inseparably joining emotion and thought, both of which are 
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“ways of knowing” (Tuan, 1977, p.10). Experience is not limited to sensations, but is 
influenced by thought and, importantly, feeling.  
Differentiating the concepts of space and place, Tuan says, “place is security, 
space is freedom: we are attached to the one and long for the other” (Tuan, 1977, p. 3). 
He that places are a kind of object that define space, and that place arises from extensive 
experience of and the ascription of value to space. He states that “objects and places are 
centers of value…to attend to them even momentarily is to acknowledge their reality and 
value” (Tuan, 1977, p. 18). But a place can only “achieve concrete reality when our 
experience of it is total, that is, through all the sense as well as with the active and 
reflective mind” (Tuan, 1977, p. 18). Places can lack the weight of reality because of 
limited experience, but humans “can become passionately attached to places of enormous 
size, such as a nation-state” without direct experience (Tuan, 1977, p. 18).  
The discussion of the role of biological sensory experience in the creation of place 
and the recognition of the human species as emotional, feeling beings are a significant 
contribution of Tuan. The idea that experience can be considered what is learned from 
dealings with the external world mirrors the conceptualization of culture as learned 
behaviour concerned with meaning. (Sewell, 1999, p. 41) 
He contributes to our understanding of the reciprocal relationship between 
humans and the physical environment through the illustration that humans not only 
modify their inhabited space but are affected by the manifestations of place. His reading 
helps to critically analyze the relationship between cultural practices and the physical 
environment because though he agrees that “culture is uniquely developed in human 
beings [and] strongly influences human behavior and values,” Tuan argues that culture is 
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not an adequate enough approach, given the existence of shared behaviours independent 
from culture, to comprehend the ways in which humans understand place and attach 
meaning to it (Tuan, 1977, p. 5). 
Given the variance of human experience, Tuan’s claim that concrete reality is 
only possible with total experience is unstable. He says that at first a neighbourhood is 
“…a confusion of images to the new resident; it is blurred space ‘out there.’” (Tuan, 
1977, p. 17) A neighbourhood becomes place as significant locations or objects within 
are identified and given value. Even briefly noticing objects and places is to acknowledge 
their reality and value. Until then, it is only space. Long-term residency in a place does 
not result in its concrete reality until we can reflect upon our experiences within it, but 
places “lack the weight of reality” when we do not know it intimately (Tuan, 1977, p. 
18). So then place is space that has been directly experienced and been given value and 
meaning. 
To complement the neighbourhood, the nation-state is a provided example of an 
expansive place that humans become attached to despite “limited direct experience” with 
it. (Tuan, 1977, p.18) I found it difficult to conceptualize the nation-state as place.  If 
space is a network of places, and places are directly experienced, one could consider the 
nation-state to be mythical space, which Tuan (1977) describes as a “...fuzzy area of 
defective knowledge, surrounding the empirically known; it frames pragmatic space.” (p. 
86) Tuan continues to say that in our modern world “…groups share a common store of 
hazy knowledge (myths) concerning a far larger field – the region or nation – in which 
their own local areas are imbedded…though inaccurate, it is necessary to the sense of 
reality of one’s empirical world.” (Tuan, 1977, p. 88) 
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The attempt to discern place from space leads one to question the ontological 
existence of place. Mitchell argues that culture “is a victim of infinite regress,” that if it 
exists ontologically, then it “...must be definable in an internally coherent and inclusive 
manner.” (Mitchell, 1995, p. 107) Tuan states that “the ideas of space and place require 
each other for definition,” and that we cannot define one without referring to the other, 
equally undefinable concept. (Tuan, 1977, p. 7) 
The problem of scale in the definition of place also lends to the idea of infinite 
regress. Both the neighbourhood and a place of residency within it are objects/places, as 
is a room within the place of residency. If an expansive territory like the nation-state can 
be considered place because of felt attachment, then the attachment of value to the planet 
is reason enough for it to be considered place. Indeed, any named location is a particular 
object about which humans feel deeply. This raises the question at what scale is place 
situated, and if there are limitations as to what can be considered place. 
Tim Cresswell (2004) unpacks the concept of place, and says there are many 
different manifestations of place because places are ongoing creations that “…are being 
made, maintained, and contested.” (p. 5) In addition to the where and material form, 
place must also have a sense of place, or “the subjective and emotional attachment people 
have to place.” (Cresswell, 2004, p. 7)  For Cresswell places are spaces that have been 
made meaningful. He states that when humans invest meaning into space, in the context 
of power, then place is created, but that this conception of place “is confused someone 
what by the idea of social space, or socially produced space – which, in many ways, plays 
the same role as place.” (Cresswell, 2004, p. 10) This is comparable to what Tuan says, 
that humans “…try to embody their feelings, images, and thoughts in tangible material” 
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the result of which is architectural and sculptural space.” (Tuan, 1977, p. 17) There is a 
modification of both culture and place wherein individuals, attempting to convey their 
human experiences, are directly involved. Place, then, like culture, is a human 
construction that in turn acts back on humans as they experience the environment.  
To Mitchell (1995) culture “is seen as an attribute of (or attributable to) distinct, 
bounded, localized social entities…culture is ‘an image of the world, of oneself and one’s 
community” (p. 105). It is a way to render the complexity of the human experience 
orderly. The same argument can be made about the concept of place; that it is a way of 
organizing “undifferentiated space” for the purpose of creating an orienting image of the 
world, within which community and self are located. (Tuan, 1977, p. 7). Mitchell (1995) 
states that “the stuff of culture…is elusive, best approached obliquely in terms of the 
processes through which meanings are constructed, negotiated, and experienced” (p. 
106).  
Landscape, Culture, and Power 
With regards to relations of power in the process of culture and place-making, 
Mitchell discusses “critical infrastructure” and the individuals responsible for the 
production of culture. (Mitchell, 1995, p. 111) He defines the critical infrastructure as 
“those workers whose job it is to implement ideas about culture, to solidify culture in 
place, to produce what gets called ‘culture,’” This includes art critics and creative types, 
Mitchell states the practices of the critical infrastructure translate art and intellectual 
works into “reified culture.” (Mitchel, 1995, p. 111) He goes further to argue that the 
critical infrastructure creates cultural capital; It is their role to ensure that cultural goods 
and practices become commodities and are “…incorporated into systems of capital 
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circulation and that they become known as emblems of culture.” (Mitchell, 1995, p. 111) 
and that “what gets called culture is thoroughly implicated in the continual reproduction 
of everyday. It is inseparable from relations of production and consumption – and of 
power.” (Mitchell, 1995, p. 112)  
With a critical geography approach, Tim Cresswell (2004) provides insight from 
social theory and social analysis and contributes to the discourse of ideology and 
transgression with the emphasis on the role of place in the constitution and maintenance 
of ideology.  Stressing the idea that society both produces and is reproduced by space, 
Cresswell attempts to explain “how and why place is a powerful force in…ongoing 
hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles.” (Cresswell, 2004, p. 13) 
In the third chapter of In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and 
Transgression, entitled The Crucial ‘Where’ of Graffiti, Tim Cresswell provides support 
for his claim that the examination of place in cultural and social processes can aid in the 
understanding of ideology and power in effecting the everyday behaviour of individuals. 
Cresswell demonstrates that the practice of graffiti results in the transformation of the 
meaning of New York by challenging the hegemonic ideology’s image of the city. With 
particular attention given to the dominant power’s response to graffiti, he argues that the 
“investigation the ‘out-of-place’ metaphor points to the fact that social power and social 
resistance are always already spatial.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 11) 
Tim Cresswell outlines with what definition of ideology he is operating. Goren 
Therborn argues that ideology establishes and models “how human beings live their lives 
as conscious, reflecting initiators of acts in a structured meaningful world” which include 
defining what exists and does not exist, what is good and appropriate (as well as what is 
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not) and what is either possible or impossible. (Cresswell, 2004, p. 14) This allows for a 
defense of the ideological stance on a given subject, making ideology not just a system of 
beliefs and values, but riddled with various power dynamics, making ideology “meaning 
in the service of power.” (Cresswell, 2004, p. 14) 
Cresswell also states that ideology is not a class phenomenon, and that there is 
positional ideology, which “subjects one to, and qualifies, one for, a particular position in 
the world of which one is a member” and there is inclusive ideology that defines the 
individual as a member, like nationalism. (Cresswell, 1996, p. 15) This is a significant 
point to understand for the discussion of graffiti, in that positional ideology makes an 
individual not only aware of their own position but also aware of those in different 
positions: ‘others’.  Positional ideology allows for one to be aware of what’s in-place 
through the awareness of what is out-of-place, a crucial geographic metaphor, showing 
that ideological contestation has always had a spatial component.  
So it is established that ideology, in deciding what is appropriate, and good, and 
possible, greatly affect the actions of individuals. These practices are carried out after one 
has read the place, and behaves accordingly. However, by altering practices within a 
place based on what ideology deems appropriate, practice therefore informs place. This 
idea of appropriate practice makes actions seem “…natural, self-evident, and 
commonsense.” (Cresswell, 1996, p.16)  However, practice “ is simultaneously a form of 
consumption…and a form of production….By acting in space in a particular way the 
actor is inserted into a particular relation with ideology.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 17) 
Cresswell (1996) states that “meaning is invoked in space through the practice of people 
who act according to their interpretations of space, which, in turn, gives their actions 
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meaning.” (p. 17)This is a fluid and mutating process. But the crucial point to be made 
about commonsense is that it is a mechanism of domination, or doxa. It fosters an 
adherence to a perceived natural order, when in reality it is a method of reproducing an 
object condition, an “established order,” despite individuals’ subjective beliefs. 
(Cresswell, 1996, pp. 18-19) Doxa become orthodoxy when individuals begin to question 
the legitimacy of commonsense through the awareness of alternatives.  
Cresswell (1996) argues that the reactions to graffiti, evident in language use, by 
the media, the government, and individual citizens signaled the existence of a fear that 
there was disorder in the city.  He writes, 
“Reaction to graffiti describes it as a threat to order- as out of place- in two main ways: 
(1) by suggesting through a mass of metaphors and descriptive terms that graffiti does not 
belong in New York’s public places and (2) by associating it with other places- other 
contexts- where either the order is different and more amenable to graffiti or disorder is 
more prevalent.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 37)  
The words used to suggest that graffiti was out of place in New York includes 
words such as dirt, pollution, and garbage. The spatial component of such word choice is 
evidence of graffiti’s out-of-placeness, given that, for example, “the meaning of dirt is 
dependent on its location.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 38)  
Dirt isn’t necessarily disgusting if it’s in its proper place, but becomes disgusting 
when it is where it should not be. The meaning of dirt depends on its position to other 
things, there, then, exists a symbolic order or hierarchy.  “Symbolic orders are 
constructed through and by power, and filth represents the ‘objective frailty’ of that 
order. When graffiti is labeled as filth it is an acknowledgment of the threat that it poses 
to order.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 39) Another similar choice of language is to refer to 
graffiti as a disease, plague, or contagion. Cresswell states that “implicit in the use of 
disease terms in the anti-graffiti rhetoric is the idea of separation and confinement. The 
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causes of disease need to be isolated; carriers need to be quarantined. Like dirt, a disease 
is a disorder with spatial implications.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 41)  
Cresswell identifies “the paradox of graffiti as art” in that at the same time the 
practice of graffiti was criminalized, othered, and recognized as anarchic by the 
government authorities, it was taken out of the public spaces and into art galleries by the 
‘authorities’ of culture. (Cresswell, 1996, p. 50) This placed graffiti in its appropriate 
place, making it art instead of “a tactic of the marginalized,” as it was now conforming to 
the dominant ideology’s idea of proper place. “In effect, the art world has transformed 
and commodified graffiti by displacing it.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 50) 
This relates to Don Mitchell’s argument about cultural mediation by the critical 
infrastructure. Cresswell states that as graffiti was being reconstituted as art “by the 
secular magic of displacement.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 52) This relocation from the streets 
to the art galleries can be seen as a strategy of the dominant ideology to undermine the 
challenge to the current order that the practice of graffiti poses. “The criminality of 
graffiti,” Cresswell argues, “…lies in its being seen, in its transgression of official 
appearances. To take this and put it in a gallery negates its criminality as well as its 
meaning” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 58). Money is being spent to remove graffiti from public 
places but money is also being spent to be added into private places. Indeed Mitchell was 
also in agreement, arguing that “what gets called culture is thoroughly implicated in the 
continual reproduction of everyday. It is inseparable from relations of production and 
consumption – and of power.” (Mitchell, 1996, p. 112) 
The questioning of doxa is a fundamental form of resistance to and struggle with 
the hegemonic ideology. Transgression is the crossing of a boundary between what the 
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dominant ideology describes and good or appropriate. Transgression becomes resistance 
when the intentionality of the transgressor is purposeful, or intent on challenging or 
changing the hegemonic orthodoxy. In the third chapter, Cresswell argues that the 
material defacement of the city infrastructure is not the real issue at stake, it is the image 
of New York City that is most critical.  The presence of graffiti, giving the impression of 
disorder, is “….destroying the proper significance (meanings) of the carefully controlled 
facades of the urban environment.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 46) Graffiti is made criminal 
because “…it subverts the authority of urban space and asserts the triumph (however 
fleeting) of the individual over the monuments of authority.” The built environment, upon 
which graffiti is drawn, are the concrete constructions of appropriate meanings, as 
reasoned by the dominant ideology. This “hegemonic landscape is one that is never static 
and fixed but always, sometimes minutely, changing as a result of the continuing struggle 
between dominant and subordinate cultural groups.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 57)  Place is 
used by both to either dominate or resist the other, and  
The practice of graffiti is contesting this meaning and creating their own. 
Cresswell provides insight into power relations and ideological contestation of place, and 
the reciprocal effect of place and practice, and how this alters culture. Indeed, the 
subordinate ideology effectively challenged and altered the image of New York City, as 
is evident in “the choice by Disney World (the supreme court of representations) to 
represent New York City not with the Empire State Building or the Statue of Liberty but 
with a graffiti-covered subway train.” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 37) 
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Place and Identity 
Identities are not static or immutable, or singular, but are acquired through a 
lifetime of lived experiences. They are negotiating and constructed in the public sphere, 
where locality, space, and place influence the identity created. David and Bar Tal (2014) 
summarizes that social identity is formulated through the categorization of individuals 
into groups, the categorization of the self into a group, designation of meaning, and the 
characterization of other groups in comparison. The second a desire to distinguish one’s 
own social group from other groups. Collective identity is “a joint awareness and 
recognition that members of a group share the same social identity” (David & Bar Tal, 
2014, p. 356). The nation is such a collective identity. It is “a community of people whose 
members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national 
consciousness” (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 42).  
National identity is fluid and dynamic, and feelings of belonging to the nation are 
based on elements that vary. Guibernau i Berdún (2007) outlines five dimensions of 
national identity: psychological, cultural, territorial, historical, and political. National 
identities also exist at various spatial scales, and the state is contemporary in relation to 
other longstanding affiliations. The spatial identity of a nation is “composed of land 
deemed essential to its security and vitality” (Kaplan & Herb, 1999, p. 3). This land 
consists of the actual inhabited space, the terrain that defines the group in a significant 
way, historical legacy of a territory, and specific natural or strategic importance. (Kaplan 
& Herb, 1999, p. 3).  
The debate within the literature on the concept of the nation can be divided into 
two broad camps. The primordialist perspective of nationalism views nations as 
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inevitable entities that arise organically; a “collective answers to the call of the blood” 
(Herb, 1999, p. 14). Commonalities can be identified amongst the varying explanatory 
theories of the nation, the first of which is the stronger loyalty evoked by the nation in its 
members than other communities. The membership is “collectively self-defined,” and its 
cohesiveness is in large part dependent on an us-and-them distinction, wherein us is 
superior to them. The second commonality of the nation has a long shared history, real or 
myth, giving legitimacy to the community. Lastly, the nation has either a destiny or 
shared goal to “enforce and preserve the unique character of its community” (Herb, 1999, 
p. 16). There is a desire to distinguish one’s own social group from other groups. 
  Constructivists see nations as artificial creations, or “imagined communities” 
(Anderson, 1991). The process of nation formation is undertaken by individuals for a 
purpose. The nation is defined as a project of the elites, the result of structural changes, a 
discourse of domination, and “bounded communities of exclusion and opposition” (Herb, 
1999, p. 15). In Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson (1991) ultimately argues “that 
the very possibility of imagining the nation only arose historically when, and where, three 
fundamental cultural conceptions, all of great antiquity, lost their axiomatic grip on men’s 
minds.” (p. 36) These three cultural conceptions include the idea of sacral scripted 
language as the only access to the truth, the concept that society was naturally centered 
on a divinely-ordained monarch, and lastly, the idea of temporality.  
Anderson provides a working definition of the nation as “an imagined political 
community…imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” (Anderson, 1991, p. 6) 
Anderson states that it is imagined because the members will never know the majority of 
the nation’s other members, yet have an image or sense of unity. The nation is also seen 
 41 
as limited because it has confining, finite borders, and, lastly, is imagined as sovereign 
because the concept was created in the age of Enlightenment, which was eroding the 
legitimacy of divinely-ordained rule. Lastly, the nation is imagined as a community 
because it is “conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” despite the inequality and 
exploitation that likely exists within. (Anderson, 1991, p. 6) 
The rise of the concept of the nation occurred during the century of 
Enlightenment, which was characterized by rationalist secularism and the decline in 
religious modes of thought. Religion served to explain human suffering and respond to 
“obscure intimations of immortality, generally by transforming fatality into continuity,” 
connecting the dead with the yet unborn. (Anderson, 1991, p. 11) So, Anderson argues, 
what was required then, with the rise of secular rationalism and the decline of religious 
thought, “…a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into 
meaning…” and the idea of a nation was best suited for this end. (Anderson, 1991, p. 11) 
Each religious community, the Islamic Ummah, and Christendom, for example, 
were not territorial in nature but “…imaginable largely through the medium of sacred 
language and written script.” (Anderson, 1991, p. 13) Each community saw itself and 
central and was confident in the sacredness of its language, to say that it had privileged 
access to divine power. Coupled with this was the idea that society was organized 
hierarchically rather than horizontally. The result was “…a conception of the world, 
shared by virtually everyone that the bilingual intelligentsia, by mediating between the 
vernacular and Latin, mediated between earth and heaven.” (Anderson, 1991, pp. 15-16)  
The decline in the religious community was the result of explorations that 
“widened the cultural and geographic horizons and men’s conception of possible forms of 
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human life.” (Anderson, 1991, p. 16) This exposure and exploration fosters the idea of 
the territorialization of faith and society. This was also accompanied by the demotion, at 
a quick pace, of sacred language in favour of local vernacular. In addition, “the automatic 
legitimacy of sacral monarchy began its slow decline in Western Europe” during the 17th 
century. (Anderson, 1991, p. 21) 
Anderson states that, “beneath the decline of sacred communities, languages, and 
lineages, a fundamental change was taking place in modes of apprehending the world, 
which, more than anything else, made it possible to ‘think’ of the nation” (Anderson, 
1991, p.22). He argues that the visual and aural mediation of religious conceptions to the 
illiterate masses over a vast territorial area meant that “…however vast Christnedom 
might be…it manifested itself variously to particular Swabian or Andalusian 
communities as replications of themselves.” (Anderson, 1991, p. 23)  
With this came the idea of simultaneity, which is “…traverse, cross-time, marked 
not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock 
and calendar.” (Anderson, 1991, p. 24) Prior to this idea of simultaneity, Anderson argues 
that medieval Christians had no conception of history as a chain of cause and effect 
events.  The result of this is the conception was individuals are embedded in societies, or 
sociological organism, and the sociological entity is also embedded within the mind. 
(Anderson, 1991, pp. 25-26).  Seeing the sociological organism moving through this 
empty time “is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a 
solid community moving steadily down (or up) history.” (Anderson, 1991, p. 26) 
Anderson’s ultimate argument is that nationalism and the nation is a constructed 
cultural artefact arising out of a specific historical context, marked by the decline in 
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religious conceptions and modes of thought and world exploration. Anderson provides a 
working definition of the nation as “an imagined political community…imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.” (Anderson, 1991, p. 6) Anderson states that it is 
imagined because the members will never know the majority of the nation’s other 
members, yet have an image or sense of unity. The nation is also seen as limited because 
it has confining, finite borders, and, lastly, is imagined as sovereign because the concept 
was created in the age of Enlightenment, which was eroding the legitimacy of divinely-
ordained rule. Lastly, the nation is imagined as a community because it is “conceived as a 
deep, horizontal comradeship” despite the inequality and exploitation that likely exists 
within. (Anderson, 1991, p. 6)  
Anderson argues that nationalism and the nation is a constructed cultural artefact 
arising out of a specific historical context, and that nationalism served to replace religious 
thought as a unifying and loyalty-creating sentiment. National consciousness is often 
deployed by state and local actors for a specific political end. Connor would agree, citing 
the speeches of national elites as evidence that nationalist sentiments and “the stirring of 
national consciousness is…a ploy utilized by aspiring elites…” (Anderson, 1991, pp.73-
74) It is persuasively argued that modernization, industrialization, and capitalism created 
the need for membership to a larger community in “societies that were stratified by class” 
to address the void of belonging that resulted from modernization. (Herb, 1999, p. 14) In 
this light, nationalism can be seen as “a sociological necessity” (Herb, 1999, p. 14) 
National Identity and Place 
Given that space and place are central to human experience and attachment, 
territory is an essential component of constructed national identity, helping “weld 
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together fragmented individual and group experiences into a common nation story. The 
territory creates a collective consciousness by reinventing itself as homeland” (Herb, 
1999, p. 17). The goal of preserving the exceptionality of the community is what 
politicizes the nation. Whereas a nation is a community that shares a common history 
with a distinct culture, the state “is a legal and political organization with the power to 
require obedience and loyalty from its citizens” (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 42).  The goal 
of the nation-state is to create a homogenous population and construct a distinct national 
identity to foster feelings of belonging. The construction of one national identity within 
the state as critical for stability and the retention of power and authority. This is of 
particular importance in nondemocratic systems, like the monarchical Gulf States, where 
legitimacy of the ruling family, or families, is questioned given the lack of popular 
participation. But spatial identities of the state and the nation are not aligned, but blurred, 
overlapping, and muddled. Spatial identity “manifests itself in spatial forms that are 
distinct from the spatial identity associated with the state” and continue to diverge and 
evolve (Kaplan, 1999, p. 35). 
David Kaplan (1999) argues that the acceptance of the sovereign territorial state 
structure promoted the process of nation-building. The modern state challenges “the 
primacy of national identity although it has enabled national identity to assume its present 
characteristics and dominance” (p. 33). That is to say, legitimacy and recognition 
afforded to states compels “stateless,” or non-territorial entities like the nation, “to 
accommodate themselves to a state-centric order” to gain recognition. This in turn 
promotes the process nation-building, seeing the nation-state as “the best guarantor of 
political stability.” (Kaplan, 1999, p. 33). Loyalty to the state is dependent upon the 
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legitimization of the national identity it constructs. The state fosters a unitary national 
identity through social, cultural, and political means. Creating a national identity involves 
disseminating an image of the nation, the creating and spread of cultural symbols, values, 
and rituals to reinforce a sense of community belonging. The institutional use of a 
national language, and promotion of national dress are ways in which the image of the 
nation is reinforced, and belonging to the nation strengthened.  
The territorial state is a vehicle to carry out nation-building activities, specifically 
through territorial control (Kaplan, 1999). The role of territories in identity formation is 
the active transformation of the elements within the territory.  The state modifies territory 
to meet this objection of national identity by symbolic and material modification of 
territory. This could entail the placement of monuments or symbolic representations of 
the shared history throughout the state, large-scale development projects of high 
visibility, and specific language used for signage (Kaplan, 1999, pp. 21-23).  
Globalization, Place, and Identity 
International migration is both driven by and a component of globalization, thus 
making it an important context for understanding contemporary migration. “The world is 
experiencing unprecedented interconnectedness in terms of the speed of such connection, 
their extensity (the reach of these connections), and their intensity (the density and 
strength of those connections)” (Samers, 2010, p. 71). Many scholars view globalization 
as a transformation of the global economy through the spread of neoliberal ideology, 
resulting in the homogenization of culture, the opening of economies to foreign 
investment, promotion of export-led industrialization, and the privatization of public 
goods. (Samers, 2010, p. 72).  Globalization and “the inter-state economic activity have a 
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profound effect on territorially-based identities, giving rise to bifocal identities, 
biculturalism, and other non-territorial alternatives to national identity.” (Kaplan, 1999, p. 
42-43). The academic preoccupation with migration results a failure to account for the 
plurality of individual experiences regarding identity and belonging. Discussion of 
migrants also tends to view migrants as temporary, despite the fact that in many locations 
“the South Asian-dominated neighbourhoods…are into their second, third, or even fourth 
generation.” (Vora, 2013, p. 3) 
Research on labour migration to the Gulf largely focuses on oil development as 
the defining determinant of migration, despite the presence of a longstanding historical 
relationship between South Asia and the Gulf and robust social networks. Migrants’ 
decisions are motivated by purely economic reasons. This approach to migration views 
migrants as “an ‘apolitical,’ ‘transient,’ and ‘disposable’ workforce convenient for 
patrimonial rulers trying to overcome the dilemmas of modernization.” (Chalcraft, 2012, 
67) 
According to Baubock (2008) transnationalism “refers to processes and activities 
that transcend international borders” and these activities and processes occur “within the 
limited social and geographic spaces of a particular set of countries…” and, notably, 
“involves non-state actors.” (p. 2) Technological advancements of communications and 
transportation have greatly facilitated transnational migration.  Dependency Theory 
argues that the underdevelopment of the third world is the result of resource (including 
labour) exploitation through colonization, and that this exploitation is being continued in 
the postcolonial period through the domination of the former colonial powers in the 
global political economy and the implementation of policies and regulations with unequal 
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beneficial outcomes. World Systems Theory (Amin 1974, Wallerstein, 1984) arose from 
Dependency Theory, and emphasized the multinational corporate presence within the 
less-developed ‘periphery’ and the acceleration of urbanization, population displacement, 
and growth of poverty that ensued. (Samers, 2010, p.  26) This approach viewed 
international migration as another way for the core capitalist economies to maintain 
dominance over the periphery and the continuation of their dependence on the core. Dual 
Labour Market Theory emphasizes factors that pull migrants to certain locations rather 
than the factors driving individuals to emigrate.  Piore (1979) that the presence of a dual 
labour market, consisting of a primary and secondary sector, in rich countries drives 
migration. The primary sector is has the hire-paying occupations with better working 
conditions and opportunities for advancement. This sector is dominated by national 
workers. The secondary sector is dominated by migrant workers and consists of low-
paying, and unstable positions with poor working conditions and little opportunity for 
promotion. Because it is difficult to attract the national population to these secondary 
sector occupations, employers look to foreign workers to fill such roles in the economy. 
(Samers, 2010, p. 65) Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) proposed Labour Market 
Segmentation Theory to address the oversimplified and inaccurate aspects of the Dual 
Labour Market Theory. A grouping of job positions, or segments, within the labour 
market have differing pay rates, working conditions, and promotional opportunities. A 
worker’s assigned segment is based on their individual attributes, including level of 
educational attainment, language skills, and qualifications, but also stereotypes of race, 
nationality, and gender, and employer assumptions about worker suitability based on 
these stereotypes, which could have positive or negative outcomes for the worker. 
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(Samers, 2010, p. 130) Peck (1996), arguing that segmentation of the labour market can 
be explained by the demand for labour (based on production requirements), regulations 
(immigration and labour), and social factors (like the role of families), added a crucial 
component to this theory; The processes responsible for the segmentation of the labour 
market are locally constituted, emphasizing the importance of space and locality in the 
character of the labour market. (Samers, 2010, p. 131).  
Michael Samers (2010) discusses the dismissal by geographers of the idea that 
globalization eradicates culture diversity and uniqueness of ‘place’ and informs and 
determines local happenings. “Rather, the global is in the local, and the local is in the 
global, and we should instead speak of a ‘global sense of place.’” (Massey, 1994) 
Because of the human capacity for abstraction and attachment, globalization and 
transnationalism have amplified the rise of bifocal identities, multiculturalism, and other 
non-territorial alternatives to national identity (Kaplan, 1999, pp. 42-43). The term 
diaspora is commonly used to reference transnational immigrant communities originating 
from the same homeland who maintain cultural linkages and social networks once settled.  
There are, according to Baubock, four elements to diaspora which include, 
“traumatic dispersal from a homeland; resistance against full assimilation and retention of 
a distinct group identity in countries of settlement across multiple generations; horizontal 
ties of solidarity and joint activity between groups of the same origin settled in different 
places; and homeland-oriented projects to shape that country’s future by influencing it 
from abroad or by returning there” (Baubock, 2008, p.  2)  
The impact of transnational migration on national identity varies. Baubock (2008) 
discusses the challenges of transnational migration on both sending and receiving 
countries. He mentions political threats and divided loyalties, and the outbound flow of 
remittances as potential challenges to the state. The variables at play include the volume 
of migrants to the same locality and the robustness of social networks, time-scale of 
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immigration, the ethnicity of the migrant, her skills or economic standing, attitudes and 
institutions of the receiving state, and values of the host population. (Guibernau i Berdún, 
2007, p. 63) These factors are unique to the location of destination for migrants, and thus 
the migration experience and its impacts on identity vary by destination. 
Social networks are the ties that bind all migrants and non-migrants with and 
between the countries of origin and destination, but are a way of mediating between 
larger structural forces and individual agency. Networks connect the societal and 
individual migration motivations. The settlement patterns of migrants are dependent upon 
several locality-specific factors. Community formation can be influenced by economic 
factors, like cost of living, and social factors, including existing migrant social networks. 
In environments where racism and discrimination are strong, residential concentration 
persists. The degree to which migrants assimilate into the dominant, national culture is 
dependent upon their reception in the destination country. Samers (2010) quotes Goss 
and Lindquist (2005), who  reject the idealized concept of migrant networks, providing 
an alternative view of these connections as migrant institutions, described as, 
“A relatively permanent feature of social life that results from the regularization of 
social interaction for the purposes of overseas employment and which in turn regulate 
interaction and structures of access to overseas employment through the operation of 
institutional rules and resources. It is usually a complex institution consisting of 
knowledgeable individuals and the agents of organizations (from migrant associations 
to multinational corporations…and other institutions (from kinship to the state).” 
(Samers, 2010, p.  105) 
 
In whatever case, migrant networks are an important component of 
transnationalism, or the binding of widely dispersed migrants through multiple cultural, 
ethnic, social, and political ties. Transnationalism has been conceptualized as “the 
processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
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together their societies of origin and settlement” (Samers, 2010, p. 94). The settlement 
patterns of migrants have an impact on identity as well, and are dependent upon several 
factors. Community formation can be influenced by economic factors, like cost of living, 
and social factors, including existing migrant social networks. In environments where 
racism and discrimination are strong, residential concentration persists. The degree to 
which migrants assimilate into the dominant, national culture is dependent upon their 
reception in the destination country. 
In addition to the impact place has on migrant settlement patterns and feelings of 
belonging, Tara Polzer Ngwato (2011) argues for the acknowledge of place to as an 
important component in “understanding migrant–host relationships and the integration 
process, specifically how both ‘migrant’ and ‘host’ group identities can be constructed in 
relation to each other and in relation to the spaces they respectively (are seen to) occupy. 
(p. 570) Management of the foreign population includes different methods of exclusion 
and marginalization. One of the “most enduring legacies of the nineteenth century was 
the introduction of a new notion of citizenship, whereby political loyalty was directed 
towards a particular territorial entity” (Choueiri, 2005, p. 301).  Conferring rights of 
membership, citizenship in the nation-state context, and excluding others from rights and 
benefits afforded to the nation is an important component of nation-building (Guibernau i 
Berdún, 2007, p. 25).  “Planning and zoning…seemingly harmless development projects 
can be exposed to carefully designed nation-building strategies that serve the interest of 
one nation at the expense of another” (Herb, 1999, p. 23).  For example, social separation 
has been purposefully planned in Dubai’s urbanization through the placement of 
shopping malls in areas that are accessible only by cars, further highlighting the 
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socioeconomic differences between the native and immigrant communities. Research on 
migrants’ public spaces in Dubai, characterized as “transitory spaces,” are intended to 
discourage the formation of “spatial attachments to a city that is not meant to be theirs” 
(Elsheshtawy, 2008, p. 10). 
Social exclusion and cultural marginalization involves material exclusion, like 
exclusion from salaried occupations, hire education, and social welfare services, or a 
broader exclusion, from government reports or media representations, effectively 
rendering migrant communities invisible. (Samers, 2010, p. 266). The self-definition and 
othering of migrant workers is of importance in the Gulf, simply because local 
populations are usually small in comparison to the foreign population. 
Cultural marginalization, often a response to perceived threats to cultural security, 
further excludes immigrant communities. Peck (1996), arguing that segmentation of the 
labour market can be explained by the demand for labour (based on production 
requirements), regulations (immigration and labour), and social factors (like the role of 
families), added a crucial component to this theory; The processes responsible for the 
segmentation of the labour market are locally constituted, emphasizing the importance of 
space and locality in the character of the labour market. (Samers, 2010, p. 131). The 
rentier mentality amongst a host population alters the popular perception of the Other, in 
turn affecting the reception of migrants and therefore settlement choices and the degree 
of acculturation.  
The Global City 
It has been argued that migration from poor states to richer states would not have 
happened if ‘global cities’ did not develop, migration has aided the development of these 
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cities. Global cities are products of “the increased mobility of capital and labour and they 
are the sites of new notions of membership, solidarity, and violence” (van der Veer, 2004, 
p. 177). 
Global cities emerged in the 1970s as centers for multinational corporations and 
‘producer services’, creating a demand for highly skilled labour, but in turn creating a 
demands for low-income migrant labour , “a veritable army of low-income migrants 
[that] increasingly work in the restaurants where the wealthy dine, clean the homes and 
offices where the wealthy live and work, and care for their children and elderly parents” 
(Samers, 2010, p.  74) Existing literature also argues that the presence of a low-income 
migrant workforce within these cities perpetuates the segmentation of the labour market, 
and reinforcing the demand for cheap migrant labour. 
Cultural engagement within the global city is largely reactive to the dislocations 
of migration. New collective identities are constructed in the encounters with the Other, 
“which is often anonymous and indifferent, but sometime violent when spatial markings 
of identity are violated.” (van der Veer, 2004, p. 177). Exclusion of and cultural hostility 
towards foreign populations, arising out of perceptions of the foreign other,  greatly 
influence the sense of belonging for migrants, and in response, migrants can adopt the 
dominant culture, reject it entirely, or negotiate both cultures, influencing the 
representations of the ‘local’ culture. (Samers, 2010, p. 269) 
The global city can be cosmopolitan rather than parochial which is “…first of all 
an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It entails an intellectual and 
esthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than 
uniformity” (van der Veer, 2004, p. 167) Exclusion inhibits feelings of belonging and 
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limit migrant loyalty and attachment. With regards to loyalty, considering the 
problematic nature of even defining identity, the location of ‘home’ is less important than 
feeling at home where one resides. Accepting this to be true “does not require that people 
abandon their legacies, only that they recognize the historicity of their cultural identities, 
and that those identities are subject to change in the course of historical counters.” 
(Dirlik, 2004, p. 157). In essence, identity is not a given based on cultural background, 
but is a matter of identification of self and community. Therefore, state and civic loyalty 
is a matter of self-identity and a sense of belonging. 
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CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND 
 
Oman: An Introduction 
The Sultanate of Oman is located in Southwestern Asia in the Persian Gulf, 
bordering Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. To its south and east is 
the Indian Ocean. The terrain is rugged and mountainous, with an incredibly expansive 
coastline.  The climate of the coast 
is hot and incredibly humid. 
Muscat, the current capital city and 
most populated governorate, is 
located along the coast in the 
northeast of the country on the Gulf 
of Oman. It is from this area of 
coastline that maritime trade 
connections were generated 
between Oman, the Gulf, the Indian 
subcontinent and eastern Africa.  
According to the National Centre for Statistics and Information (NCSI),in 2016 
the total Omani population is estimated to be 2,427,825, and increasing quite steadily 
given the age structure of the population. However, the total population of Oman is 
estimated to be just over 4 million with the inclusion of the population of migrants within 
the territory, estimated at 1,986,226 (See Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.1: Political Map of Oman 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2014) 
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There are eight provinces or 
governorates, or wilayat, of Oman 
(Figure 3.3). Along the coast, Muscat is 
its own governorate. North of the capital 
city along the coast is the Batinah, which 
extends to the city of Sohar. Musandam, 
a peninsula jutting into the Strait of 
Hormuz, is another. From Muscat to Sur, 
the southern portion of the greater coast 
extending slightly inland, is known as the 
Sharqiyah.  As for the interior of the 
country, the Dakhliyah is due west of 
Omani National Non- Omani National 
Figure 3.2: Omani and Non-Omani population estimates, 2002-2016 
Source: National Center for Statistics and Information (NCSI) 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Oman’s Population 
by Governorate; Source: NCSI (2010) 
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Muscat across the Hajar range. North of the Dakhaliyah is Dharirah and Buraimi, which 
is largely part of the ‘Empty Quarter’ of the Arabian Peninsula.  South of the Sharqiyah 
region is the Wusta governorate 
Just to the west of Muscat, the capital, running parallel to the coastline, is the Hajar 
mountain range, “which separates the two main axes of the traditional Omani nation – the 
coast and the interior – from one another” (Jones and Ridout, 3). The Hajar mountain 
range has influenced, and continues to influence, the distribution of the population. The 
climate of the interior is drier than the coast, and because of its isolation, the interior of 
the country relied on and livestock 
shepherding and subsistence agriculture, 
where possible, rather than trade connections. 
As evident in the topographical map (Figure 
3.4), there is very little land in Oman that is 
viable for agriculture. The plateau area 
referred to as Jabal Akhdar (Green 
Mountain), given its elevation and cooler 
temperatures, allows for terraced agriculture. 
The southernmost part of Oman in Dhofar 
which, like Jabal Akdhar, allows for cultivation of crops given the presence of mountains 
that limit the encroachment of dessert, and the region’s seasonal monsoon rains (Jones & 
Ridout, 2015, pp. 3-6). However, the northern coastal plain, the Batinah plain, holds the 
majority of the territory’s agriculturally viable land, and not surprisingly, the majority of 
the population is settled in this area. (Figure 3.5: Population Density) 
Figure 3.4: Topographical Map of Oman 
Source: ETH Studio Basel (2013) 
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In addition to influencing population settlement and distribution, this mountain 
range also influences cultural, social, and political life within the territory, The Hajar 
mountain range is a significant barrier to 
travel, and has played a significant role in 
the diverging nature of society between the 
‘traditional’ interior and the cosmopolitan 
port cities along the coast. There has always 
been political and economic distinctions 
made between the coast and the interior of 
Oman, particularly important is the political 
distinction between the two. This is 
reflected in the country’s original name, 
Muscat and Oman. The coast was a dynastic 
Sultanate, whereas the interior was an 
Imamate rule by religious leaders.  
Given the varying degrees of 
contact and isolation between tribes, and between the inhabitants of the coast and interior 
regions, there were, and still are, multiple spatial identities amongst these initial Arab 
communities within the state territory, manifesting in differences in language, dress, 
religious interpretation and practice, diet, and the like. Given this plurality of cultural 
practice and values amongst the early Arab inhabitants of the territory, it becomes rather 
unfeasible to identify which cultural practices are authentically Omani, if any.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Population Density 
Source: ETH Studio Basel (2013) 
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Initial Migration and Settlement  
Making identification of authentic Omani culture and identity more difficult is the 
migrant origins of the early Arab inhabitants. There were two major migrations of Arabs 
into the territory known as Muscat and Oman. The first phase of Arab migration came 
from the South, Yemen, into the Dhofar region and subsequently north thereafter. The 
second migration of Arabs came from the North through Buraimi. These migrants came 
into contact with Persians of the Sassinad Empire, who occupied the area, exerting 
indirect control, until roughly the seventh century. (Jones & Ridout, 2015, pp. 6-9) In 
addition to the Sassanid Empire, the coast of Oman was occupied briefly by the 
Portuguese in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans in the seventeenth century, impressing 
upon the population cultural aspects. More influential is the sustained British presence in 
Oman since their control of the Indian Ocean arena during the height of imperialism. 
Trade and Empire-building 
In addition to these initial migrations and settlement within the present territory 
on Oman, the country has a history of cultural contact and exchange with people all 
across the Indian Ocean. Given that Oman is separated from the rest of the Arabian 
Peninsula by expansive desert, much of Oman’s interactions have been with South Asia 
and the Indian subcontinent. This extensive contact was the result of commercial trade 
networks in the Indian Ocean and Oman’s expansion of its empire. By 1856, “the formal 
sovereignty of the Omani empire covered the whole north-western edge of the Indian 
Ocean, from Mozambique to Baluchistan.” (Valeri, 2009, p. 135).   
Oman’s relationship with East Africa “dates to at least the early Islamic era, if not 
before” (Peterson, 2004b, p.45).  Until 1964, Zanzibar was an Omani colony, and in 
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addition to the initial Omani settlers of the island, Omanis from the mainland territory 
migrated to Zanzibar to escape economic and social devastation. The role of Zanzibari 
Omanis in the state’s development project becomes a critical facet of this argument, to be 
discussed shortly. 
This history of trade, travel, and occupation lead to migration and settlement of 
Omanis elsewhere as well as the settlement of foreign communities of various origins in 
Oman, including a small population of Jewish merchants. The Baluch constitute the 
largest community of non-Arabs in Oman, and are mostly located on the northern coast. 
This can be attributed to Oman’s possession of Gwadar and the recruitment of Baluch 
soliders, who settled in Oman (Peterson, 2004b, p. 35). Travel records from the sixteenth 
century mention Baluch communities in Oman. An estimate of the Baluch population put 
the estimated the community to comprise 12% of the total Omani population in 2004 
(Peterson, 2004b, pp. 35-37). Indian merchants have lived in Muscat for centuries, 
notably Banians, whose numbers in Muscat were higher than “in any other city of 
Arabia” and were successful businessmen who “nearly monopolized the pearl trade from 
the Gulf” (Peterson, 2004b, p. 38). 
Many of these communities, the notable exception being slaves, were largely 
accepted. Indian merchants have resided in Oman for centuries, settling first in the 
fifteenth century. Members of this community “are widely held to have played a 
significant role in the expulsion of the Portuguese from the Omani coast in the mid-
seventeenth century.” (Jones & Ridout, 2015, p. 15) As a result of their efforts, Indians 
were afforded more privileges than usually given to non-Muslim communities, and their 
influence is still formidable.   
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The Arab Gulf States 
Oman is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC has six 
member states; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. These rentier states are absolute monarchies. The populations of the Gulf States 
are increasing quickly given the age structure of the local populations, resulting in a high 
natural rate of increase, and the hasty modernization and development that also results in 
increased immigration. Historically the economies of these states were humble, based on 
subsistence agriculture, herding, and fishing in addition to modest coastal trade. The 
discovery of substantial oil deposits in the region in the 1960’s however, greatly altered 
the economies of the GCC, altering their economic base and increasing states’ wealth. 
Countries of the GCC have some of the highest GDP per capita rates in the world. 
(Figure 3.6) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: GCC states GDP per capita 
Source: ETH Studio Basel (2013) 
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Urbanization in the GCC is incredibly high, and the region boasts some of the 
highest urbanization rates in the world (Figure 3.7). This rapid urbanization is largely due 
to the rapid modernization and development efforts made with the newly-found oil 
revenues. The rapid modernization of the Arab Gulf states in the 1970s, and the 
subsequent labour recruitment for development projects, led to both regional economic 
growth and increased labour migration to “oil-exporting countries suddenly flush with 
enormous revenues and unable to provide domestic labour for the large number of new 
infrastructure projects” (Solomon, 285). Prior to discussing the regional migration trends, 
understanding global migration trends will be a helpful orientation. 
 
 
 
Global Migration Trends 
In 2015, the number of international migrants reached 244 million, a 41% 
increase in the estimate international migrant population since 2000. (UNDESA) 
International migration is both driven by and a component of globalization. Many 
scholars view globalization as a transformation of the global economy through the spread 
of neoliberal ideology, resulting in the homogenization of culture, the opening of 
Figure 3.7: Urban Population as Percentage of Total Population 
Source: ETH Studio Basel (2013) 
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economies to foreign investment, promotion of export-led industrialization, and the 
privatization of public goods. (Samers, 2010, p. 72). Indeed the overall global migration 
trend is, and has been, an outward migration from states characterized as ‘developing’ to 
those classified as ‘developed’ (Figure 3.8) 
 
 
 
Majid Tehranian (2004) identifies commodification as a trend of contemporary 
migration, “reminiscent of the colonial period when large numbers of slaves or 
immigrants were brought by the colonists […] to provide cheap and reliable labor” (p. 
15). This is supported when considering the countries of origin and destination. The 
United States, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom host the largest 
migrant populations, while India, Mexico, Russia, China, and Bangladesh have the 
largest diaspora populations living abroad.  
The commodification of migration is also evident when considering the labour 
exportation policies of some states. The Philippines, for example, has a strong labour 
exportation policy to overcome the “inability to ‘realize sovereignty’ given its position 
within a globalized division of labour and globally distributed political authority” 
(Solomon, 281).  For example, large-scale migration of Filipino temporary workers 
Figure 3.8: Global Migration 
Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2015) 
 63 
overseas began in 1974 in response to the increase in oil prices in the 1970s. Facing 
overpopulation, unemployment and inflation “…the Philippine government established a 
policy of encouraging Filipinos to work overseas for fixed periods of time.” (Solomon, 
2009, p. 285)  Solomon (2009) argues that the Philippine labour export policy is “a 
specific spatial strategy of the state demonstrating an effect sovereignty that has 
reconstituted the Philippines as deterritorialized” (p. 284).  The Philippines, to safeguard 
national loyalty and, probably more importantly, the flow of remittances, refers to its 
Overseas Foreign Workers as national heroes, in addition to providing dual citizenship, 
and welfare services. Its attempts to secure both capital and legitimacy through this 
labour export strategy has remade the state and transformed what constitutes national 
identity.  
Regional Migration Trends 
According the data collected by the Population Division of the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Figure 3.8), the Middle East North Africa 
(MENA) region (which includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morrocco, Palestine, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen) had an international migrant population of 34.5 million. The 
majority of migrants living in the MENA region, 74% reside in the member states of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). (UNDESA, Population Division, 2016) 
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In terms of origins, labour migration to the Gulf comes from India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh Indonesia, and the Philippines, many of which actively market their 
workforces abroad to address domestic unemployment and demographic issues (Figure 
3.9). “By 1985 there were 3.2 million Asian workers in the Gulf states” (Castles & 
Miller, 2009, p. 131). The majority of migrants (about 66%) in the GCC are male, but the 
demographics are shifting slightly with the economic shift from construction toward 
services. Females are typically preferred for service sector occupations, specifically 
nursing and housekeeping.   
Religious compatibility is an important criterion for migrant workers in the Gulf. 
Paths of migration are driven by cultural factors, influencing migrant demographics and 
cultural dynamics. Despite the feminization of labour migration, the gulf remains a prime 
destination for young male migrants. Most states in the Gulf region have policies and 
regulations in place to control immigration and reduce dependency, in addition to strict, 
ethnic ideas of citizenship. (Castles & Miller, 2009) 
Figure 3.9: Migrant Destinations in the Middle East & North Africa, 2015 
Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2016) 
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In the nineteenth century, motivated by the desire to “monopolize political 
authority and mobilize resources,” European colonial powers impressed upon the Arab 
world the European territorial state as the key political unit (Murden, 2005, p. 373). The 
countries of the Gulf are considered Rentier states, providing for their citizens through 
the distribution of natural resource revenues “…in the form of food subsidies, 
employment opportunities, health care, and all the basic necessities of living” (Levins, 
2013, p. 389). Because governments, rather than private institutions, own and control the 
oil industry, its revenue and the distribution of the wealth, they are unmatched in their 
economic power, “and with unrivaled economic power comes vast political power” 
(Levins, 2013, p. 390).  
One of the “most enduring legacies of the nineteenth century was the introduction 
of a new notion of citizenship, whereby political loyalty was directed towards a particular 
territorial entity” (Choueiri, 2005, p. 301). In the Gulf, citizenship is defined by shared 
Figure 3.10: Migrant Origins in the Middle East & North Africa, 2015 
Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2016) 
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descent, or kinship, either real or imagined. It is typically referred to as a folk or ethnic 
model of citizenship, and is an exclusionary measure of national identity formation. 
Migrant workers and their children are not entitled to citizenship regardless of their 
length of stay in Gulf States (Shah, 2008, p. 5). However, feelings of belonging, even 
among those with citizenship, can be influenced by perceptions of purity of Arab 
ethnicity. “The issue of national belonging is plainly being distorted by theses other 
perceptions of belonging, while legal measures effectively enforcing inequality suggest 
that the state itself is not based on a conception of national inclusion” (Patrick, 2012, p. 
56). 
The state essentially buys the loyalty of its citizens, which could be severely 
challenged if the flow of oil revenue were to stop, and popular economic hardship be felt, 
but this is coupled with the concept of rentier mentality. Unique in terms of economic 
behaviour, income is not associated with work, but is associated with situation, leading to 
an expectation of sustained revenue, and a satisfaction with their lives and little drive for 
invention (Levins, 2013, p. 393-395).  
The rapid development experienced in the Gulf, undertaken by large foreign 
workforces, created global cities in the region. These cities are products of “the increased 
mobility of capital and labour and they are the sites of new notions of membership, 
solidarity, and violence” (van der Veer, 2004, p. 177). These rentier global cities have 
two basic divisions of labour, and this the segmented labour market drives migration to 
the ‘global cities’ of the Gulf. The national population has higher-paying occupations 
with better working conditions and opportunities for advancement. Low-paying, and 
unstable positions with poor working conditions and little opportunity for promotion are 
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reserved for the foreign workforce. The privileges of the national population, oil revenue, 
is not afforded to migrants, who must earn their incomes by filling the occupations 
deemed demeaning by the national population. The globalization-induced diversity and 
segmented labour market alter the local perception of the Other, in turn affecting the 
reception of migrants and therefore their level of acculturation, which has implications 
for the maintenance of national identity.  
Loyalty to the state is, as previously discussed, also dependent upon the 
legitimization of the national identity it constructs. The state fosters a unitary national 
identity through social, cultural, and political means. The promotion of a shared heritage 
is frequently institutionalized, driven by the high volume of migration to the Gulf State, 
educating nationals and foreign residents alike of the local history, selectively 
emphasizing a tribal identity. In the Gulf, as is the case elsewhere, the most significant 
unifying cultural aspect is religion. “The GCC states, collectively and individually, all 
emphasize Islamic fealty in policy statements and public projects, and all have 
emphasized Islam and part of the recent focus on national identity” (Patrick, 2012, p. 53). 
The self-definition and othering of migrant workers is of importance in the Gulf, simply 
because local populations are usually small in comparison to the foreign population. 
The Gulf States also employ policies that aim to restrict the volume of foreign 
workers by increasing indirect taxes to make the cost of living higher, discouraging 
further migration and lengthy residency. (Shah, 2008, p. 6) The deportation of illegal 
migrants and restrictive visa issuance and visa trading policies are also strategies 
employed to control and limit migration. (Shah, 2008, pp. 7-9) 
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In addition to policies that are aimed to decrease the supply of foreign labour, 
there are policies employed to increase the demand for local labour. In some instances, 
the government subsidizes the salaries of nationals employed in the private sector (Shah, 
9). Technical and vocational training is also provided, and the cost of hiring foreign 
employees is increased in order to decrease the attractiveness of hiring non-nationals. 
(Shah, 2008, p. 9).  Several Gulf States have implemented nationalization policies to 
gradually decrease reliance on foreign workers and “secure the gradual replacement of 
expatriates by” through the policy limiting the total number of foreign workers through 
the allocation of work permits, the imposition fees on employers when foreign workers 
are hired, and awarding government contracts to private companies. (Valeri, 2009, p. 
201) The rates of workforce nationalization can be seen in Figure 3.10, however Oman 
only has figures for the private sector. 
 
 
Spatial separation is another avenue pursued in an attempt to mitigate the impact 
of migration on the constructed national identity. “Planning and zoning…seemingly 
harmless development projects can be exposed to carefully designed nation-building 
strategies that serve the interest of one nation at the expense of another” (Herb, 1999, p. 
23).  For example, social separation has been purposefully planned in Dubai’s 
urbanization through the placement of shopping malls in areas that are accessible only by 
Figure 3.11: Expatriates as Percentage of Total Workforce (Oman: % of private sector) 
Source: ETH Studio Basel (2013) 
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cars, further highlighting the socioeconomic differences between the native and 
immigrant communities. Research on migrants’ public spaces in Dubai, characterized as 
“transitory spaces,” are intended to discourage the formation of “spatial attachments to a 
city that is not meant to be theirs.” (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p. 10) Having discussed the 
regional migration context, it is important to discuss the economic development of Oman 
beginning in 1970 in order to understand the migration circumstances within the state, 
and, specifically, the city of Muscat. 
The Omani Renaissance 
Oman was at the center of maritime trade in the Indian Ocean, but geopolitical 
circumstances at the height of imperialism changed this dynamic. To be brief, between 
1856 and 1932 Oman was in decline and marginalized in the global economy. The British 
consolidated power in the Indian Ocean, exerting their influence on the slave trade and 
Zanzibar itself, in addition to dominating maritime trade in general. “The marginalization 
of Oman itself involved the decline of local and regional trade in the Gulf, as a result of 
the development of steamer traffic in the Indian Ocean and the gradual replacement of a 
regional economy dominated by the Indian manufactures and trade networks by a system 
dominated by the British.” (Jones & Ridout, 2015, p. 64) 
Because of the changing nature of trade in the Indian Ocean and the state’s declining 
economic dominance, Oman became increasingly reliant on the British. Between 1932 
and 1959 the concept of the territorial state and the concept of nationalism were also 
taking hold in Oman. Anti-colonial sentiment was growing worldwide during the Second 
World War and Oman was no exception. Said bin Taimur tried to unify the state, while 
limiting dependence on the British, but also relying on their political and military support 
for territorial unification. Essentially the British exercised indirect control, that became 
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increasingly more direct when coupled with the benign neglect and general absence of 
the Sultan.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a separatist rebellion in the Dhofar region is 
witnessed, during the height of the Cold War. This nationalist movement, influenced in 
part by South Yemen, was influenced by Marxian ideology. The communist rebellion 
was of concern to the British, and they, wanting to contain the threat of communist 
expansion, supported Sultan Said’s son, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, with the expectation that 
he would be in opposition to the movement. 
 The isolation of Oman from the rest of the world left the “sultanate devoid of 
modern basic infrastructure,” including roads, ports, and electricity (Kechichian, 2008, p. 
116). In addition to distressing foreign powers, Sultan Said’s “benign neglect” galvanized 
domestic opposition, including his own son, Qaboos bin Said. (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, 
pp. 28-29). On the 23rd of July 1970, in a coup coordinated by British, Sultan Sa’id was 
deposed and “the British government formally recognized Qaboos on the 29th of July,” 
marking the beginning of the Renaissance (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, pp. 29). It is referred 
to as a renaissance specifically to imply the lack of development prior to ascension, and 
to emphasize the positive aspects of his modernization and development efforts. 
Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said stated that he sought to build “a new society… 
authentic ... with its own methods of thought” that didn’t mimic any system of 
government (Kechichian, 2008, p. 127) Immediately following the coup, Sultan Qaboos 
bin Said established a fledgling government, as only the rudimentary basics existed, and 
the former Sultan’s British advisors constituted the ‘interim advisory council’ without 
formal procedures or mandate.  The new sultan, needing to maintain territorial state unity, 
 71 
changed the country’s name from Muscat and Oman to the Sultanate Oman, and adopted 
a new flag. Qaboos also quelled the Communist separatist movement in the Dhofar 
region from 1970-1975, spill-over from South Yemen, (Kechichian, 2008, pp. 121-123). 
In public addresses, Qaboos highlights the atheistic element of communist ideology, 
garnering popular support and legitimizing the suppression of the nationalist movement.  
 Qaboos eventually established a new government with various ministries and 
institutions in January of 1972, appointing family members to key positions and phasing 
out British appointees in the process. Qaboos appointed himself as the minister of 
defense, foreign affairs, and finance, in addition to Prime Minister (Allen & Rigsbee, 
2000, p. 36). Sultan Qaboos, in addition to the formal government structure, had a group 
of expatriate advisors, one Brit, an American, two Libyan, and one Saudi advisor. This 
group of foreign personal advisors came to be referred to as the “Muscat Mafia,” and 
were involved in the economic development planning (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, p. 36).  
The traditional business elites disliked the Muscat Mafia because of the potential for their 
exclusion from the benefits of development. 
 In the summer of 1975, the Law for the Organization of State Administration was 
published, providing broad guidelines for the role of the council of ministers, special 
councils, the sultan himself, and other various government institutions. (Allen & Rigsbee, 
2000, p. 39). The council of ministers main function was to be the executive body, 
drafting legislation and coordinating policies. Most of the special councils dealt with 
development and planning in various areas, including water, agriculture, environmental 
protection, and economic planning. Other government offices created include General 
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Telecommunications Organization and Oman National Transport (Allen & Rigsbee, 
2000, pp. 39-41). 
Another approach to territorial control employed was to work within the tribal 
framework of authority, incorporating Arab custom and tradition to both legitimize the 
state and ensure political stability. A distinguishing feature of the rentier state is the 
increase in power of the ruling family and the decline in power of traditional elites and 
tribal leaders, given that those with the economic power are those with unmatched 
political power. Despite the prominent role of the royal family in government affairs, 
“Oman followed a very different pattern whereby the traditional elites actually saw an 
increase in their political power following the coup of 1970 as state involvement in both 
economic and social programs increased and the bureaucracy grew” (Allen & Rigsbee, 
2000, p.  34). Business elites demanded and gained entry into government positions, and 
therefore more control over the distribution of wealth. The leaders of various tribes also 
benefitted from increased political authority, given that the state did not have the military 
or economic means to impose will upon various tribal elites and had to rely on alliances 
for stability and control.  
 With the understanding that popular participation in government was compatible 
with Islam, the ruler of Oman conveyed his commitment to "establish just, democratic 
rule. . . within the framework of [the] Omani Arab reality, the customs and traditions of 
[the] community, and the teachings of Islam, which always light our path" (Kechichian, 
2008, p. 131).  To this end, Qaboos initiated a yearly “meet the people” tour in 1975 with 
the goal of consulting directly with Omani citizens, who could provide feedback and 
voice concerns directly to the Sultan. Allen & Rigsbee  (2000) state that this event, 
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initially an unassuming trip where the Sultan and his companions slept in tents,  evolved 
into a major formal event by the 1990s, with large crowds in people gathering to 
demonstrate their support for the Sultan.  
 This method of consultation was not fruitful, and in 1981, the Majlis Al-Istishari 
Li Al-Dawla, or State Consultative Council (SCC), was created by royal decree for the 
purpose of fulfilling the state’s “promise and in pursuance of our policy which aims to 
allowing a larger measure of participation for the citizens in the efforts which are being 
made by the government to implement its economic and social plans” (Allen & Rigsbee, 
2000, p. 48). The SCC met three times a year, and had 43 members, eleven of whom 
were government representatives, with nineteen members from the private sector and 
fourteen representatives from various regions. (Allen & Rigsbee, pp. 48-50). The 
religious composition of the Council was representative of the Omani population as a 
whole, with over half being Ibdahi, following by 29% being Sunni, and 16% of members 
were Shia (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, p. 50). However, there was popular criticism of the 
SCC, given that the majority of its members were western education, urban, and in their 
forties or older. Given that the majority of Omanis were rural, uneducated, and young, the 
SCC was not representative of the population. 
 A royal decree issued in 1990 created the Majlis Al-Shura to replace the State 
Consultative Council in 1991. Each of Oman’s governorates would nominate three 
individuals from which one delegate would be chosen. In 1994, the Majlis Al-Shura was 
opened to women living in Muscat, and in 1997, this membership was expanded further, 
allowing women from across the country to nominate and stand as candidates (Allen & 
Rigsbee, 2000, pp. 50-56; Peterson, 2004a, p. 133). The Basic Law, which is perhaps 
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akin to a constitution, was issued in 1996 also by royal decree and will be discussed more 
thoroughly in the following chapter. 
Oil exports provided almost one-hundred percent of the state’s revenues in 1970, 
which is characteristic of a model rentier state, and thus facilitated the development 
efforts of the state. Qaboos continuously stated that the sultanate’s most important 
resource and sole source of significant revenue "belong[ed] to its people.” The state 
gradually purchased Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) assets from private 
companies, American and British to gain firm control over this wealth. By 1975, the 
government had acquired 60 percent and by 1999 owned 100 percent of the assets of 
PDO. (Kechichian, 2008, p. 120) Though the state owned the oil industry, the private 
sector in Oman played a significant role in the country’s economic development. Qaboos 
“certainly understood the broader implications of opposition to the regime and did not 
propose to ignore economic and social programs,” coopting the strong historical tradition 
of private sector involvement and entrepreneurship to both emphasize the cosmopolitan 
merchant aspect of the national narrative and foster private sector growth. (Allen & 
Rigsbee, p. 99) Oman did not follow the same method of decreasing government 
expenditure as other Gulf States by suspending development projects and payments. 
Instead, the state invited the private sector to undertake development, and courted foreign 
investors (Kechichian, 2006, p. 60). 
 This private involvement in state development was also a way of quelling 
opposition. The Sultan did not have the means to challenge tribal leaders or impose will, 
and so dependence of alliances was essential, maintaining, at least initially, their 
autonomy. (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, pp. 99-100).  A partnership emerged “whereby this 
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traditional elite offered their time and expertise to the new government in exchange for a 
laissez faire attitude toward private economic activity” (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, p. 113). 
This bolstered rather than marginalized the tribal commercial establishment while 
emphasizing the merchant identity narrative, to be discussed more thoroughly in the 
following chapter (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, p. 113).  
 At the time that Qaboos assumed power, Oman had “a mere 10 dispensaries and 
nine health centers… serving a population of around 750,000, spread over a geographical 
area as large as Britain” (Kechichian, 2008, p. 115).  Twelve new hospitals and twenty-
five dispensaries were established by 1972. But in 1970, Oman had only twelve 
physicians, so the state had to look overseas to fill the serious shortcoming, while 
simultaneously establishing a nursing school, to meet growing local needs (Kechichian, 
2008, p. 115). 
Development and Labour Shortage 
 Given its small and largely uneducated population, a result of the neglect of 
preceding rulers, the Sultanate of Oman faced a human resources dilemma. Following the 
period of British maritime dominance and Oman’s subsequent decline, Omanis had 
emigrated to escape economic and political hardship. They lived in other states of the 
Gulf, Egypt, Europe, and, of course, eastern Africa. By the end of the 1960, “more than 
50,000 Omanis had migrated to other Gulf emirates, where they were looking for better 
living conditions” (Valeri, 2009, p. 138).  
Following his ascension to power Sultan Qaboos first called out to Omanis living 
abroad, many of whom had invaluable skills and education, urging them to return ‘home’ 
and roll up their sleeves for the betterment of the nation. Qaboos also reached out to those 
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who had been exiled for their opposition to his father, the former Sultan.  Essentially, the 
new “…opened the doors for its sons to return and build a country, shut off from the 
outside world by instability, tribal warfare, and poverty.” (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p. 102) 
Zanzibari Omanis, those who settled for decades in Zanzibar and were substantially more 
educated, played an important entrepreneurial and bureaucratic role in the development 
and modernization of the state. In fact, because their early migration and mixed Omani-
African heritage “placed them outside the straightforward tribal categories”, the 
community was seen as supporters of the new government. (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p. 102) 
The Omani community living abroad was wholly accepted upon return as citizens 
without distinction made, and such acceptance resulted in allegiance to the state, who 
capitalized on the educational background and skillsets of the immigrants, many of whom 
had previously never been to Oman. 
 Though the new bureaucracy of the sultanate was initially dependent on expatriate 
knowledge, the government began to train Omanis for lower-level civil servant positions 
in 1977. Recruitment, and training of an Omani civil service began in the mid-1980s, 
with specialized positions requiring technical or secondary-school completion. (Allen & 
Rigsbee, 2000, p. 42) Because of the lack of formal education and, therefore, skilled 
labour amongst the Omani population, “most non-Omanis were employed in teaching 
under the ministry of education; as doctors and nurses in the ministry of health; or in 
various public works functions.” (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, p. 42) 
 In need of qualified Omanis for both technical and unskilled positions, in addition 
to urging the return of educated and trained expatriates, the state began a vocational 
training program in 1972. In 1974, he stressed the expectation that all citizens commit 
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themselves to the development of the state, as the aim was "‘to forget the past’, and to 
forge a new nation with all available talent.” (Kechichian, 2008, p. 127) In 1970, Oman 
had only three schools, by 1975, the rapid development efforts resulted in the 
construction of 176 schools with 50,000 enrolled students, “with another 50 schools, 
1,000 teachers and 10,000 new students coming on board every year that passed. Within 
a decade, by 1980, over 100,000 Omani children were receiving basic education.” 
(Kechichian, 2008, p. 114) 
 Despite the development of vocational and educational institutions, there 
remained an immediate need for both skilled and unskilled labour forces to undertake the 
state’s development. By 1975, it was estimated that 19.4% of Oman’s population was 
foreign, 132,250 workers in total. (Winckler, 2000, p. 26) Socioeconomic development, 
however, increased after the Dhofar rebellion was suppressed in the mid-1970s, and 
“according to an official Omani estimate, 154,000 foreigners were working in the 
contrary in 1980, representing 50.3 per cent of the total labour force.” (Winckler, 2000, p. 
27)  
Local Migration Trends 
 According to the Omani National Centre for Statistics and Information, the top 
countries of migrant origins are India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Sri Lanka, 
the Philippines, Sudan, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. The majority of the foreign 
workforce is male, most of whom are between the ages of 20 and 60, or working-age 
years (Figure 3.12). This greatly changes the demographics of the state. In Figure 3.12 
the gender and age ratio of both the migrant and Omani population are displayed. The 
largest age/gender group for expatriates is males between the ages of 25-30. 
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Figure 3.12: Expatriate population by gender and age, 2014 
Source: National Centre for Statistics and Information 
Figure 3.13: Omani and Expatriate populations by gender and age. 
Source: ETH Studio Basel, 2013 
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Muscat 
As previously stated, the Al Batinah plain is the main location of historical and 
contemporary settlement, and well as political, social and economic activity. It is also, 
because of these factors, the main destination of foreign workers in Oman. The Muscat 
governorate comprises roughly 1.3% of Oman’s territory, but comprise about a quarter of 
the total population, nationals and expatriates. The metropolitan area of Muscat 
Governorate is divided into six wilayats, or districts, that are then subdivided. The six 
main districts of Muscat are Seeb, Bowshar, Amarat, Matrah, Muscat (aka Old Muscat), 
and Qurayyat. The population’s distribution varies significantly within Muscat 
governorate, with the most populated being Bowshar, and the least populated is Qurayyat 
(Figure 3.14).  
Likewise, the demographics of these populations also vary by wilaya, and more or less 
correlate with the size of the 
total population. Matrah and 
Bowsher have the greatest 
number of expatriate residents 
(Figure 3.15), followed by 
Muscat and Seeb, and then 
Amarat. Qurayyat has the 
smallest population of foreign 
residents. 
 
 Figure 3.14: Population of Muscat Governorate, 2016  
Source: National Centre for Statistics and 
Information 
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Neighbourhoods of Muscat 
Wilaya Mattrah includes the neighbourhoods of Mattrah, Qurum, Darsait, Ruwi, 
and Wadi Kabir. Wilaya Bowshar includes the neighbourhoods of Bowshar, Shatti, Shatti 
al-Qurm, Madinat Sultan Qaboos, Al Khuwair, Ghubra, and Ghala, and Azaiba. The 
neighbourhoods of importance to this study are Mattrah, Muscat, Seeb, Qurum, Ruwi, 
Shatti, Shatti al-Qurm, Madinat Sultan Qaboos, Al Khuwair, and Azaiba. The 
development of Muscat and its neighbourhoods, including zoning and place-making, will 
be addressed more thoroughly in chapter 5, but a limited discussion of Muscat’s 
neighbourhoods provides an orienting context. 
Mattrah and Old Muscat are the oldest neighbourhoods in Muscat. The residences 
in this area are older traditional villas and apartments. Most of the residents here are 
lower to middle class Omanis and Indian expatriates. Mattrah Souq, the National 
Museum, and the Sultan’s palace are all located in this area. The coast has been 
developed for tourism through attractive landscaping along the corniche. There are many 
cafes and tourism-oriented shops along the main road and within the souq. 
Figure 3.15: Expatriate Population of Muscat Governorate by Wilaya, 2016 
Source: National Centre for Statistics and Information 
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Ruwi is a neighbourhood known for its largely South Asian population and high 
population density. Its residents are typically lower to middle class South Asian 
expatriates. The type of housing typical in Ruwi is older apartment buildings. Though 
residences comprise most of Ruwi, there are restaurants and coffee shops, and stores. 
Ruwi Souq is an incredibly crowded street in the neighbourhood characterized by 
electronic, jewelry, textile, and other consumer shops. In addition, Ruwi is the location of 
the main Indian School of Muscat and Pakistani School of Muscat. 
The Qurum neighbourhood is a popular neighbourhood for Muscat residents of 
middle to high income. The housing type is mostly free-standing villas, but apartment 
complexes are the most recent residential developments seen. Though the neighbourhood 
is dominated by residential areas, there are many shops, restaurants, and entertainment 
venues located within, including Qurum City Centre Mall. 
Shatti and Shatti Al Qurum, discussed here together because of their similarity 
and the researcher’s unfamiliarity with where the arbitrary boundary between two is 
drawn, is the most prestigious and popular Muscat neighbourhood. Residents here are 
usually wealthy Omanis and expatriates, usually western expatriates. Free-standing villas 
of large size and gated community compounds are typical of the residences in this area. 
There are many restaurants and coffee shops, and high-end shopping centers in Shatti, 
and Shatti beach is one of the most popular beaches in Muscat. The government’s 
ministry buildings are located within this neighbourhood this area of Shatti is referred to 
as the Ministries District. Foreign embassies and consulates are also located in this 
neighbourhood, as is the Royal Opera House. The Grand Hyatt and Intercontinental Hotel 
are also both located in Shatti.   
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Al Khuwair is a neighbourhood characterized by high density, but not as highly 
dense as Ruwi. The homes in this neighbourhood are smaller townhomes and villas, and, 
mostly, apartment buildings. The residents of Al Khuwair are middle class and usually 
expatriates of various national origins. Many of the residents are Asian expatriates. There 
are many shops on the first floor of mixed-use buildings along main roadways, including 
textile electronic shops. There are budget-friendly restaurants and cafes in this 
neighbourhood, including the popular shawarma stand Istanboly’s.  
Azaiba is almost exclusively a residential neighbourhood in close proximity to the 
airport. The houses in this area are free-standing villas. Azaiba beach is a popular 
attraction that draws in residents, who are both Omani and expatriates of middle class.  
Madinat Sultan Qaboos was initially developed as a neighbourhood for 
expatriates. The residences here are smaller townhomes and villas as well as more 
recently developed, high-end apartment complexes. Residents in this neighbourhood are 
of middle to upper class Omanis and expatriates, particularly Western expatriates and, 
more specifically, American and British expats. There are a few shopping complexes in 
this neighbourhood, which include restaurants and cafes and grocery stores, but are rather 
limited in terms of other consumer goods. Muscat’s Pavo Real Mexican Restaurant is 
located here, as well as the popular shisha café Kargeen, and the Al Fair supermarket, 
which caters to European tastes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE: THE CITY 
 
The following chapter attempts to understand representations of Muscat as 
conceived by the state and city residents. Lefebvre distinguishes between knowledge and 
cognition. Knowledge serves power, which includes ideology and political practice, 
whereas “cognition is critical, subversive, open to reality and possibility.” (Bertuzzo, 
2009, p. 30) Schmid (2008) summarizes that Lefebvre’s representations of space, 
 “emerge at the level of discourse, of speech as such, and therefore comprise verbalized 
forms such as descriptions, definitions, and especially (scientific) theories of space. 
Furthermore, Lefebvre counts maps and plans, information in pictures, and signs among 
representations of space. The specialized disciplines dealing with the production of these 
representations are architecture and planning, but also the social sciences (and here of 
special importance is geography).” (p. 37) 
This chapter is concerned with representations of Muscat informed by knowledge 
and ideology. It first outlines the elements included in the national identity constructed 
and promoted by the state, followed by the methods employed to promote these elements 
in the nation-building process. Following a discussion of the elements and methods of 
nation-building, the attributes of interviewed participants will be discussed to gain insight 
into their circumstances and experiences. After discussing participants’ attributes, the 
effectiveness of the state’s nation-building will be evaluated in relation to the 
participants’ representations of the city as a whole. 
State Representations of Space: The City 
Islam plays an important role in the construction of Omani national identity, and 
is injected into the rationale behind government decisions and the implementation of 
many institutions for the purpose of state legitimation. Likewise, the inclusion of the 
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Ibadhi Islamic tradition in state institutions and the national narrative appeases the leaders 
in the interior, who, under the Imamate, based their political system on Ibadism. Though 
religion plays an important role in the creation of an Omani civic identity, religious 
tolerance, attributed to historical Ibadhi practice and cosmopolitanism, is also emphasized 
alongside piety. 
Other key elements of the constructed and unifying national identity is Arabness, 
including Arab ethnicity, the Arabic language and traditional social structure, as well as 
Arab culture and values. Emphasis is placed on the historical underpinning of Bedouin 
culture and traditional ways of life in the new territory. Arab tradition, in terms of both 
culture and social organization, is emphasized in the national narrative and incorporated 
into the state apparatus. These components of national identity, like the emphasis of 
Ibadism, appeases traditional tribal leaders, who would otherwise feel threatened by the 
rise of state power and pose a threat to state unity. The identity project gives recognition 
to the cultural diversity within the territory by celebrating trivial regional differences, like 
dress, folklore, and dialect, while simultaneously constructing an image of Omani culture 
as unified and homogenous. 
A reoccurring message of national identity is the reiteration of the collective 
nature of Omani society, where hard work, individual responsibility, and sacrifice for the 
betterment of the nation is emphasized. This relates to the Islamic concept of the umma, 
or the Muslim community at large. The redistribution of oil wealth to citizens reinforces 
this concept of religious unity as well as traditional tribal/social organization. Including 
rhetoric promoting hard work and sacrifice on the part of the individual emphasizes the 
traditional importance of collective identity for the purpose of state development. There 
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is also great importance placed on the family as the foundation of society. Likewise, 
traditional paternal leadership is yet another key element of the civic identity, and the 
legitimacy of the state is centered on Sultan Qaboos himself.  The personalization of his 
rule is an important component of the effort to build a modern national identity. Valeri 
(2009) writes, 
“With 80% of the population never having known any ruler other than Sultan Qaboos, it 
is easy for the Sultan to portray himself as the embodiment of modern Oman in general 
and of the 1970 renaissance (nahda) ideology in particular – the regime’s leitmotiv in any 
national celebration.” (pp. 130-131)  
In addition to highlighting traditional Arab culture and the pluralistic 
manifestation of this singular culture, the national narrative incorporates elements of 
cosmopolitanism as part of Omani identity, especially in Muscat. “This cosmopolitanism 
is the consequence of hundreds of years of active Omani participation in trade and 
cultural exchange across and around the Indian Ocean and its littoral…” (Jones & Ridout, 
2015, p. 15) Omani social and religious tolerance and openness to the outside world, the 
result of longstanding transnational connections and diverse coastal communities, are 
emphasized in the construction of identity are major components of the identity project. 
However, this cosmopolitan attitude isn’t supposed to come at the cost of Omani identity 
through conformity and syncretism, and so steadfastness and awareness of the national 
identity is promoted in concert with the promotion of tolerant, respectful, and progressive 
understandings of others. 
Methods of Identity Construction 
Legislation and Policy 
In 2014 the Sultan issued Royal Decree number 38, which is an update to the 
1983 previous decree on the Omani Citizenship Law. The Law of the Organization of 
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Omani Nationality outlines who is legally considered an Omani resident, and the 
circumstances under which a foreign can obtain Omani citizenship. Article (11) defines 
Omani citizens as those born in or outside of Omani territory to Omani fathers, to Omani 
mothers whose father is unknown or has lost his Omani nationality, those born within the 
territory to unknown parents, and those born in Oman, and who became resident there, of 
fathers themselves born in Oman but without having nationality. (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p. 
100) With regards to Omani citizens, it states that he or she “may not renounce their 
nationality in favour of another until they have fulfilled their obligations and 
commitments towards the Sultanate” and article (12) lists the conditions that need to be 
met in order to renounce Omani citizenship. (GLMM, 2016) 
 The Basic Law coopts Arab tradition, and religion, further emphasizing those 
facets of national identity. Article (1) of the Basic Law classifies that the Sultanate is “an 
Arabic, Islamic, Independent State with full sovereignty and Muscat is its Capital.” 
Article (2) identifies Islam as the state religion and Islamic Sharia as the basis of 
legislation. Article (3) states that Arabic is the official language of the Sultanate. Article 
(4) states that the law determines the national anthem, flag, emblem and insignia. Article 
(5) classifies the system of governance as “Sultani, hereditary in the male descendants of 
Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan, provided that whomever is to be chosen from amongst 
them as a successor shall be a Muslim, mature, rational, and the legitimate son of Omani 
Muslim parents.” (GLMM, 2014a) 
 The second chapter of the Basic Law, which outlines the principles guiding state 
policy, declares it a political principle to “lay suitable foundations for consolidating the 
pillars of genuine Shura emanating from the heritage of the Nation, its values and Islamic 
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Sharia, taking pride in its history and adopting the useful contemporary means and 
instruments.” In addition to this political principle guiding the policies of the state, 
“establishing a sound administrative system that guarantees justice, tranquility and 
equality for the Citizens and ensures respect for the public order and the preservation of 
the supreme interests of the State.” (GLMM, 2014a) 
 Article (12) outlines social principles guiding state policy, and declares justice, 
equality, and equal opportunities between Omanis as pillars of Omani society. Article 
(12) also states that “collaboration and compassion are intimate bonds amongst the 
Citizens. The reinforcement of the national unity is a duty. The State shall prevent 
anything that might lead to division, discord or disruption of the national unity.” In 
addition, the article declares the family as the basis of society and “the law regulates the 
means for protecting it, preserving its legitimate entity, strengthening its ties and values, 
safeguarding its members and providing suitable conditions to develop their potential and 
capabilities.” (GLMM, 2014a) 
 Article (13) relates to the guiding cultural principles, and focuses largely on 
education stating that the aim of education is to “raise and develop the general cultural 
standard, promote scientific thought, kindle the spirit of research, respond to the 
requirements of economic and social plans, and build a generation that is physically and 
morally strong, which takes pride in its Nation, Country, and heritage and preserves its 
achievements.” This article also states that the state “shall foster and preserve the national 
heritage, encourage the sciences, arts, literature, scientific research and assist in their 
dissemination.” (GLMM, 2014a) 
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 The third chapter of the Basic Law discusses the rights and duties of the public. 
Article (15) states that nationality is regulated by law and that “it is not permissible to 
denaturalize or revoke it” except where the law permits. The following chapter declares it 
impermissible to deport or exile citizens, or prevent their return to the state. Article (17) 
states that all citizens are equal and share the same public rights and responsibilities. The 
article prohibits discrimination “on the ground of gender, origin, colour, language, 
religion, sect, domicile, or social status.” Article (28) of chapter three pertains to the 
protection of religious freedoms provided that “it does not violate the public order or 
contradict morals.” (GLMM, 2014a) 
 Article (38) declares the preservation of national unity and the safeguarding of 
state secrets as “a duty incumbent upon every citizen.” Chapter 4 of the Basic Law 
discusses the Head of State. Article (41) summarizes by saying “His Majesty the Sultan is 
the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, his person is 
inviolable, respect of him is a duty, and his command is obeyed. He is the symbol of 
national unity and the guardian of the preservation and the protection thereof.” (GLMM, 
2014a) 
National Narrative and Discourse 
The state’s official narrative and discourse is used to foster a collective national 
identity and legitimate the rule of the Sultan. One of the ways in which this is achieved is 
through the promotion of specific values and elements deemed part of the Omani identity. 
To start, the national anthem of the state mostly emphasizes the legitimacy of and 
obedience to Sultan Qaboos specifically. This reinforces his sovereignty and appropriates 
the traditional patrimonial nature of leadership within the modern state. It includes other 
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elements of the constructed national identity as well, including Arab ethnicity, peaceful 
conduct, loyalty, unity, and multiple reiterations of the religious character of the nation. 
Omani National Anthem 
O Lord, protect for us our Majesty the Sultan  
And the people in our land,  
With honour and peace.  
May he live long, strong and supported,  
Glorified be his leadership.  
For him we shall lay down our lives.  
May he live long, strong and supported,  
Glorified be his leadership.  
For him we shall lay down our lives.  
O Oman, since the time of the Prophet  
We are a dedicated people amongst the noblest Arabs.  
Be happy! Qaboos has come  
With the blessing of Heaven.  
Be cheerful and commend him to the protection of our prayers. 
(Online Education & Expert Training, n.d) 
 
 
The Ministry of Heritage and Culture, formerly known as the Ministry of National 
Heritage, was created through Royal Decree No. 12/76. Duties of the ministry include 
finding, restoring, and maintaining archaeological and historical sites, establishing 
museums, publishing culture and heritage related literature, organizing festivals and 
cultural exhibitions, and applying protection laws. In addition, the Ministry of Heritage 
and Culture is created for economic motivations, especially tourism-related development. 
The website associated with this ministry also lists the following duties, 
- “Preserving elements of Oman’s heritage to protect them from loss or damage 
since they are considered as a cultural inheritance that can be used to serve the 
national economy in general and the tourism sector in particular.” 
 90 
 
- “Revitalising traditional arts and improving the arts of drama, music, cinema and 
fine arts in accordance with Omani traditions and in a way that enhances the 
cultural awareness of Omanis.” 
 
- “Censoring artwork and applying laws related to respecting public morals and 
beliefs in society, which is carried out in coordination with other relevant parties.” 
(Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Heritage and Culture, n.d) 
 
Museums, texts, and official media outlets like television outlets underscore the 
society’s diversity through the emphasis of its maritime tradition, and regional 
differences, officially appropriating pluralism for political stability. Material symbols like 
coffee pots, frankincense burners, traditional khanjar daggers, oryx and turtles, scimitar 
swords, and other such ‘authentic’ environmental and cultural symbols of the nation are 
logoized and found on the national flag, currency, letterheads, websites, and 
infrastructure. Another method is the rewriting of history in the collective memory of the 
population through speeches, education, and official publications. “The Omani state, 
under the Sultan’s and the Ministry of National Heritage’s aegis, holds the monopoly of 
historical discourse” and “the Omani national identity is basically built of the negation of 
the country’s pre-1970 history”  in order to conceal the political climate and territorial 
divide that existed when Qaboos rose to power. (Valeri, 2009, pp. 132-133)  
Preservation of Omani heritage has been a focus of the state development 
endeavour. In a speech given during UNESCO’s 60th anniversary conference in 2005, 
Sultan Qaboos stated, “We attach our cultural heritage in all its forms and contents of 
material of particular importance and we mean a distinct attention because of its 
importance and significant role in the advancement of vibrant intellectual and artistic 
creativity and innovation.” Given “the importance of craft as a symbol of Omani cultural 
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identity,” Royal Decree No. 24/2003 established the Public Authority for Craft Industries 
(PACI) as a department within the Ministry of Heritage and Culture. (khanjar.om)  The 
PACI regulates the craft industry to ensure continuity and an adherence to traditional 
design to prevent alteration of national symbols. For example, the design of khanjars, 
traditional Omani daggers, are specified, in terms of dimensions, material, and weight. 
(Oman Observer) 
In all of his State of the Sultanate address, Qaboos referenced Quranic verses, 
highlighting the Omani understanding of Islam as the foundation of society, and 
acknowledging national pride in their religion and its role in the state’s development. And 
though he stressed the importance of Islam in Omani society, Qaboos warned that, 
"Extremism, under whatever guise, fanaticism of whatever kind, factionalism of whatever 
persuasion would be hateful poisonous plants in the soil of [the] country that will not be 
allowed to flourish" He saw that Islam could adapt to modernity, and attributed 
fanaticism to " a lack of knowledge among Muslim youth about the correct facts of their 
religion." (Kechichian, 2008, p. 15) 
Another reoccurring message of national identity was the reiteration that Omani 
society is one of hard work, individual responsibility, and sacrifice for the betterment of 
the nation. In promoting perseverance, diligence, and effort, Qaboos utilized imagery of a 
common seafaring heritage, telling young Omanis that their challenge was “to withstand 
globalization's storms was no different from the risks faced by their forefathers when they 
took to the high seas.” The message that the population should be proud of their heritage, 
and actively involved in the society’s renaissance strengthens the viewpoint that Omani 
society is cosmopolitan and more than capable to adapt to and thrive in a modernized 
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world, because of its history and communal values, with personal sacrifice for the state. 
Sultan Qaboos addressed his population, say "your country calls upon you to perform 
your duty with faith and discipline, Oman is a society that is used to hard work and it is 
not our style to be lazy or negligent, but to responsibly and honestly carry out our 
obligations" (Kechichian, 6). Hard work and humility are aspects of Omani national 
identity further strengthened through state development, for the purpose of state 
development. In this National Day speech, Sultan Qaboos said, 
“As we celebrate here the twenty-sixth Anniversary of our glorious National Day, 
in an atmosphere redolent of our ancient maritime past, we express our great pride in 
Oman’s seafaring history, which was written by those great ships that traversed the broad 
oceans carrying the pride and power of our country and its desire to foster friendly 
relations with all nations. We wish to remind the new generation of the high purpose of 
their forefathers who braved the storms of the violent seas in order to provide us with a 
wholesome standard of living. 
The Omani youth who look forward to glorious horizons are called upon today to 
take their ancestors as an example of diligence, hard work, patience, persistence and 
sustained effort. They are also called upon to believe, as they believed, that productive 
work – no matter how small it is – is a key element in the structure of the nation. The 
foundation will be strengthened and the pillars will be raised higher. This must be the 
goal for which all must seek and relentlessly strive with humility.With productive work, 
there will be no place in our society for idle hands, which must have no role in the 
process of our evolution and progress.” Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Information, 
2015, pp. 369-370) 
 
In this speech excerpt all promoted identity and cultural values are mentioned, including 
hard work but also cosmopolitanism, national pride and unity, respect and tolerance, and 
humility. There is also reference to the historical narrative of the state as well. 
A major aspect of the national discourse is, as previously stated, is the emphasis 
of the ‘new era’ in Omani history ushered in by Sultan Qaboos.  In 1974 he said,  
“On this immortal landmark day, four years ago, a new sun shone in our beloved land to 
light the flame of the national spirit and zeal of our citizens, who plunged into building 
this renaissance […] Our beloved Oman lives today in the dawn of a great and 
comprehensive renaissance.” (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Information, 2015, p. 31)  
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The Sultan, in his speeches, makes the inference that the country was built from 
the ground up through his ascension in 1970 with no meaningful development occurring 
prior. In this way Qaboos “has presented himself as the tutelary father of a just-reborn 
nation which ‘he conducts in its march towards progress and prosperity’.” (Valeri, 2009, 
p. 134) In addition, there is the promotion of his legitimacy and justification for his 
patrimonial rule. In an interview, Sultan Qaboos said,  
“The man in the street often doesn’t want or know how to deal with foreign governments 
or defend the country. He trusts me to do it. That is why these areas have been excluded 
from the majlis debates. In this part of the world, giving too much power too fast can still 
be exploited. Elections in many countries mean having the army prevent bloodshed. Is 
this democracy? Are these happy countries? […] No. they are really just power struggles. 
I am against creating such situations when people aren’t ready for them.” (Qabus & 
Miller, 1997, p. 17) 
In his National Day Speeches, Qaboos continuously states that the renaissance 
and his ascension to power as essentially the beginning of development, saying that, with 
God’s help, the renaissance has “resulted in bringing our Omani people to higher 
standards of life through their deliverance from the bondage of isolation, ignorance and 
backwardness.” In discussing the achievements and progress made thus far, Qaboos 
stresses appreciation for the contributions made by the Omani people, and says, “You are 
the pioneers who blazed the trail that ensured that, in days to come, our progress will be 
faster and unconfined, with our future gains assured.” (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of 
Information, 2015, p. 352) 
Addressing the graduating class at Sultan Qaboos University, Qaboos also 
emphasizes Omani history, and a self-sacrificing collective approach to development 
while simultaneously implying that this is the beginning of the Oman’s development. He 
said,  
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“From the very start, one of our primary aims was to bring education to every part of the 
Sultanate, so that every member of the population could acquire the schooling he or she 
was entitled to. This country was facing a great challenge in its battle to overcome the 
results of long years of isolation and backwardness. So we began a hard, grueling 
struggle, as we set about building our modern state brick by brick. We were helped 
immeasurably in our task by the legacy of our ancient civilisation, history and glory, by 
the assistance of Allah, and by the hard work, determination and noble ambitions of our 
people. The fine achievements of Oman today are a demonstration of her deep and 
ancient roots, and an affirmation of her rare and sublime qualities.” Sultanate of Oman 
Ministry of Information, 2015, p. 248) 
 
Student were also told that their educations will assist them in building modern 
Oman, and will assist in the “preserving the gains of the Blessed Renaissance, and 
achieving greater progress for the present and coming Omani generations, within the 
framework of the eternal values we all share. These values represent virtue and truth, 
tolerance and integration, selflessness and sacrifice, and decent conduct in one’s dealings 
with others. These are values inherited from fathers and forefathers, and absorbed by 
Omani society over the generations. They have become an essential part of it and have 
been one of its praiseworthy attributes over the ages.” Sultanate of Oman Ministry of 
Information, 2015, p. 250) This excerpt includes all the promoted Omani identity and 
culture values discussed thus far, including tolerance and respect of others, hard work, 
and morality. 
Standardized teaching in public schools was introduced to, in part, foster Omani 
national identity. As previously discussed, Article (13) of the Basic Law names as an 
objective of the education system the building of “a generation that is physically and 
morally strong, which takes pride in its Nation, Country, and heritage and preserves its 
achievements.” (GLMM, 2014a) 
 Marc Valeri (2009) argues that the national school system has been an effort to, 
“…inculcate individual feeling of belonging to the nation, wrapping it with outwards 
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signs of sovereignty, like raising the national flag and singing of the national anthem 
before entering school.” (p. 121) Valeri states that “the school-promoted symbolic 
repertoire…by definition was reserved for national children only.” and, in addition to 
minimizing tribal differences and reinforcing generational difference, “it led to the 
adoption of common values and behaviours, but also to expansion of new sociability 
networks between individuals without previous opportunities of relationship.” (Valeri, 
2009, p. 121)  
 The way in which Omani history is taught in state schools is indicative of national 
narrative reinforcement for the purpose of identity construction and state legitimation. 
Valeri (2009) writes that “in the lower grades…ancient history predominates; common 
themes are Oman’s Islamisation, its relations with the Persians, and the Middle Ages 
until the thirteenth century. These periods’ contribution to the building of national pride, 
which (it is suggested) made it possible for Oman always to remain independent, is 
stressed.” Valeri (2009) states that “in preparatory grades, the al-Ya’arubi and al-Busa’idi 
maritime empires are studied in detail. At the secondary level, history is only studied in 
arts sections…Twentieth-century Oman is only skimmed over, leaving a black hole 
between the imperial nineteenth century and the nahda.” (131-132) In fact, in the 1980s 
students in school were told to replace the word infitada with the word nahda in their 
textbooks. Valeri (2009) writes,  
 “With 80 percent of the population never having known any ruler other than Sultan 
Qaboos, it is easy for the sultan to portray himself as the embodiment of modern Oman in 
general and of the 1970 renaissance (nahda) ideology in particular. Indeed, the Omani 
nation not only is defined by an inviolable territory represented materially and 
symbolically by splendorous state but is also built on the negation of the country’s pre-
1970 history, any reference to which remains taboo.” (Valeri, 2009, p. 145) 
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 There are several local newspapers in Muscat, 
including Times of Oman, Muscat Daily, The Oman 
Observer, and the Oman Tribune. The Oman 
Observer is a national daily newspaper published by 
the Ministry of Information while the others are 
privately owned, funded in part by government 
subsidies. “Even though censorship was officially 
abolished in 1985, the press is still governed by a 
1984 law which laid down that all publications and 
journalists must be registered with the Ministry of 
Information.” (Valeri, 2009, p. 126) The Omani press 
report largely what is reported by the official press agency of the state, the Oman News 
Agency, created in 2006, including royal decrees. According to Valeri, the Ministry of 
Information exerts pressure on journalists, which results in little accounts of controversy 
or criticisms of the government. The nature and content of local news is nationalistic and 
uncritical. Tourism, economic development, workforce nationalization, heritage site 
restoration, and royal decrees are commonly the focus of local articles. Social media is an 
avenue utilized by the state to promote its constructed Omani identity, more precise 
targeting of its burgeoning young population. Local news outlets like the Times of Oman 
engage in social media, as do the Royal Oman Police and Muscat Municipality to name a 
few (Figure 4.1). A recurring and popular hashtag is #OmanPride, which usually 
showcases much of the positive and flattering nation-building content, including 
development achievements, positive international attention, uplifting quotes from Sultan 
Figure 4.1: Hardworking Narrative 
Source: Times of Oman Instagram 
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Qaboos, and academic, athletic, and artistic accomplishments of Omani citizens and, 
occasionally, expatriates. 
Another method of identity construction and reinforcement is clothing. It is 
required by law that Omani nationals wear traditional dress, a white dishdasha and 
embroidered in public places, like government buildings and ministries, schools, or 
publically-owned, wholly or in part, businesses. Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout 
discuss how both place-making and national dress requirements to retain tradition and 
Arab authenticity in the face of modernity are misleading. They write, “…both dress and 
architecture represent not so much the persistence of the past in the present as the 
imaginative reconstruction of an idea of the past, for the purposes of establishing a shared 
culture for the contemporary nation.” (Jones & Ridout, 2015, p. 196) In addition to the 
dishdasha, there is a Bedouin type turban called a masar, or an embroidered cylindrical 
hat called a kuma, popular in the Muscat governorate. The kuma as local dress is the 
result of cultural exchange and contact with eastern Africa. The appropriation of the 
kuma as a symbol of national identity is evidence of invented tradition. The emphasis on 
national dress, then, serves to emphasize the cosmopolitan nature of Omani history and to 
distinguish the national population from the foreign in both the public and private 
spheres, making the two broad classifications of the population readily identifiable. 
Mitigating the Impact of Migration and Modernization on Identity Construction 
In addition to the motivation and methods of promoting and reinforcing the national 
identity, the state also attempts to mitigate further the influence of globalization and migrant 
presence in particular. As previously discussed, because of the population’s limited labour 
capabilities as well as the ambitious and rapid nature of the state development project, the 
Sultanate continues to rely on a substantial foreign workforce to shoulder these modernization 
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efforts. The new job opportunities attracted thousands of migrant workers to Oman. Of the labour 
force in 1970, foreigners accounted for seven percent, but ten years later, foreign workers 
constituted sixty-five percent of the labour force (Valeri, 2009, p. 145). At the time of the first 
national census in 1993, “non-Omanis constituted 61.4% of the total labor force while Omani 
constituted 38.6%.” (Localization of Labour)  Recognizing that the importation of such a 
substantial foreign labour force would have significant economic and social consequences 
contrary to the nation-building project, efforts are made to mitigate the impact of foreign labour 
upon the constructed national identity. 
Legislation and policy 
 Article (35) of the Basic Law addresses legal foreign residents and ensures their 
protection and the protection of property rights. It continues by stating “He shall observe 
the values of the Society and respect the traditions and sentiments thereof.” However, the 
language of the legislation makes it clear that the rights afforded therein are reserved for 
citizens, including those address equality and discrimination. 
In addition, as previously discussed, the Omani Citizenship Law issued in 2014 
outlines who is considered to be an Omani citizen, and outlines the requirements needed 
in order to obtain Omani citizenship. Article (15) outlines the conditions to be met by 
non-Omani applicants, and these requirements differ based on the gender of the applicant. 
Firstly, male applicants must have “resided in Oman for at least 20 continuous years or, 
15 years if married to an Omani woman provided that their marriage shall have taken 
place after obtaining approval of the Ministry of the Interior…and he shall have a son 
from his Omani wife.” Secondly, the male applicant must be fluent in the Arabic 
language and possess “sound conduct and character”. The male applicant must also have 
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a clean background, having never been convicted of a crime, and be disease free. Lastly, 
he must renounce his or her nationality of origin in writing. (GLMM, 2016) 
The language regarding female applicants is rather unclear, referring only to the 
wives of Omani citizens and not discussing the granting of citizenship to unmarried 
women. Article (16) states that the foreign wife of an Omani can apply for citizenship if 
the marriage had taken place after having obtained approval from the Ministry of the 
Interior, has a son with her Omani husband, and “have been married to her Omani 
husband and resided with him in Oman for at least 10 continuous years.” In addition, the 
female applicant must be able to communicate in the Arabic language, also “possess 
sound conduct and character”, have no criminal record, and provide written proof of 
relinquishing her nationality. (GLMM, 2016) 
As previously mentioned, marriage between an Omani and non-Omani requires 
governmental permission. Civil law requires one to seek a marriage permit from the 
Ministry of the Interior, which evaluates the application. The application for a marriage 
permit between an Omani and a foreigner can be approved if there are medical or social 
conditions that necessitate a marriage, if the non-national has the financial means to 
provide for the Omani spouse, and, if the Omani is male, he must not already be married 
to an Omani woman. Exempt from rigourous review are those permit applications 
wherein the Omani wishes to marry a non-Omani from a neighbouring Gulf country, the 
non-Omani has resided within the territory for at least eighteen years, or the Omani 
female is divorced or widowed with children. (Marriage in Oman, 2009)  
Because the legal system of Oman is also based on shari’a law, the likelihood of 
approval is improved if certain religious prerequisites are met. Non-Omani men seeking 
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to marry an Omani woman should be Muslim, and non-Omani women seeking to marry 
and Omani man should be Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, reflecting the monotheistic 
tradition of Islam, and the historic tolerance between the Muslim community and “People 
of the Book.” The requirement of governmental permission for intermarriage allows for a 
significant amount of control over foreign populations with significant social and cultural 
ties to Oman. One can control, to a certain degree, the level of social and cultural impact 
of migrants on the local population by controlling the composition of the family unit, and 
therefore the transmission of cultural norms. 
To obtain a visa to work in Oman, one must be sponsored by his or her employer. 
The work visa is specific to both the job and the sponsoring employer, making changing 
occupations and employers difficult. Once a work visa is obtained, a residency permit is 
required. The work visa and residency permit can be cancelled at any given time, for 
instance if the employee is fired, or the company goes out of business. In this event, the 
worker is expected to leave Oman immediately, regardless of length of residency, lack of 
overseas connections, or number of dependent children. Similarly, children of expatriates 
are expected to leave the country once they reach legal age, even if they were born in 
Oman and have no familial connections elsewhere. This is intended to control the 
younger population and influence the proportion of expatriates to Omani citizens.  
Because of the lack of formal education and, therefore, skilled labour amongst the 
Omani population, “most non-Omanis were employed in teaching under the ministry of 
education; as doctors and nurses in the ministry of health; or in various public works 
functions.” (Allen & Rigsbee, 2000, p. 42) The state began a vocational training program 
in 1972 in order to avoid dependence on foreign labor for unskilled work. In 1974, he 
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stressed the expectation that all citizens commit themselves to the development of the 
state, as the aim was "‘to forget the past’, and to forge a new nation with all available 
talent.” (Kechichian, 2008, p. 127) Following the rationale that occupations held by 
expatriates could be held by Omanis, and replacing foreign workers with nationals would 
reduce public spending on expatriates and increase domestic spending. Omanization of 
the workforce began in the mid-1980s. The policies established specific employment 
regulations to “secure the gradual replacement of expatriates by” through the policy 
limiting the total number of foreign workers through the allocation of work permits, the 
imposition fees on employers when foreign workers are hired, and awarding government 
contracts to private companies. (Valeri, 2009, p. 201) Qaboos stated that it was "a 
national duty, even at the most basic levels," to create thousands of working opportunities 
that did not require advanced degrees. (Kechichian, 2008, p. 118) Foreign workers were 
therefore prohibited from employment as fishermen, and taxi drivers. 
The Foreigners’ Residence law adopted in 1995 regulates the residency of 
foreigners within the territory, though the law does not apply to all foreign residents, 
including citizens of other GCC states. Article (11) states that a foreigner cannot be 
issues a work entry visa if he has previously worked in the country until two years have 
passed since his last residency. Upon entry, foreigners must register their residence with 
the authorities within the first 30 days. (GLMM, 2014b) 
Article (14) specifies the types of foreign residence, the duration, conditions, and 
renewal procedures. It states that “granting a visa to a married foreigner entails granting it 
to his/her spouse and children under the age of twenty-one as well.” . (GLMM, 2014b) It 
sets that the duration of residency at two years, requiring the submission of a renewal 
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request several weeks prior to its expiration. However, the request for residence or its 
renewal may be denied without giving any reason as to why. . (GLMM, 2014b) 
Article (17) states that “a foreigner shall lose his right to residence if he resided 
outside the Sultanate without a valid reason for six continuous months or eight non-
continuous months in a year or for eighteen months within a three-year period.” . 
(GLMM, 2014b) Raids at places of employment are frequent to ensure adherence to 
labour laws on the part of the employers and the expatriate employees. Expatriates also 
have residency cards which are expected to be carried on their person to be shown to 
authorities when asked on the spot. There are also many road blocks throughout the 
Muscat governorate, the locations of which change, to catch illegal immigrants and other 
violators of the law.  
Discourse and Social Differentiation 
As previously mentioned, the coast of Oman, prior to 1970, was pluralistic and 
cosmopolitan.  Baluchis, Persians, and Indians have been intermingled with the ‘local’ 
Arab population throughout their transnational imperialistic history. Many important 
families of these communities received Omani citizenship. Despite this, however, new 
arrivals are not granted the same treatment. “As elsewhere in the Gulf, citizens and 
expatriates constitute different moral and statistical universes, and while official statistics 
document the diversity of the new immigrants, ethnic and religious differences among 
citizens do not count officially and are hardly recognized.” (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p. 104) 
 In order to assume control over the territory, the state embarked on the task of 
compiling national statistics and began conducting censuses. As evident in the table of 
population distribution from the 2010 Omani census, there is no differentiation within the 
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migrant population with regards to their origins, or the Omani population with regards to 
ethnic or religious distinction. There are no sub-categories of Omanis who returned in 
1970 after emigrating abroad in official statistics or data. This erases the diversity of both 
the local and the migrant community, effectively collapsing the entire migrant population 
into a broad ‘other’ categorization, and the local population into a broad ‘us’ 
categorization in a widely distributed publication.  
Sultan Qaboos has, when discussing state development and economic 
diversification, discussed why his approach to promoting the tourism industry is one that 
caters to wealthier visitors, instead of large-scale tourism. He said, 
“I won’t hide from you the fact that, before some of these alternatives and industries got 
started, visitors – that is to say, journalists and others – used to ask me `What about the 
future?’ That was at a time when one was still searching for the right road to follow… To 
reply `Praise be to God, we have some agriculture, fish and seas, and quite honestly, fish 
are a real source of wealth’ would have been unconvincing, but at that time no other 
answer was possible. However, now we can say that we have begun to open up scope for 
investment and we have begun to invest. And we are attracting some investment from 
abroad. We have begun to open up to tourism in a rational, realistic and carefully 
considered manner.” (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013) 
The impact of having a tourism industry that targets all segments of society is 
that, in addition to the greater volume of foreign visitors, many ‘undesirable’ visitors, 
being those that wouldn’t exactly be respectful or behave in a respectable way, would 
have more of an impact on Omani society. Targeting wealthier populations is a strategy 
to limit the potential negative impact of tourism. Qaboos continued to discuss tourism in 
the context of his conversations with other world leaders, saying,  
“We certainly do not encourage tourism in its general unrestricted sense. When I was in 
Spain last year I met the King of Spain – he came to dinner – and he asked me `What is 
the tourist situation in your country?’ I told him `We have begun to open up the country.’ 
He said `Be careful. Be extremely careful that you do not make the same mistakes that 
we did.’ I replied, `We have absolutely no intention of making the same mistakes that 
you did.’” (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013) 
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Sultan Qaboos has also, in his speeches, attempted to counter the popular negative 
sentiments about expatriate labour and economic opportunity. Many expressed discontent 
with the fact that so many expatriates were being hired at the expense of Omani 
jobseekers. In addition, Qaboos addresses the attitude amongst Omanis that certain 
occupations, and salaries, are below them, as well as attitudes of entitlement towards 
public sector employment as well. In a speech he said,  
“The citizen should not refuse to accept work, when there are job opportunities in various 
sectors – particularly in the private sector which is full of joy opportunities – and which 
still depend upon the expatriate workforce. The work is there, but some people do not 
like to work or use the excuse of the small salary, or that the employer prefers foreign 
labour as he thinks, unfortunately, it is cheaper and profitable and willing to work for 
longer hours. Yes, he may work for longer hours but will the proceeds go to the 
employer? The worker does this for his own benefit and not for his employers. Has the 
citizen thought of this? Is it better to engage a foreign worker or someone from his own 
family, people or society and encourage them to work and be satisfied with a small return 
and wait for better to follow? 
When it rains, it begins in small drops and then it pours. It is the same with 
material benefit. What you should be doing is to enlighten your children on these matters 
so that they can feel responsibility towards themselves and towards serving their country. 
The citizen serves himself first and by doing so, he serves his country. If he is an active, 
productive member of his society, he benefits himself and his society. And if he is 
unproductive and unemployed, he harms himself and his society. Moreover, he will 
become a burden on the community and will depend on others. This is a matter which we 
reject totally. Any talk of unemployment in this country at the present time, is talk of 
artificial unemployment and not real unemployment. We can prove this fact from the 
result of the Population Census, which showed the existence of an estimated half-a-
million strong expatriate work force, while the present number of job seekers does not 
exceed 30,000. Where is the unemployment in a situation where there are half-a-million 
expatriate workers and 30,000 citizens seeking jobs, if the citizen really wanted to work? 
But if he makes excuses, then it is a different matter.” (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of 
Information, 2015, p. 332) 
 
He goes on to urge Omanis to stop complaining, making excuses, and roll of their 
sleeves, saying, “In Oman, we must purify ourselves. We must not `fall sick’ and then 
seek treatment; we must apply the doctrine of `prevention is better than cure’. All that we 
have already said and say and stress now is solely a part of our keenness on prevention 
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against a situation in which we already find ourselves.” (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of 
Information, 2015, p. 333)  
The discourse used by local news media in reference to expatriates depends upon 
the legality of their residency and content of the article. Mostly, national origin goes 
unreported and instead the individual is referred to as an ‘Asian national,’ for example. 
Occasionally, when the article is highlighting the positive influence of an expatriate, or 
discussing their art exhibition, comprised solely of portraits of the Sultan, for example, 
the article will specify “Indian resident” or something similar that evokes some level of 
belonging in terms of residency and community, not national belonging. Not belonging in 
the sense that they are Omani, but that they are contributing to the development of the 
state and positively reflecting the benevolent nature of the Sultan. Something like that. 
Expatriates involved in illegal activity like drug smuggling are for the most part referred 
to as ‘Asian expatriate’ without reference to their country of origin. If the local news 
media is reporting on government crackdowns on illegal immigration, the word choice is 
a little more threatening and a little vaguer. Those who violated labour law or whose legal 
residency has lapsed are referred to simply as ‘workers’. Those who entered Oman 
illegally or were caught attempting to enter the Sultanate are referred to as ‘infiltrators’.  
The requirement of national dress, discussed previously, is described by Marc 
Valeri (2009) as a “mechanism of strong differentiation from foreigners settled in Oman, 
whether Arab, Western or from the Indian subcontinent, in order to strengthen awareness 
of belonging to an immediately and concretely identifiable community.” (p. 121) Such an 
external sign of belonging “…encourage different sets of social practices and behaviour, 
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depending on whether one is dealing with an Omani or an expatriate.” (Valeri, 2009, p. 
122) 
Local news recently published articles discussing a statement disseminated by the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry that warns against altering traditional clothing in 
light of recent fashion trends. According to Oman Observer, “The statement from the 
ministry urges commercial establishments and companies to stop adding offensive 
changes to the traditional clothing. New designs have invaded the Omani masar, which is 
the headgear worn by males in Oman. The trend saw strong reactions on the social media 
and websites with comments fueled with anger opposing and expressing dismay in 
hurting the identity of Omani traditional attire which reflects the values.” (Oman 
Observer) Barcelona Football Club logos upon masars was a cited example as one of 
such offensive alterations to Omani traditional dress. 
Times of Oman reported that the Ministry is continuing “…its march towards 
protecting Omani costumes from any deformities and maintaining the Omani identity, 
and is executing the third article in the ministerial decision No. 270 / 2015 (banning 
import of some goods).” Ministerial decision No. 270/2015 states that importing, 
designing Omani traditional clothes or transgressing these, or modifying anything in it in 
such a way that it harms the Omani identity, is banned.” (Times of Oman) According to 
this article, the objective is to ensure that no modified traditional clothing with 
“unnecessary decorations or indecent drawings”. 
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Participant Representations of Space: The City 
Participant Attributes 
Having discussed the conceived space of the state and the promotion of specific 
cultural and identity values amongst the national population, and the methods of 
mitigating outside influences, participants’ representations of the city and its inhabitants 
will be examined, after a brief discussion of their attributes. During three months of 
fieldwork I interviewed nineteen Muscat residents (Table 4.1). Five participants were 
Western expatriates: two Portuguese nationals, one male and one female, one very French 
male of West African descent, and two British males. Five participants interviewed were 
of Asian or African nationalities: two Philippine nationals, one male and one female, one 
Indian female, and two Sudanese males who both held Omani citizenship because their 
parents earned citizenship through their contributions to the development of the state. In 
addition, I interviewed 3 Arab expatriates: one Yemeni male, one Bahraini male, and one 
Egyptian male. In addition to expatriates, I conducted interviews with six Omanis, three 
males and three females. One of these male Omani participants was half Filipino on his 
mother’s side. 
The gender ratio for participants is quite skewed, with thirteen male participants 
and only six female participants. This skewed gender ratio limits this study’s insights into 
the spatial practices of women in Muscat. The age range for the participants is 22-44 
years with the average age of those interviewed being 29 years. Ten of the participants 
are under the age of thirty. Four participants were in their thirties, and three participants 
were over the age of forty. The age of participants is important, and, especially for Omani 
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participants, their personal memories of life in Oman prior to the Renaissance and its 
resulting development is limited.  
In terms of their levels of educational attainment, three participants had a high 
school education, and another three had attended a college or other vocational school. 
The majority of participants, thirteen in all, had attended university and received a higher 
degree. For the Omani participants specifically, two had a high school education, one 
participant had gone to a vocational college, and three had university degrees. For 
Western expatriates, one had a high school education, one had vocational training, and 
three had university educations. For the Asian and African expatriates, 1 participant had a 
vocational education and the others had a university degree. All three of the Arab 
participants interviewed has university degrees. 
Table 4.1 
Participant Attributes 
Participant Nationality Age Gender Birthplace Occupation 
Education 
Level 
Length of 
Residency 
1 Sudanese 23 Male Oman Student College 23 
2 Omani 40 Male Oman 
Petroleum 
Engineer 
High 
school 40 
3 Portuguese 30 Female Portugal Museum Curator University 3 
4 Omani 25 Female Oman Architect University 19 
5 French 48 Male Spain Architect University 5 
6 Egyptian 31 Male Egypt Architect University 7 
7 Indian 26 Female UAE 
Mental Health 
Admin University 10 
8 British 30 Male England 
Telecom-
Managerial University 7 
9 Portuguese 24 Male Portugal Florist 
High 
school 3 
10 Omani 25 Female Oman Translator University 25 
11 Omani 33 Male Oman 
Planning/Business 
Owner College 9 
12 Omani 28 Female Oman 
Investments/Radio 
Host University 22 
13 British 23 Male England Chef 
Culinary 
School 15 
14 Yemeni 23 Male Yemen 
Software 
Consultant University 17 
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15 Bahraini 25  Male Bahrain 
Events 
Management University 1 
16 Sudanese/Omani  25 Male Oman 
Tech /Business 
Owner University 25  
17 Omani/Filipino 22 Male Oman Unemployed 
High 
school 22 
18 Filipino 27 Female Philippines 
Procurement 
Agent University 24 
19 Filipino 44 Male Philippines 
Procurement 
Agent University 20 
 
The majority of occupations were professional in nature, while a few others were 
service-oriented occupations. The occupations of participants was varied across the 
national origins, including an engineer, architects, procurement agents, a chef, a museum 
curator, software and tech consultants, a florist, and an English translator, to name a few. 
Three participants had two jobs. Omani Participant 13 was a radio host part time in 
addition to her full-time administrative position. Omani Participant 11 owned a 
blacksmithing and aluminum fabrication business in Mabelah in addition to his 
administrative position at the Supreme Council for Planning. Sudanese Participant 16 
owned an American-style steakhouse in Madinat Qaboos in addition to working in 
technology. One participant, Omani-Filipino Participant was neither studying nor 
employed.  
 The majority of non-national participants interviewed, of various regional origins, 
moved to Muscat for economic reasons. The employment opportunities available to 
expatriates with work experience in various field relating to development were cited as 
the motivation for relocation. For others, however, the choice to live in Muscat was not 
theirs to make, though the economic opportunity was still the most important factor. 
British Participant 8, a telecommunications manager, stated bluntly, “I was offered a job 
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so I just took it.” Participant 5, a French architect born in Spain but based in London, 
gave more context to his motivations, saying,  
“I was working at the time in the UK where I specialized in airports. I was working 
in France at the main airport and was head-hunted to go to London where I worked 
in terminal five. Then I moved on and was working on cross-rail, which is a 
project in London and I was head-hunted to come to Muscat because they have the 
airport development. That’s why I came down here. I was the architect in charge of 
the air traffic tower and a string of buildings around the airport. I was doing that 
for about 2.5 years then one of our directors of senior management here used to be 
one of my directors at the airport. Found out that I wanted to stay further in Muscat 
and asked me if I wanted to join NJP which I did in January of this year.” 
British Participant 13 stated, “I came to Oman because my father works for the 
sultan.” Participant 9, a Portuguese florist, initially came to Muscat because his sister 
moved to Muscat and married an Omani. Her reason for residing in Muscat, too, related 
to the economic opportunity of the city; her father, Participant 11’s uncle, was an 
architect employed by the state with the purpose of restoring old forts and constructing 
facades for prison buildings. Participant 11 moved to Muscat for more personal 
motivations rather than economic reasons, citing as his reason that he loves the city and 
that Oman is his second home. 
 Egyptian Participant 6, also an architect, stated that he moved because he enjoys 
“experiencing new places” and that he has “always look forward to seeing new places 
and cultures and learning new things.” However, employment was a more substantial 
reason for his move to Oman. On why he came to Muscat, Participant 6 stated, “I got an 
opportunity to join here in this office back in 2008 and I thought at that time it was a 
good opportunity to go. I got an offer when I was in Egypt and I met with one of the 
representatives back in Egypt, I had an interview, and I thought it was a good 
opportunity.”   
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 Participant 19, an embassy procurement agent from the Philippines, stated, “I’ve 
been here almost 20 years…and came for work, for economic reasons. But if I had a 
choice and better opportunities in my country or elsewhere I would go.” However, 
Participant 19 had a transnational upbringing in Muscat, too. He said,  
“My dad used to work in the Royal Hospital as an IT person. He brought us with him in 
1983. I was the only one who studied in the Philippines, but came every year for vacation 
until 1993 when I decide to come over and work. I worked, from my girlfriend from the 
Philippines and in 1995 we got married and my two boys were born and I’ve been here 
ever since.” 
 Sudanese Participant 1, a student and Muscat local, stated that his father moved to 
Muscat in 1982. He said, “It was my father only he moved here by himself and then he 
started, and then he went back to Sudan and came back with my mom and then it’s on 
from then.” Likewise, Participant 18 said, “I’ve been in Muscat since 1991. We moved 
here because my dad was working here.” Similarly, Participant 7, an Indian female who 
grew up in the Gulf, initially moved to Muscat because of her father’s employment, and 
the presence of her family was the reason to return to Muscat, where she met her 
husband, Participant 7. She decided to remain in Muscat because, “We got married and 
he was living here anyways.”  
Omani Participant 12, a radio DJ for a western music station, advised that I should 
give more consideration to Oman’s rural-urban migration, because Muscat is “the hub 
and not everyone here comes from Muscat.” She elaborated by saying,  
“…very few of the population of Omanis have families who are originally from Muscat. 
Everyone has settled here but their forefather so everyone meets in their towns so a big 
percent of Omanis not from Muscat. Very few tribes are actually from here. The majority 
just migrated here. The new generation, our generation, the younger ones say I’m from 
Muscat but you ask “where did your tribe come from?” and they’ll say ‘oh this or that 
place.’ Most of the jobs are here, the ministries, the government sector jobs are here. 
They have to move, most people, to work.”  
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Participant 12 said, “I’m Busaidi. There are two roots of Busaidis one in the east in Ibra 
and the actual one is from Nizwa, just south of Nizwa so that’s the origin of all Busaidis 
But then with time everyone dispersed someone else.” Other Omani participants did relay 
that their families moved to Muscat in the 1970’s and 1980’s following the start of the 
renaissance and the economic opportunity available in the city. Participant 2, a petroleum 
engineer, stated that his grandfather moved to Muscat in the 80’s and acquired a land 
plot, and that is why he was born and raised in the city. Despite this, he stated, “Actually 
I’m not from the city. My family they are from Ibra in the interior. Sharqiyya region. So 
all my life I have been here. SO, I love it, but sometimes we go to interior, go to 
Sharqiyya.” 
For several participants their residency was not continuous, with periods of 
residency abroad, a kind of transnational on-and-off residency in Muscat. Sudanese 
Participant 1, for example, stated, “I was born here so I lived here almost all my life but 
I’ve been travelling to France. I lived in Malaysia also. But most of my life has been in 
Oman...so...I know everything that’s small and big in Oman, feel me?” Portuguese 
Participant 9 lived in Muscat for two years with his sister prior to his current residency. 
He was been in Muscat for 3 consecutive years, but five in total. His uncle was an 
architect in Oman 20-30 years ago restoring forts. His sister came for a visit, enjoyed her 
time, and got a job to stay. Eventually, she married an Omani man and remained in 
Muscat. Indian Participant 7, who was born in the United Arab Emirates, stated that she 
had resided in Muscat “…on and off for about 10 years. I moved here when I was about 
11 and I left home when I was 14 or 15, came back when I was 20.”  Filipina 
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procurement agent Participant 18 also said “I did…go back to Manila to study 
engineering, but eventually came back to Oman to work.”  
A few Omani participants had also spent some time living abroad. Participant 4, 
an architect, stated that she has lived in Muscat for nineteen years but immediately after 
being born moved to Bahrain where her father was based, and her family returned to 
Muscat when she was five years of age. Participant 12, the radio DJ, said, “I did 2 years 
of high school in the states, Delaware, and then 4 years in the Netherlands, and then came 
back so total of 6 years outside of Oman.” In addition to residency abroad, many 
participants stated that they had traveled abroad, or travel abroad periodically, for 
touristic purposes. Travel destinations for participants include Malaysia, Thailand, The 
UK, The United States, and others. 
Representations Signifying Success of Nation-building Efforts 
To uncover and explore participants’ general representations of Muscat, the following 
interview questions, or variations thereof, were posed: 
- What do you think about the culture in Muscat?  
- Are there aspects to the culture that you like more than others?  
- Is there anything you don’t particularly like about the culture? 
- Is Omani society welcoming of foreigners? 
- As an Omani what is it like to live in a city that is so diverse? 
- What do you think are some positive aspects of the other cultures that are here? 
- Are there any negative aspects of other cultures that you see? Anything that 
annoys you? 
 
The questions “What do you think about the culture in Muscat?”, “Are there 
aspects of the culture here that you like more than others?” and “Is Omani society 
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welcoming of foreigners?” were posed to participants, and patterns clearly emerged that 
speak to the effectiveness of the state’s nation-building efforts. The following aspects of 
Muscat culture and identity were favoured and appreciated with frequency:  
Purity, tradition, and steadfastness were elements of the culture in Muscat 
mentioned several times during interviews. Portuguese Participant 9 loves everything 
about “authentic” Omani traditions and cultural activities, even the banal like burning 
frankincense. He seems to have really romanticized and embraced Arab culture.  
Likewise, Filipino Participant 19 said the “local culture of Muscat is very rich, once 
preserved and still lived by.” Participant 1, a Sudanese student with Omani citizenship, 
said,  
“The culture… The culture is just uh. They’re really really, like, they’ve been holding 
their culture which is really good. It means that they never… change their culture. 
They’re just keeping it 100, they’re keeping it real to what they believe in. And that’s 
what the other countries should do too.”  
The most frequently mentioned conceptions of Muscat culture are that it is 
welcoming, hospitable, friendly, and generous. Participant 6, an Egyptian architect, 
mentioned the humble nature of Omani culture, saying,  
“The good thing about Omanis is that you feel that they are still pure…still umm…they 
don’t have the arrogancy of ‘we are superior’ in terms of their relations between the 
expats coming to work here in this country. You know in other countries they feel like 
‘okay you are coming to work for us so you know we are better.’ You don’t hear it here 
most of the time. I never came across someone…of course…maybe less than one percent 
you might find someone that feel that ‘okay you come here and this is my country. 
You’re an expat coming to me’ but mainly you don’t feel it at all. I don’t feel this.”  
All participants said that Omani society was welcoming of others. Participant 14, 
a Yemeni software consultant, said, “Of course, 100% welcoming.” Omani Participant 12 
said, “Yes definitely. We’re known as the most hospitable people in the Arab World so 
I’ll vouch for that. Because I’ve heard everyone say that.” She then describes a culture-
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shock experience that made her more aware of the welcoming, hospitable nature of 
Muscat culture, saying,  
“I was in Holland and it was a paradox like you’d be in there house and they wouldn’t 
invite you for dinner. They’ll have dinner and not tell you ‘there’s some food, will you 
have some?’ so you’d stay in the living room while they’re eating dinner in the kitchen. 
But that’s how the people are there and yes it was a culture shock for me was like that’s 
so rude but why is it rude? You know? ‘It’s my right it’s my money it’s this it’s that.’ 
‘Okay, fine.’”  
Indian mental health care administrator Participant 7 said, “They’re quite 
generous as well, generous with their time for sure, way more than they are overseas.” 
This sentiment was echoed by Participant 19, a Filipino male, who said, “You would 
notice that people are very hospitable and very generous in all aspects. The people are 
known to be loving due to the random act of kindness.”  
Kindness was also mentioned by Omani-Filipino Participant 17, who said, “I 
think the culture here is incredible. People are kind and respectful, for the most part, 
when interacting with both foreigners and locals.” Bahraini Participant 15 who works in 
events management highlighted the niceness of Muscat residents, saying, “People are 
very nice and welcoming, and are often very hospitable.” This is echoed by French 
architect Participant 5 who said, “The good thing about Oman is that I feel Oman is a 
friendly place where as a westerner you don’t feel, as I felt once or twice when I was in 
Tunisia, unwelcome.” Participant 8, from the UK, was incredibly impressed with the 
friendliness of the local culture, saying,  
“Overall, the friendliness and everything actually hits you quite a lot when you’re an 
expat. Like in England when someone comes up to you know and says, ‘How are you? 
Can I help you? Would you like to come in for a cup of coffee?’ You’re like ‘No. Why? 
Are you gonna rob me?’ Here it’s genuine you can’t….I mean. Something like that is 
unbelievable. Oman is the best place to live in the Middle East. ”  
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Participant 3, a museum curator from Portugal, said she likes a lot about the 
culture of Muscat. She said, “I love the food of course. I really like the strong connection 
with the sea, like in the North, that everyone has. Um and their very cheerful and happy 
people. It’s very different from how people react when they are at work.” She also 
mentioned that she loves how helpful everyone is, saying, “The Omanis in general help 
you whenever you’re in need.” Helpfulness was reiterated by Participant 5, a French 
male, who recalled an experience when he first arrived, 
“When I first moved here I drove to Dubai by myself and my Omani colleagues, he’s 
now like a friend really, a close friend, he gave me his number and was calling me every 
hour to make sure I was okay. On that trip I stopped to make a phone call and I was 
stopped for maybe ten minutes and three cars stopped, all Omani, to ask me if I was okay, 
if I had a problem, if I needed help, if I had water. I mean you’re from the US no one 
would stop and see if you’re okay. Nowhere else really, I mean I’m originally from West 
Africa (Nigeria, Cameroon area) no one would stop if you were stopped because you 
could get jacked.” 
 
The conception of Muscat as a place that is like home was also repeated by several 
participants. Participant 9, the florist from Portugal, stated that Omani culture makes you 
feel at home, and that they are humble. Participant 6 said,  
“Also Omani culture is pure…it’s not you know…you can see the country is not very 
advanced. You can see the difference between here and Dubai. You can see how 
sometimes I go there I’m lonely somehow. But here you feel you are somewhere where 
you are welcome, you feel peace. If you want to stay with a family its better.”  
 
Another frequently mentioned element appreciated by participants was the safety of 
Muscat. French Participant 5 stated, “In Oman, everyone goes about their business, they 
don’t mind you being here because they have a life to live so you feel very safe here.” 
Sudanese Participant 1 said, “To be honest because I’ve been living here and I’ve 
learned a lot of things here, and the peace in this country is unbelievable. Very very very 
peaceful. I don’t know what they hear in the media, you know propaganda but the peace 
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is unbelievable in this country.”  Participant 2, an Omani petroleum engineer, discussed 
the safety and tolerance of Muscat in relation to his experiences as a tourist in the United 
States. When he mentioned that he visited, I asked him where he went, if he talked with 
Americans while there, and, if so, were they friendly. His response is incredibly 
insightful. Participant 2 replied, 
“Yea but I saw some difference in the US, that’s what I wanted to talk to you about. I 
went to a bar in Daytona I had long hair I had a ponytail. So you could say I looked 
Mexican or whatever. So I went to the bar and the bartender kicked me. He told me to 
get out. I said ‘why I just want a beer’. He told me ‘get out they will kill you’ I was like, 
‘what?’ I looked back and the whole bar stopped. You got me? This is something I never 
experienced. As an Omani I go to Dubai, I go to Europe, normal. So, he said to me ‘get 
out before they kill you.’ And it was true. They were playing pool, I love playing pool. I 
said I will take a beer and go there. He said to me “I cannot serve you.’ And I looked 
around the room and everyone was staring at me. I didn’t understand. That’s how Arabs 
get killed there. You don’t know where they are. So I left. After two or three days I 
realized they have their own problem there. Mexicans….it’s not because I’m Omani or 
Arab they don’t know who I am. They have their own thing with Mexicans. They have 
their own neighbourhoods and they are dangerous. I didn’t know that. But see for an 
American to come here, he can go anywhere. He can go to an, like you, go to Matrah.” 
 
Yemeni Participant 14 said, “The culture in Muscat is so simple, full of history and 
modern all at once. Omanis are more open minded than any of the GCC countries and 
they all come from different backgrounds and races.” Likewise, Participant 7, an Indian 
female, responded, “I would say they don’t judge very much, I mean from what I can 
see...I have no idea what they say behind closed doors.it feels like a pretty relaxed 
environment.” She went on to discuss the openness of local culture, emphasizing its 
genuine origins, by comparing it to other cities in the region. She said, 
“I mean…everyone says Dubai is a great place to be because it’s so open. But you 
gotta understand that they are looking to make money out of it that’s why they are so 
open. Having been brought up there, born there, I know what it’s really like for 
foreigners. They’ve relaxed all their rules and regulations because they need more 
money. They do it here in Oman because of the culture and history of Oman.”  
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Participant 7 continued to emphasize how tolerant and welcoming the society. “They 
cater to us a lot,” she said. 
“You can be negative all you want and say ‘oh I have to go to a special area to buy pork 
and alcohol’ but you’re drinking and you’re eating pork in a country which doesn’t allow 
it. We have everything we could want and we’re grateful for that. We are very grateful 
for everything we’ve been given. And we’re here to contribute as well we’re not here for 
ourselves. We wouldn’t have dedicated so much of our lives to a place we didn’t feel any 
affection for.” 
Religious tolerance was mentioned also. Participant 8, a British male in the 
telecommunications industry, said,  
“You learn to respect…we live in a Muslim country but what I find amazing is follow 
one or two rules and you’re fine. You’ll have the best time. And uh…I like that. I like 
that fact that I can come here and do that…as a Christian. It’s fine. Whereas the media 
doesn’t show this side to it. I mean there are Hindu temples and Christian churches I 
don’t know the type of Islam they follow…so they allow any religion…”  
Responding to this statement made by her husband, Participant 7 said,  
“Yea I mean the churches aren’t built like cathedrals but what’s interesting is that the 
sultan and the Indian community back in the day had a close relationship make in the day 
so in Ruwi there is a legit temple statues everyone, it is a beautiful temple. And it’s not in 
a regular buildings it’s a temple and it looks like one.”  
National pride and loyalty was mentioned by several participants during 
interviews as an aspect of Muscat culture that was appreciated. Participant 19 said a 
positive aspect he observed was “the discipline they show and the love for their own 
people and country, like for them it is the nationals first in everything before the 
foreigners. In our culture our own people tend to treat the foreigners/tourists much better 
than their own people.”  
Patriotism was really appreciated by Participant 8, a British male, who said,  
“Another thing I really like is the sort of national pride and pride for their king... I think 
like even for me I feel sort of indebted to him because what he has done, and you feel the 
pride of others in him and it is genuine and the fact that they respect and love the culture 
they love the country, but they really love it. I mean sometimes I feel like England is lost 
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or the queen is just someone on the money. Coming from a country where you have the 
royal family and then coming here… it’s amazing.”  
 
At the same time, however, Participant 8 did convey that this loyalty made him 
feel like an outsider. He said,  
“They’re supportive I think at the same time though maybe you’re always on the outside. 
Doesn’t matter if you know someone or not. You’re always on the outside. Except for a 
few of my friends that I’ve known forever if there was another Omani they’d say…they 
probably wouldn’t take my side. I get that feeling anyway.”  
 
Representations Signifying Counteraction of Nation-building Efforts 
When participants were asked if there was anything they didn’t particularly like 
about the culture in Muscat, there was a variety of responses, but many of them run 
counter to the state’s promoted identity and cultural values. Like other participants, 
Participant 6, the architect from Egypt, showed an interest in Omani history as a source 
of understanding. He said,  
“I don’t think there is anything annoying. I’m trying to understand and know what they 
are. We came here I assume late so I don’t know how things work in their history so if I 
have a chance to talk to someone about how the area is, how it was, how they were 
living...I’m kind of interested in this kind of thing.”  
 
Racism was mentioned by many as a negative elements to the local culture. 
Participant 13, a British male who has grown up in Muscat, said he has encountered 
discrimination based on language and race only when dealing with police. He said, “If 
you don't speak Arabic they look down on you… you can sense them looking down on 
you for your skin colour. I have had this many times very horrible… the only thing in 
Oman I hate. I have no trust in the police.” 
Participant 12, an Omani female, said, “In terms of population you have different 
classes of expats...” and cited labourers, who are mostly South Asian, as those comprising 
the lowest class of expats. Participant 5, the architect from France, stated that “You’ll 
 120 
realize that wage-wise westerners are better off because there’s the power of the passport. 
It’s a fact and because we are meant to come from markets where we have experience.”  
One participant, Participant 17 who is both Omani and Filipino, qualified his response to 
the question of whether Omani society was welcoming or not. He said it “depends on 
what type of foreigners. Working class foreigners, Indians, Filipinos, Indonesians, for 
example, aren’t given as much respect as western foreigners, Americans and Europeans.” 
He went on to say, “People are kind and respectful, for the most part, when interacting 
with both foreigners and locals. Although there are certain class groups, working class, 
that aren’t given the respect they deserve for the amount of work that they do.” Referring 
to treatment of maids, British Participant 8 said, “Most people don’t abide by the laws but 
people…I mean they’ll hire a maid and say ‘here’s your bed, here’s your TV’ and pay 
them 40 Rials a month and make them work 24/7.”  
This racism based on national origins was particularly upsetting for Participant 8, 
who said, “One thing I feel obviously is coming from the UK is the way that other 
nationalities are treated. You have your maids…your…I don’t know. I just find it weird 
how people are treated like that. That’s one thing I observed.” I asked him how they are 
treated to which he replied, “More like servants or something…What I’m trying to say is 
I guess I was being politically correct, what you see is more people are racist. Like 
‘you’re from this part of the world I’m better than you do what I say.’” Aware of his 
whiteness and the privilege it affords, Participant 8 continued saying,  
“I’ve been told ‘you need to respect me because you’re in my country.’ And I turned 
around and said ‘no you need to respect me because I’m here trying to do your job.’ I see 
it more with like cleaners and how these people are spoken to rather than...I mean if 
someone brings me a cup of tea it doesn’t matter who you are I’m gonna thank you. 
That’s one thing that gets me angry. I’m lucky I’m from the first world.”  
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Government censorship was mentioned as a negative aspect of the culture in only 
one interview, but was mentioned in a few off-the-record conversations. In the interview, 
the issue of censorship was mentioned in the context of physical and mental health 
awareness. Participant 7, who works at a mental health clinic in Azaiba, said,  
“But I think something else, I don’t wanna say more important but as significant 
definitely is um there is a huge problem with dependency issues when it comes to alcohol 
and drugs and whatnot. And we can’t talk about it. I think raising awareness, whether its 
addiction or um mental health…we need more awareness in the Middle East and that’s 
why the number is so high.”  
 
I asked whether or not the lack of public awareness is because drug and alcohol 
use is taboo, to which she replied,  
“Yea definitely I’ve had people tell me that they can’t publish my articles because it 
discusses that topic. The TV, newspapers, everything is regulated by a higher body and if 
they say you can’t put this out, the public doesn’t hear about it. Even when it comes to 
violence or domestic abuse you don’t hear about it. You don’t know if it exists here or 
not.”  
 
In other informal conversations, the lack of adequate and factual coverage of the 
damage and government response to natural disasters was mentioned. The extent of 
property damage and the death toll for cyclone Gonu was, I was told, grossly 
underreported by the state, and contrary to what was personally experienced during that 
natural disaster. One individual said that because of his proximity to military airspace, he 
had seen a helicopter carrying dozens of corpses in a net. He considered that sight 
evidence of government underreporting. In another conversation, with a small group of 
friends, they relayed that once, while hanging out at the home of one of the group, they 
came to notice a commotion at the street corner. When they went to investigate, they said 
there was a deceased newborn, unclothed with the umbilical cord still attached, dumped 
on the street. They speculated that it was a baby born out of wedlock and its birth 
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would’ve tarnished the woman’s, and hence the family’s, reputation. They said that this 
type of occurrence never receives any media coverage, despite how upsetting it may be. 
In another conversation 
Though tolerance, and in particular religious tolerance was frequently mentioned 
as a positive aspect of Muscat culture, Participant 9, a florist from Portugal who 
converted to Islam during his residency, stated that though Omanis respect Christians 
they don’t respect Hindus because they don’t like people who worship idols.  Participant 
9, despite his love for Omani culture, had a few other negative aspects to mention in 
addition to religious intolerance. He also mentioned how he’s bothered by the fact that 
people don’t care for stray dogs or cats and dislikes the mistreatment and neglect of 
animals. Relating to the natural world, he also stated that he doesn’t appreciate the 
destruction of the natural landscape in the process of development, including terracing. 
Participant 9 also stated that he doesn’t like how superficial weddings are, and 
said it’s more about “spending like an Arab” than it is about the marriage itself. This 
negative aspect of the culture in Muscat was mentioned in informal conversations as well. 
“Spend like an Arab” was a phrase I heard frequently in relation to weddings, birthday 
parties, and other such celebrations in addition to material belongings like cars, clothes 
and jewelry. Material wealth is increasing in social importance and serves as a signal of 
success. It was discussed off-the-record that this “spend like an Arab” aspect of Muscat 
culture is more of a regional influence than one typically seen in Omani culture, which 
favours humility and austerity.  
The last negative aspect mentioned by Portuguese Participant 9 relates to the 
changing family dynamic, especially when it comes to children. He said he doesn’t like 
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how parents leave their children with maids instead of teaching them traditional Omani 
values, which are strongly regarded by Participant 9. It was only mentioned by this single 
participant, but it’s not unlikely to see housekeepers and nannies caring for children in 
public, even in the presence of the parents. Having lived there previously, I overheard a 
female Omani coworker chatting with another about how her husband wants another 
child. Her response to him was “I’ll have another baby if I get another nanny.” 
The culture of work in Muscat was mentioned frequently also. Many said that 
Omanis lack work ethic and professionalism, frequently showing up late, and wasting 
time once there. For example, Participant 15, a male from Bahrain, said “…when it 
comes to work and being efficient, things tend to take longer than they should. I feel the 
culture lacks a sense of urgency in that regard.” Egyptian architect Participant 6 had some 
insightful comments about the work environment in Oman. When I asked him if he 
wanted to stay in Muscat permanently, he said, delicately and diplomatically,  
“The problem is once you start to live and you get used to the …for each country their 
own type of system of work goes on. It is very unique and different between countries. 
The system of work in Egypt is very different than it is here is Muscat. The tempo of 
work for example sometimes in Egypt we are a very big country we have on 90 million 
people so the competition the way of work the standards are different than what we are 
using here in Oman. You’ll find that when you want to go back to your type of work 
you’ll find some difficulty.” 
 
Several participants, and other city residents during off-the-record conversations, 
mentioned that Muscat is restrictive. Participant 19, a Filipino male, compared the 
Philippines to Muscat to illustrate his point. He said what he likes about the Philippines 
is, 
 “…the freedom. Women can dress and behave as they want openly, guys can drink on 
the street, you can buy alcohol from the local 7 Eleven and drink wherever you want.  
Plus I think because of the religion and strict implementation of it, the society does not 
seem normal as we were accustomed to growing up. We grew up in a culture that is pro 
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American and feel like I'm being choked up in a restrictive society…. But the pros is that 
because of this strict laws nobody gets out of line, like you have in our countries.” 
 
Participant 5, from France, attributed this restrictive environment to traditional Omani 
social values, and the prevalence of judgment and gossip. He said, “Out here, socially 
representation is very important…I have some friends from the royal circle and there are 
things they cannot do, places they cannot go because they’ll be seen. And it seeps down 
to the whole society and it’s a very Victorian approach.” He went on to discuss the trend 
of Omanis and expatriates going on holiday abroad in relation to this restrictive Victorian 
society. He said,  
"…that’s why I go to London. It’s such a melting pot. People are just too busy doing their 
own thing. Dubai’s a bit like that. Muscat isn’t which is why sometime I mean you lived 
here four years ago…most people tend to just go off to Dubai just to let off steam. 
Omanis, expats, everyone. And that’s the thing about Muscat it is small, it’s very non 
provincial but it’s got a…you feel like you’re in an invisible straight jacket and 
sometimes you wanna let your hair down.”  
 
Participant 11, a recent Muscat transplant from the rural Sharkiya region, 
considered Muscat to be crowded and polluted, saying,  
“In cities it’s like this always, most cities, is more pollution, more than other village and 
very crowded busy. Even when you go to mosque it is not the same, it’s different. So 
crowded and also you cannot…I cannot focus and give all my attention on the praying, 
on the God.”  
 
In addition to defining Muscat as polluted and crowded, he considered the culture 
alienating. When discussing residential areas, Al Khuwair in particular, I asked if he 
knew his neighbours or talked to them, he said, “Here? No. I feel they like this type. I 
can’t go to them even because I feel they like this style, private and being alone. But not 
all of them…I mean there’s difference. There is very big difference between here and 
outside of Muscat.” 
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For Omani participants, the diversity of the city was generally seen as favourable, 
with a couple of responses indicating limited interaction with and ambivalence towards 
the presence of others. No participant conveyed any negative comments about other 
Muscat residents, and the responses of Omani participants reflect closely the promoted 
culture and identity of the state.  
Omani participants discussed the presence of others in Muscat as positive, and an 
opportunity to increase awareness, understanding, tolerance and respect. For example, 
Participant 4, a female architect, said more generally, “the positive aspect I believe is 
having a multicultural city for the people to expand their horizons. It teaches people to be 
aware and considerate about others…sharing new experiences.” In addition to this, she 
stated, “Personally, it’s always exciting to meet a foreigner in Oman because I see it as an 
opportunity to get an idea about customs and cultures of others and compare it to our 
own.” Similarly, Participant 11, who works for the government in planning, said, “But we 
also have to understand and learn other cultures. It’s okay to learn to know but not by 
being influenced by them…you can take advantage take good things so add this things to 
you.”  
English translator Participant 10 made it clear that she has limited dealings with 
expatriates, saying, “In terms of interaction I guess it’s nice ‘cuz they don’t interact that 
well I mean….from my experience from our neighbourhood we have some foreigners but 
we don’t visit them they don’t visit us. We don’t really interact.” However, she stated that 
when she has interacted with foreigners, in the work environment for example, that the 
interactions are good. “They respect the traditions and habits. They respect the culture 
here which is good,” she said. When asked what she likes about the cultures of others that 
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she’s encountered, Participant 10 said, “mmmm…I like how they respect other cultures 
and I like how they do not interfere themselves in people’s businesses because as you 
know here if you do something and everyone wants to know and everyone looks at you 
when you go out.” I asked if she meant that they don’t gossip, and she said yes. 
When asked if they can see any benefits or positive aspects of the cultures of their 
foreign fellow residents, work culture was consistently mentioned. In response to this 
question Participant 12 said, “Professionalism would be one. I like how Europeans are 
very professional and punctual and I wish Omanis were. Especially since I lived abroad I 
would compare how work ethics are and it’s a whole different thing that I wish we had 
more of.” Likewise, Participant 2 cited merit-driven promotion as a positive aspect, 
saying, 
“When you ask me if I like the Americans I work with. Of course. They taught me the 
job, first of all, and they treat me with respect. And they’re very ‘you work hard you go 
there if you don’t work hard you don’t go there’ it’s something that I respect, and it’s 
something we don’t have much here by the way.” 
 
Participants noted what they see as negative aspects of the cultures of others, or 
negative aspects of the city’s diversity in general. For the most part, there were very few 
negative aspects mentioned. Petroleum engineer Participant 2, when asked if he noticed 
anything negative, said,  
“No not really. See um, Nothing will annoy me because foreigners when they come here 
they respect our culture, so they do their own thing without disturbing us. They don’t 
force us to follow them and we don’t force them to follow us so nothing will annoy me. If 
they force me to do something I don’t like, then I will be annoyed because it is my 
country, but no one force me. I respect them, they respect me. It’s all good.”  
 
Participant 12, the female radio DJ, isn’t fond of the preference some foreigners 
give to their compatriots. She said,  
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“There are very few things I don’t like...like for instance how it’s based on preferential 
treatment especially when you work with the South Asian population you do notice how 
they prefer someone from their own background in comparison to someone who has the 
skills to do something. That’s just professional work. But other than that yea.” 
 
Participant 4, the female architect, made a general statement about the downside 
of Muscat’s diversity, saying “…on the other hand there are also some negative aspects, 
for example the youth tend to copy and mimic what they see from foreigners without 
being aware that the contentious mimicking is stripping away some of their culture.” This 
counters the promoted cultural trait of steadfast identity in the face of modernization. 
The personal impact of Muscat’s diversity on Omani participants is more limited 
than initially thought. Participant 10, a female translator, said, “It’s okay for me. It’s cool 
I mean I don’t feel they’re impacting me in any way.” She went on to say, “I actually 
don’t have foreigner friends. But if I do have one I don’t mind hanging out with them.” 
Participant 12, the DJ, said she doesn’t really notice the high level of diversity in the city. 
She said,  
“I don’t mind even though statistics say Muscat has 60% expats I actually notice more 
Omanis than expats I don’t know if that’s my image or if where I roam around expats 
aren’t available but… I’ll give you an example when I was abroad I would notice I was 
much of a foreign in the place I lived where here I feel more at home because everyone is 
of the same culture and same nationality so…I don’t know.”  
 
Participant 11 who works in planning in addition to running his own business, 
demonstrating the steadfastness of Omani identity well, said, “It depends...but when you 
believe on one thing and strongly believe in one thing you cannot be influenced by any 
other culture...But we also have to understand and learn other cultures. It’s okay to learn 
to know but not by being influenced by them…you can take advantage take good things 
so add this things to you.” Similarly, Participant 2, a petroleum engineer, said,  
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“… most of the people that come here they love our identity. They love it so that they 
don’t follow us. We don’t follow them. We respect each other. We respect the identity 
and culture and whatever. If they come and love it, of course I won’t leave it. Because it 
is something that we love, as Omanis.” 
 
Discussion 
In addition to state development and policy, global economic forces have 
influenced participants’ representations of Muscat, particularly the increasing mobility of 
global labour forces. For the majority of participants, of Western, Asian, African, and 
Arab origins, Muscat represented opportunity. The main reason cited by expatriate 
participants for their residency in Muscat was economic opportunity, relating heavily to 
the global labour market. Several participants stated that an employment opportunity in 
Muscat presented itself and the opportunity was seized. Some participants stated that if 
they had the same opportunities in their countries of origin or elsewhere, they would’ve 
accepted those, too. Actually, a few migrant participants mentioned a lack of economic 
opportunity in their country of origin as the motivating factor to relocate. Western, Asian, 
and Arab expatriates were essentially sought out by their employers for their educational 
background or work experience in their respective fields/markets. Similarly, those 
expatriate participants who moved to Muscat as children did so because their fathers were 
given employment opportunities in the city. For the majority of Omani participants, the 
global economy influences their representations of the city as well, and similar to those 
expatriate participants, Muscat represents economic opportunity. The decision to move to 
Muscat was made by their parents or grandparents, who moved to Muscat for the 
economic and employment opportunities available at the start of the renaissance. One 
Omani participant made the decision to relocate from the interior to Muscat because of 
the employment opportunities, particularly in the public sector. In addition to this 
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immigration, the fact that every participant interviewed had international travel 
experience, even living and studying abroad, demonstrates the impact of global markets 
and globalization, which in turn influence their spatial practices in terms of interests, 
preferences, and comfortability in diverse company.  
The representations of Muscat amongst participants more or less reflects the 
promoted cultural values of the state, which revolve around traditional Arabness, Islam, 
and cosmopolitanism. There is strong evidence that such nation-building efforts have 
been quite effective. Both Omani and expatriate participants, from all origins but 
particularly Arab participants and Muslim African participants, held representations of 
the city as pure and traditional, even ‘authentic’. Many participants, including Europeans, 
viewed Muscat as home or as a great place to raise a family in comparison to other cities 
in the Gulf. This purity and authenticity was also strengthened by participant statements, 
of Asian, African, European and Arab origins, regarding the cultural steadfastness of 
Omanis even in the face of increasing diversity.  
Related to this cultural steadfastness is the conveyed representation of Omani 
society as loyal and patriotic, emphasized notably by a British participant. National pride, 
unity, and loyalty was also mentioned by expatriate participants, with an emphasis on 
Sultan Qaboos himself. This was not conveyed blatantly by Omani participants, perhaps 
because these representations of the city are produced in relation to representations and 
experiences of other places, and so this unity and loyalty might be passively experienced 
without reflection. However, a foreign participant did say that he felt like an outsider, and 
felt as if Omanis would be supportive of other Omanis regardless of the situation, even if 
he, a British male, and the Omani were close friends. Participants also seem to have some 
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understanding of the historical materialism, specifically the maritime trade relations of 
yesteryear, that serves as the basis for Omani cultural values. The term wasta was used 
during informal conversations, and it effectively translate to nepotism. Muscat residents 
said with frequency that knowing someone or being from the same tribe as someone 
produces results, especially when it comes to government affairs and permissions. This is 
evidence of loyalty and unity, though not meritorious. I also observed such loyalty in 
social situations, and, in particular, admiration of and loyalty to Sultan Qaboos himself. 
In conversations his accomplishments are spoken of in high regard, and seen as selfless 
dedication to the Omani people. This alone fosters patrimonial loyalty, playing into the 
nation-building strategy employed. Relating to traditional Arab social and cultural values 
is the promoted characteristic of Omanis as hardworking. Though no expatriate 
participants cited strong work ethic as a characteristic of Omani society, the fact that 
Omani participants thought the professionalism exhibited by their expatriate coworkers 
was admirable and a positive outcome of their presence signals that there is, at least for 
some Omanis, a shift towards, or return back to, such a work ethic. Likewise, two Omani 
participants interviewed had more than one job is evidence that the state’s promotion of 
hardwork and sacrifice is at least in part effective. 
Also frequently mentioned, by all participants regardless of national origin, was 
the representations of Muscat and its inhabitants as welcoming, friendly, humble, 
hospitable and generous, some of the most central elements of the promoted traditional 
Arabness. Expatriate participants saw this hospitality and friendliness as sincere and 
genuine, and, as a white western female, I am personally in agreement with this 
representation.  This representation of Muscat usually arose from interactions of 
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participants with Omanis who extended help or hospitality even when unsolicited or 
inconvenient. Omani participants also mentioned that the social importance of hospitality, 
humility, and generosity in Oman is exceptional when compared to other peoples, both 
regionally and globally. In addition, Omani respondents also mentioned their shock when 
not met with the same hospitality, which stands as evidence that the value of hospitality is 
engrained in Omani society.   Related to this, a third representation of the city that stands 
as evidence of the success of Oman’s nation-building endeavor is the representation of 
Muscat as safe and peaceful. This was mentioned by foreign residents, of all national 
origins, and Omanis alike.  
In addition, a fourth representation of Muscat amongst participants is open-
minded, tolerant, both culturally and religiously, and progressive, serving as evidence 
that cosmopolitanism as a national identity element is successful. The fact that many 
foreign participants from more western societies mentioned this conception of Muscat is 
notable. Also, the fact that Omani participants expressed that they see the presence of 
expatriates as an opportunity to learn tolerance and respect, and gain understanding of 
others, is incredibly strong evidence of the effectiveness of the state’s promotion of 
cosmopolitanism as a critical component of national identity.  Western, or westernized, 
expatriates seemed to hold this conception of Muscat as religiously tolerant in relation to 
their conceptions about the region more broadly, or of Muslim societies more broadly.  
The exception to this is the florist from Portugal who noted religious intolerance towards 
South Asians in particular. 
Though much of the state’s promoted cultural values are verified through 
residents’ representations of space, there was some evidence that suggests a level of 
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ineffectiveness in the state’s nation-building process. Though tolerance, respect, and 
hospitality were frequently cited, several expatriate participants noted racism based on 
both class and national origin. The nationalities of expatriates expressing this sentiment 
included British, Portuguese, Indian, and Filipino. Other participants discussed the 
disrespectful and intolerant behaviours and attitudes of Omanis towards non-Western 
expatriates, specifically those employed as housekeepers, and cleaners. A couple Omani 
participants mentioned racism and ‘expat classes’ which runs counter to the cosmopolitan 
identity elements of tolerance, respect, and hospitality. An Omani participant relayed that 
there are certain classes of expatriates based on their occupation. South Asians comprise, 
according to her understanding, the lowest level of that expatriate hierarchy because they 
are the labourers. This disrespect can in part be attributed to classism, but participants of 
Asian origins experienced racism despite their employment in other fields. 
Likewise, intolerance towards specific religions was mentioned by a Portuguese 
participant who had converted to Islam. Non-Christians aren’t afforded the same level of 
respect and tolerance afforded to Christian residents. This religious intolerance, however, 
is supported in part by Omani law, especially in terms of being granted citizenship and 
permission to marry non-Omanis. To marry an Omani man, for example, an expatriate 
woman must by Muslim, Christian or Jewish to be granted permission to marry. This law 
is intended to prevent the influence of other polytheistic religions upon Omani society, 
but essentially reinforces religious intolerance amongst the population. 
This could be due to the fact that Christians historically have been respected by 
Muslims, but it could also be correlated with the national origins of its adherents. Not 
unrelated is another negative aspect of Muscat culture mentioned, and that is the 
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changing nature of the family. One expatriate participant noted that Omani parents tend 
to leave the child-rearing to expatriate nannies/housekeepers, who therefore have much 
influence over the cultural identity of those children. This could be considered an impact 
of international migration upon the national population, but I consider it more an outcome 
of urbanization and modernization upon the traditional structure of society. The influence 
of modernization and urbanization can also be seen in the conveyance that, countering the 
humble representations of Muscat culture, Omani culture is becoming increasingly 
superficial, as the phrase “spend like an Arab” was iterated on multiple occasions. 
Likewise, the representation of Muscat as crowded and alienating, as expressed by an 
Omani of rural origin, further demonstrates the impact of modernization and urbanization 
upon the local culture and counters the cultural element of collectivity and unity. 
Another counter to the state’s promotion of tolerance and understanding as a 
cultural value is the participants’ representation of Muscat as restrictive. This is 
mentioned by non-Muslim expatriates, as to be expected, but also Omanis, especially 
women. In both interviews and informal conversations, the restrictiveness of society was 
attributed to family reputation and gossip amongst Omanis. Both men and women fear 
the repercussions of being seen in public in places they are not meant to frequent, 
whether or not they are engaged in any transgression. Consideration is given to the 
thoughts and perceptions others would have, and the gossip that seems to be inherent to 
Omani society. Omani women feel a heightened sense of restriction because their chastity 
and reputation is a direct reflection of their families’ reputation, and influences their 
social and personal relations. Though the state promotes tolerance and understanding, it 
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might not be intended to apply in this situation, but for this promoted element of identity, 
it should. 
Relating to this promotion of tolerance and understanding is the issue of 
government censoring of specific domestic events. Drug and alcohol abuse, and sexual 
‘misconduct’ are not adequately covered in domestic news publications. This, I speculate, 
is a way of controlling the flow of information so that the government’s modernization 
efforts are seen in a positive light, but with gossip and grape-vine communications being 
so prevalent, the residents of Muscat are already aware of the existence of these issues, 
but perhaps not their magnitude, and are therefore aware of the media censorship. 
Increasingly, though, taboo issues, such as drug abuse and outreach, are appearing more 
frequently in local news outlets. This is, in my mind, progress towards tolerance and 
understanding amongst Omani residents. 
There was significant evidence that the state’s promotion of hard work was 
lacking amongst Muscat residents. Both Omani and non-national participants conveyed, 
citing either that they appreciate the work ethic of expatriates, or their dislike for Omani 
work ethic, that the promotion of hard work and sacrifice as an element of national 
identity was unfulfilled. Omani Participant 11, a recent transplant from the rural areas of 
Oman, ran his own business and volunteered regularly in addition to his full-time 
government job. Because of his rural upbringing and origins, I consider the rentier state, 
Omanization, nepotism, and urbanization as the cause for this lax work culture, rather 
than something that can be attributed to a ‘traditional’ Omani work ethic that existed 
prior to 1970.  
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 Having discussed the nation-building strategies employed to promote specific 
cultural traits, and evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts through an exploration of 
participants’ representations of the city broadly, the following chapter will discuss the 
more material nation-building strategy, and the subsequent representations of sub-city 
neighbourhoods amongst Muscat residents. 
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CHAPTER V 
REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE: NEIGHBOURHOODS 
The following chapter attempts to understand representations of Muscat’s 
neighbourhoods as conceived by the state and city residents. Lefebvre distinguishes 
between knowledge and cognition. Knowledge serves power, which includes ideology 
and political practice, whereas “cognition is critical, subversive, and open to reality and 
possibility.” (Bertuzzo, 2009, p. 30) This chapter is concerned with representations of 
Muscat’s neighbourhoods informed by the material reality created by the state through 
urban planning. The methods of urban planning and the production of spaces will first be 
discussed, followed by a discussion of participants’ representations of space at the 
neighbourhood level in relation to the state’s urban development efforts. 
 
Place-making in the Construction of Identity and Mitigation of Modernization’s 
Influence 
Place-making is an important strategy for national, spatial identity construction 
and territorial unification, and is a strategy used by the Omani state to counter the 
potentially homogenizing impact of modernization and globalization.  According to 
Mohamed El Amrousi and John Biln (2010), whereas other cities of the Gulf Coast, like 
Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi, “have tended to create two mutually exclusive forms of 
spatial development: hyper-modern high-rise towers and shopping complexes, on the one 
hand, and carefully renovated historic buildings…on the other…” the urban development 
of Muscat has been much more nuanced. (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, pp. 2-3)  
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Aurel von Richthofen (2011) discusses the process of territorialization in Oman 
beginning in 1970. He states that an emphasis on investment in infrastructure was a way 
to distribute wealth throughout the country and “prevent exodus from rural areas and the 
creation of slums in the Muscat Capital Area” and to decentralize existing urban areas 
that could politically challenge the Sultan. (6) The first Five-Year Development Plan 
focused on land-use and urban planning in the Muscat Capital Area that was both an 
architectural and administrative undertaking to facilitate the development of the area. 
“The extents of the Muscat Capital Area along the coast of the Gulf of Oman was framed 
deliberately by the 2 palaces of the Sultan (Muscat as the government’s seat and Seeb as 
the residence), an act of absolute territorialization.” (von Richthofen, 2011, 
PARAGRAPH #)  
With regards to the urbanization process, according to von Richthofen (2016) 
states that the Capital Area – Seeb Local Plan was created through the consultancy with 
European planners and architects and divides and separates areas of Muscat into zones 
based on singular functions. Von Richthofen states that, “this ‘modernist separation of 
functions’ marginalized the traditional mix of uses that characterizes the traditional 
Omani city.” (von Richthofen, 2016, p. 145) Royal Decree No. 26/1975 describes the 
functions of the Ministry of Land Affairs, which helped realize the Muscat development 
plan. It determines land usage, subdivision, preparation and development, and the 
allocation of land. The plan first identified sites for the location of industrial and 
commercial zones and the airport followed by residential areas, though “the plan does not 
explicitly state any segregation of ethnicities nor social differentiation within the 
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residential zones.” (von Richthofen, 2011, para. 15) Von Richthofen (2011) states that the 
delineated zones of the Ministry of Land Affairs,   
“pre-determined space and prevented dialogue….the modernist separation of functions 
marginalizing the traditional mix of uses that characterizes the traditional Omani city. 
The central power controls and structures a previously heterogeneous and indefinite 
space rendering it homogenous. The separation of functions implicit in the zoning plan 
leads to a spatial separation and by result to a sprawl of separate living, working, and 
leisure districts.” (para. 16) 
Royal Decree No. 81/84 was issued to allocate government land to Omani citizens 
through a lottery system. This decree stated that every Omani male aged 23 and above, or 
female if she was the sole provider of the family, had the right to a plot of land. These 
plots were subdivided, homogenous in size and shape, along already constructed 
roadways. Construction of homes on these subdivided lots were supported by 
government-backed loans through the Oman Housing Bank (von Richthofen, 2011, para. 
9). 
There are images of Sultan Qaboos littered throughout the territory (Photo 5.1, 
Photo 5.2), especially the capital. Businesses will display prominent portraits of the 
Sultan on the outside of their buildings, in addition to hanging portraits in every office 
and waiting room throughout Muscat. Valeri (2009) writes that “the extreme 
personalization of Oman’s external signs of sovereignty is an integral part of a modern 
national-identity building process, to assert Sultan Qaboos’ legitimacy and to link both 
the institution he embodies and his own person to the ‘renaissance’ of the country.” (p. 
139)  Likewise, place names personalizing the Omani renaissance in post-1970 Muscat 
with Qaboos include Madina al-Nahda, Nahda Hospital in Ruwi, Madina Sultan Qaboos, 
18 November Street (Sultan Qaboos’ birthday and the date of the Omani National Day), 
the wealthy Madinat Qaboos neighbourhood, Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque, to name a 
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few. By linking his name to modern and progressive developments is part of the national 
discourse, and by naming specific roads, schools, ports, stadiums, and buildings after 
himself, “Qaboos was inscribing his presence upon the national geography.” (Chatty, 
2009, p. 46) All of this place-making plays into the national narrative and produces a 
conceived space of the state in the Muscat Capital Area. 
While Muscat also has the intentions to both preserve culture and to “consolidate 
a unified…Omani identity, while also developing its tourist sector as a major source of 
foreign income,” the strategy of urban development in Muscat avoided “the reductive 
strategies” of these other Gulf cities, and can be understood to be comprised of three 
basic approaches: 1) recovering the past, 2) phasing space, and 3) forging reality. “Taken 
together,” El Amrousi and Biln (2010) argue,  
“these can be understood as original experiments in resolving some of the tensions 
between strengthening location traditions and identities (national identity, traditional 
culture, local religious beliefs and practices), on the one hand, and facilitating 
modernization and economic stability (opening up to global economies and tourist 
development), which tend to dilate local culture and tradition, on the other.” (pp. 2-3) 
The first strategy, recovering the past, involves the maintenance of traditional 
architectural and urban appearances covering a range of modern conveniences. With 
regards to regular residential buildings, El Amrousi & Biln (2010) classify Muscat’s 
urban planning as “culturally sensible urbanism” and as “Arabian-modernism” in that in 
the everyday lived experience, Muscat residents live in neo-Arabian styled houses outside 
of the tourists’ gaze, in other words not for the presentation of traditional culture to 
tourists. They classify the urban development approach in Muscat as “an organic 
extension of the 20th century modernization projects in Casablanca and Rabat that merged 
modern/Western urbanism, with its strict design guidelines, with local ornaments and 
motifs that sustain local adaptations to climate.” (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 5)  
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Building codes and construction regulations, on both commercial and residential 
buildings, govern outward appearance. There are municipal planning laws requiring 
buildings look ‘Arab,’ with neutral colours, Arab architectural design, and height 
limitations to maintain tradition sense of place. (Jones & Ridout, 2015, pp. 195-196) 
Building codes specify how residential buildings must look. According to the building 
regulations for Muscat Municipality, they must “conform with the social norms of the 
Arab Muslim families.” (Ch. 2 Article 14 A1) and Article (33) 2 of Chapter 2 states that 
“the architectural design of facades/elevation of residential and residential-commercial 
buildings shall be according to the local, Arab, and Islamic style.” (Muscat Municipality 
–Muscat Municipal Council, 1974)  (See Photo 5.3) 
The Ministry of Land Affairs and Municipality in Muscat issued ministerial 
decision No. 41/81 which promotes construction that “incorporate[s] the rounded edges 
and fleeting towers originating in traditional abode construction…to decorate the flat 
roofs with balustrades reminiscent of old forts” and to “set back glass windows to the 
inside of the dwelling to keep the appearance of a traditional house.” (Muscat 
Municipality –Muscat Municipal Council, 1974)  White and beige colours are the only 
approved exterior colours for newly constructed buildings, as they “emanate traditional 
abode or stone dwellings.” (Muscat Municipality –Muscat Municipal Council, 1974)  
There are also height limits of five stories for new construction to reproduce this 
traditional residential setting. In addition, even roof-top water tanks (Photo 5.4) are to be 
hidden “inside a crenellated white cylinder, displaying the Inner Oman forts’ architecture, 
so as not to clash with the harmony sought.” (Valeri, 2009, p. 145) Building regulations 
and guidelines have “succeeded in homogenizing the urban fabric of Muscat and 
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preserving a comprehensible past that effectively narrated the history of the city.” ( El 
Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 5) Like residential and commercial buildings, transportation 
infrastructure, like overpasses, roadways, and roundabouts, are intentionally designed to 
resemble the old forts of the territory. Roundabouts and overpasses in particular included 
sculptures and mosaics of coffee pots, frankincense burners, traditional khanjar daggers, 
oryx and turtles, scimitar swords, and other such ‘authentic’ symbols of the nation.  
These symbols of the nation are also found on the national flag, bank notes, and other 
material goods. 
Focusing on central Muscat, the historical core of the city, restoration has been 
focused on monumentality and “the production of monumental space that reinterprets 
neo-Arabian” architectural elements and places these architectural features on modern 
buildings. (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 3) Such elements are an ad-hoc collection of 
various “Muslim dynastic pasts” and were used to express and promote belonging to a 
broader Muslim community rather than the local Ibadhi tradition in order to “overcome 
the expressive and narrative limitations of local abode architecture,” since Ibadism 
promotes humble urban facades. (Photo 5.5) (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 3) 
 The Sultan’s Palace, Al Alam Palace, is located in Old Muscat/Mutrah 
area. Al Alam, which means flag in Arabic, is unique in its architectural design. The 
building itself is set off quite a distance from the road. There is ironwork on the walls and 
the opening gate is iron as well, and the path to the gate is lined with three-point street 
lamps like those usually associated with Western Europe. There are two bright yellow 
and two bright blue pillars in the front that support an overreaching roof. The 
infrastructure surrounding the palace lends to its authoritative air, as they are all white 
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with wooden balconies, reminiscent of the traditional architecture in Old Muscat and 
Mutrah. Right across from the Sultan’s Palace on the other side of the roundabout is the 
newly constructed and equally monumental National Museum.  According to El Amrousi 
and Biln (2010),  
“The plan was to transform the historic city into an urban museum that represented the 
Sultanate, and to relocate vernacular settlements, as well as state departments in al-Qurm, 
beyond the historic realm. The city was to become a cultural center, while maintaining 
symbols of the State that are accessible to the tourist’s lens…This not only satisfies 
tourists, but allows second order representations of the city to circulate in various ways 
and carry Muscat’s message of quasi-Arab monumentality well beyond the confines of 
direct experience.” (p. 4) 
 The Ministries district of Muscat is an area dedicated to the location and 
construction of ministry buildings. It is located between in Shatti between Al Khuwair 
and ‘embassy row’ along the shore of the Gulf of Oman. It is within these buildings that 
male Omani nationals are required to wear the traditional dishdasha in order to signal 
visually their citizenship status. These buildings are also large and imposing structures, 
conforming to building regulations in terms of appearance and façade. Most of these 
buildings are visible from the main road through the city. “Internally, these monuments 
are arranged to accommodate, but also conceal, the modern lighting and ventilation 
technologies and contemporary administrative systems required for modern offices to 
function efficiently.” (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 4) Some monuments were 
reconstructed or renovated “…by a group of architectural historians aiming to maintain a 
unified image that could be at once modern and traditional.” (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, 
p.4) 
Within each neighbourhood in Muscat has a highly visible and spatially-orienting 
mosque, and many of these mosques of prominence are named after political leaders. The 
most important is the Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque, an enormous structure built off the 
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expressway between the airport and the city center in the Bowshar neighbourhood. It 
serves as an incredibly visible symbol of the Muslim component of national identity, as 
well as the wealth and power of the state, and further emphasizes the personal 
involvement of the Sultan. 
The second element of the strategy as outlined by El Amrousi and Biln (2010), 
phasing space, is the promotion of functional duality, or “allowing independent religious 
and tourist functions to coexist in the same spaces at different times.” (p. 7) This is 
largely a response for the need to diversify the economy and provide employment 
through the tourism industry. Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque (Photo 5.6) is used for 
religious purposes during daily prayers, but is also used as a tourist site during regulated 
hours. El Amrousi and Biln (2010) state that,  
“The duality of function and the shift in spatial use from religious to touristic offers to 
both the faithful and the tourist a sense of living memory that is often lacking in local 
heritage sites. In this sense, the Grand Mosque can be understood as a particularly 
compelling example of ‘re-packaging’ the image of a conservative past into one that a 
tourist- but also a local- can find accessible.” (p. 7) 
Ibadhi religious doctrine declares that both vernacular and religious buildings be 
“modest, humble in appearance and lacking extravagant decoration” and that religious 
buildings in particular should not be monuments of visitations to those outside the Ibadhi 
interpretation. The Grand Mosque, with its, 
“transnational-electic choice of interior motifs and monumental symbolism transcend 
local building traditions in time and space, and inevitably reflect political decisions and 
constructed traditions. They also reflect the ambitions of their respective 
governments….in part through the presentations of a new image: that of a multi-faceted 
and tolerant Islam.” (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 7)  
In Matrah, next to the historic core of Muscat, is a large souq on the Corniche that 
is regularly frequented by tourists. According to El Amrousi & Biln (2010), this souq is 
evidence of “the front and backstage of Muscat’s commercial hub” in that the front 
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portion of the souq is a “space of tourist consumption and commerce.” (Photo 5.7) There 
you can find souvenirs shops and cafes, “fronted by a group of restored houses 
traditionally belonging to Hyderbadi merchants” while the backend of the souq is the 
lived space of Lawati residences (Photo 5.8) Spatial segregation is purposefully planned 
into the souq, with a change in lighting, roads and walkways, and the presence of gates 
signaling a change between the tourist space of the souq and the everyday living space of 
Matrah residents. (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 6) 
Aside from government schools there are several separate primary and secondary 
schools specific to national origin. For example, there is the Pakistani School of Muscat 
and the Philippine School Muscat, Indian School Muscat, Sri Lankan School Muscat, 
ABA (British Academy), Egyptian School Muscat, and The American International 
School Muscat (TAISM). The Sultan also allotted land for the construction of places of 
worship, like Christian churches and Hindu temples, and their location is significant in 
that they are not in the core of the city, and are located in areas frequented by expatriate 
residents more so than Omanis or foreign tourists. 
The importation of foreign labour, particularly unskilled, manual labour, is 
characterized by spatial and social segregation. Labour camps, within which the imported 
foreign labourers are confined, are usually in close proximity to or on the site of 
construction of the infrastructural project, and are provided for the company awarded the 
construction contract. The accommodations are usually Spartan, and the workers live in 
close quarters. In addition to the spatial separation of living arrangements, the working 
hours for the labourers are usually contrary to regular working hours, meaning that not 
only is there little interaction between the unskilled foreign labourers and the society, but 
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they go largely unseen or unnoticed. This purposeful separation, in addition to the 
economic separation given their low wages usually sent as remittances, severely limits 
the social and cultural interaction between the large population of foreign labourers and 
the local population, rendering their social and cultural impact virtually null.  
Usually, expatriate workers are provided housing by their employers, and do not 
have much choice in choosing the location of residency. These residential compounds 
allow for expatriates to conduct themselves as they wish without such activities being 
seen by the local population, like alcohol consumption and sun-bathing. These residential 
developments are usually reserved for the more wealthy migrant community, particularly 
Europeans. They limit the influence of western culture upon the national narrative being 
constructed. 
Forging reality is the third strategy in the urban development strategy and this 
relates to the construction of tourist enclaves and “developing wholly new and integrated 
‘realities’ by compressing traces of the past into present development.” (El Amrousi & 
Biln, 2010, p. 3) There are expatriate enclaves and resorts, developed by private or joint 
private-public endeavours. The Ministry of Tourism was created in 2004 and promoted 
high-end tourism rather than mass tourism with the understanding that “high-end tourists 
would expect a more authentic cultural experience” and this type of tourism would thus 
preserve socio-cultural traditions more so than mass tourism. In high-end hotels you see 
the inclusion of historical references to local culture, including architectural elements like 
arched windows and central interior domes. Al Bustan Intercontinental Hotel has a 
“castle-like appearance and grand approach” functioning as a visual reference to the 
monuments of the Imamate of the interior, like forts and castles.  The façade of Barr Al 
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Jissah, Chedi Muscat Hotel, the Wave, and Shangri-La, resorts or tourist/expatriate 
enclaves, can all be classified in the same vein, but the resort nature of these locations can 
be seen as a “further attempt to seclude the tourist from the surrounding environment by 
offering similarly entertaining, clean, and well-organized staged environments.” (El 
Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 9) 
Recognizing that foreign investors and residents engage in the consumption of 
alcohol, the Sultan allows the sale and consumption of alcohol in designated locations, 
usually in neighbourhoods dominated by Westerners or those catering to tourists. Bars in 
or in close proximity to hotels are popular amongst expatriates but are also regularly 
frequented by male Omani nationals. During Ramadan these places do not serve 
alcoholic beverages. Live music is regulated, limited by important religious dates, level 
of volume, venue location, and entertainment work visa requirements.  
According to El Amrousi and Biln (2010), “These new tourism enclaves have 
become spaces to stage new but more or less convincing narratives of Omani heritage” 
and these tourism enclaves exist,  
“…within a context that compresses several times and spaces, various pasts, and an 
evolving present. These enclaves construct from the whole cloth settings that appear 
entirely real and which sometimes surpass their imitated origins in apparent authenticity 
and presences. They tend to weave narratives of hybrid traditions that build on chosen 
sections of history, and project onto the present a fusing of disparate places and spaces.” 
(p. 10) 
 El Amrousi and Biln (2010) ultimately argue that, 
“This effectively creates a ‘new heritage’ which serves to validate a unified national 
narrative of place and identity, as well as to satisfy touristic demands for ‘real 
experiences’. These narratives and their associated space create an image of national 
identity and socio-cultural cohesion that serves to repacked the image of Oman from one 
of tribal conflict and conservatism to one demonstrating the (constructed) charm of an 
emerging Gulf State which smoothly interlaces traditional and modernity.” (Photo 5.9) 
(El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 10) 
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This staged authenticity and creation of tourist enclaves “encourages the belief 
that the rest of the landscape the tourist encounters – constructed waterfront, conventional 
tourist developments, the reconstructed urban core – is all there is to the ‘real Oman’…” 
and that “the unseen populations of the excluded […] spaces, themselves and their spaces 
as real as any other, however, remain invisible, and as such remain protected from 
unwanted incursion.” (El Amrousi & Biln, 2010, p. 10 
Participant Representations of Space: Neighbourhoods 
To tap into participants’ understandings and conceptions of specific 
neighbourhoods and areas of Muscat, in particular their inhabitants, the following 
interview questions were asked: 
- Do you think there are distinct areas where noncitizens live? Where are these 
areas?  
- Are there specific areas where Omanis live? Where are they? 
As you can see from Table 5.1, several neighbourhoods of the Muscat Capital 
Area were mentioned multiple times are areas of migrant residency. The most frequently 
mentioned neighbourhoods were Qurum, Ruwi, The Wave, and Madinat Qaboos. When 
asked where the areas of conspicuous foreign residency were, Omani Participant 12, the 
DJ replied, “The Wave is one…for westerners” but went on to summarize the residential 
composition of the Muscat Capital Area quite thoroughly. She said,  
“Like I think it’s zoned. Like the whole of Muscat, so the coast is kinda zoned and you 
have Ruwi and Matrah where mostly Indians live there. Muscat the main Muscat lots of 
Omanis who live there who it’s their hometown. Like generations and generations they 
have old ancient houses there. Also Qurum is where most high end Omanis live say the 
ones who came back in the70s and 80s and started having homes and some of them 
moved to Azaiba and Ghubra as well. Ghubra is mix you have Indian population the 
western population and Omanis but mostly Omanis. Madinat Qaboos is western kind of 
center for some reason and…You find more Omanis this side of town, Seeb Mabelah, 
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because most Omanis don’t rent flats they own land and build houses and this is where 
the new land is. Al Khuwair I’ll say is mostly Indians.” 
The expatriate residential compounds, The Wave, Dolphin Village, Muscat Hills, 
and PDO, were mentioned quite a bit as standout foreign residential neighbourhoods. 
When asked where the foreigners live in the Muscat area, Portuguese Participant 3 said, 
“Bowsher the Dolphin Village where I live is also an expat community. In Seeb, the 
Wave. Muscat Hills is starting but it’s not very big now.” Egyptian Participant 6 said, 
“The Wave is a lot of expats also, I have a few friends there, they are British. I think a 
few are Americans also.”  
The French architect, Participant 5, when discussing areas avoided mentioned 
‘expat ghettoes’, or residential compounds for expatriates. “In Muscat I’d say there 
Muscat Hills, The Dolphin as well…” He went on to discuss other areas of conspicuous 
foreign residency, saying , 
“The Wave used to be like that but it’s more and more Omanis. Muscat Hills is definitely 
an expat home, the Dolphin. Al Bustan, there’s a set of luxury villas there, but that’s 
really, really rich expats...they made a killing in the oil industry...to a lesser degree Bar 
Al Jissah is like that as well. Even still there’s a certain degree of mixity I mean even in 
Muscat hills you’ll find Omanis living there.” 
 
Sudanese Participant 1 said that preference is a factor in the decision of foreigners 
as to where they live, saying “Well, it depends on...it all depends on what they feel like. 
You know? Some people like to live in a uh, a live area, which is like you see people and 
stuff.” When I asked where the lively places are he responded, “Shatti and MQ. Uh, Al 
Khuwair. And Al Qurum.”  Madinat Qaboos was also mentioned often, and Portuguese 
Participant 3 identified MQ as “the British neighbourhood.”  
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Qurum was mentioned very frequently 
as an expatriate neighbourhood also. 
Participant 11 said, “Most of them in the 
Wave and new Qurum…and uh MQ.” He, like 
Participant 5, also stated that income and 
employment was a factor in understanding 
where non-nationals live. Omani Participant 
11 said, “It depends on the living of this 
foreign people. Many in Al Hamra especially 
those who work in PDO…and Qurum also, 
and they like to live near the sea so most of 
them near the sea.” 
French Participant 5 when asked if 
there are identifiable foreign residential 
neighbourhoods, said “You could say Qurum, 
for example, Old Qurum is full of Omanis and 
poor expats. New Qurum is full of high level 
Omanis and expats.” Participant 6, from Egypt 
said, “It depends to be honest. You can see for 
example in Qurum you can see a lot of 
expats…not specific nationality but uh 
foreigners in general you can see a lot….” 
Table 5.1 
Neighbourhoods - Foreign Residency 
Neighbourhood 
Expat 
Origins Total 
Qurum   7 
  India   
  America   
Ruwi/Wadi Kabir   6 
  South Asia   
  India   
  Pakistan   
  Bangladesh   
The Wave   6 
  Western   
  America   
  India   
Madinat Qaboos   6 
  Western   
  America   
  UK   
PDO   3 
  UK   
  America   
Dolphin Village   3 
  Western   
Al Khuwair   3 
  Asian   
  India   
  Egypt   
Muscat Hills   3 
  Western   
Matrah   2 
  India   
Al Hail   2 
  Asian   
  India   
  Nepal   
Ghubra   1 
  India 1 
  Western   
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Omani Participant 2 mentioned both PDO and his neighbourhood of Qurum, saying, 
“Indians are found everywhere. It is mixed. My neighbours I have Indians and I have 
Americans I have….you know.” 
Ruwi and its nearby neighbourhoods were mentioned with frequency as areas 
dominated by foreigners. Participant 4, an Omani female, stated that, “you can find 
migrants in all areas in general but a few areas that stand out more than others are Wadi 
Al Kabir, Ruwi, and Darsait.”  Participant 3, from Portugal, said, 
“Ruwi is where the Indian expats live...Pakistani. I was thinking only about European 
expats but Ruwi is a huge hub for Indian and Pakistani and yea… We have colleagues 
here that are engineers they just feel better there because culturally they are their own 
people. Like people at the wave feel better over there.”  
 
The Omani radio DJ, Participant 12, said “Indians live there because it’s 
cheaper…Ruwi and Matrah is cheaper way cheaper.” Participant 4, though she didn’t cite 
Matrah as a location of prominent expatriate residency, said Omani culture has adapted to 
global relations not only because of migration, but history. She stated, “Oman had good 
trading relations with India and Zanzibar, just to mention a few…and you can also link 
the architecture to the Indian mogul style, mainly seen in Matrah area along the coast.” 
Another reason cited for this residential pattern is the proximity to community-specific 
services and place of employment. Participant 18, a Filipina procurement agent, said,  
“I noticed that a lot of Indians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis tend to live in areas like 
Ruwi and Wadi Kabir because it's where the schools are. And I am almost certain that no 
Americans, British or other western nationals live in that part of town. They tend to stay 
in Ilam, Qurum, Madinat Qaboos, Muscat Hills, The Wave, and the like. But generally, 
expats are all over the place. It's usually the workplace or children's schools that dictate 
where the individual or family will reside.” 
Al Khuwair was also mentioned frequently, and is the neighbourhood of residents 
of some of my friends, interview participants, and was the neighbourhood in which our 
family lived during our stay in Muscat. Egyptian Participant 6 stated that “Al Khuwair 
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and Ruwi have a lot of expats especially Asian nationalities. For Egyptians a lot in Al 
Khuwair.” This is significant in that the Egyptian School of Muscat in located in Al 
Khuwair, as is the British School. Sudanese Participant 1 said that he thought Omanis 
live in Al Khuwair, qualifying his statement with “Al Khuwair that’s what I think. That’s 
my opinion but yea.” Al Khuwair was also mentioned by Participant 5, an expat from 
France as an area that is “very mixed up.” Since Participant 11, an Omani living in Al 
Khuwair, was really focusing on western expatriates at the start of this discussion during 
the interview, and so I asked him where those of Asian origin live to which he replied “In 
Al Khuwair, and Al Hail as well.” Participant 10, an Omani female, also mentioned Al 
Hail as an area of foreign residency, saying, “There are also expatriates in Hail for 
example my neighbourhood has like three or four foreigners houses. Indians and Nepalis 
are everywhere…haha”  
Sudanese Participant 1 mentioned 
growth and development as a factor influencing 
areas of residency, for both non-nationals and 
Omanis. He said, “Like Al Azaiba. Azaiba just 
started growing up now…nowadays. Like in 
the past two or three years or so. But back in 
the day it used to be very very extremely 
quiet.” Egyptian Participant 6, an architect, stated that the Azaiba area is one dominated 
by Omani residents (See Table 5.2). He said,  
“There are some areas for example Azaiba if you go to the beach there you will find few 
expatriates because mainly they are Omanis building their own homes and living there 
but there are some areas. But because we are architects we know there are some areas 
Table 5.2 
Neighbourhoods: Omani Residency 
Neighbourhood Total 
Azaiba 3 
Qurum 3 
Seeb 2 
Mabelah 2 
Al Hail 2 
Muscat 1 
Ghubra 1 
Al Khuwair 1 
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open for commercial residential use so people are constructing buildings are renting for 
us so renting is an expatriate expense not for local.”  
 
This point was again echoed by Participant 12, the radio DJ, who said that 
Omanis tend to live in Seeb. She said,  
“Seeb includes Mabelah, Al Hail and others. So you’ll see that all the big houses are here 
because they either got the land or bought the land and built a house. If you talk to an 
Omani nobody lives in flats and apartments. By default everyone lives in a house. The 
first this is like, ‘I need to get land’ the first thing you think of when you get a job is I 
need to buy land.”  
 
The French architect, Participant 5, wanted to mention, like other participants, 
that every neighbourhood has some degree of diversity, and this is due in part to the 
backgrounds and preferences of individuals in addition to their income. In discussing the 
‘expat ghettoes’ he takes great care to avoid he said,  
“Even still there’s a certain degree of mixity I mean even in Muscat hills you’ll find 
Omanis living there. Many Omanis lived abroad and they feel more comfortable in 
western, like if you go on the house market you’ll see western style and Omani style 
house what they means the home arrangement is western or not and that’s how 
westerners tend to go and Omanis tend to go for. In Omani style you’ve got two small 
lounges at the entry and by today’s standards they’re small you’re not comfortable in 
either room so even Omanis tend to move away from that. You’d rather have one big 
space than two small spaces.”  
 
Discussion 
The state has a huge influence on participants’ representations of space through its 
urban development, but the national or regional origins of the participants, as well as their 
occupations in some cases, also influences their conceptions of Muscat’s 
neighbourhoods. Firstly, the zoning of Muscat into specific residential, commercial, and 
leisure zones limits the areas in which people reside. The creation of leisure zones that 
cater to Western tourism and Western tastes created representations of those 
neighbourhoods as dominated by Western expatriates. This is due to the amenities and 
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infrastructure of the area in addition to the cost of housing. Participants of all regional 
origins identified Integrated Tourist Zones, The Wave, and PDO as areas of Western 
expatriate residency. The state is also influencing representations of space in its 
employer-sponsorship approach to labour importation. Employers have housing 
specifically for its Western expatriate employees, and these are located generally in the 
areas associated with western residency. Participants of various origins cited Madinat 
Qaboos as a neighbourhood dominated by western expatriates, notable British residents. 
In addition, there are expatriate enclaves mentioned by participants of all 
regional/national origins, which include Muscat Hills, and Dolphin Village, as European 
and American dominated residential areas.  
Employer-sponsored housing is also a factor in the representations of 
neighbourhoods as South Asian dominated, like Ruwi and Wadi Kabir, but zoning is also 
a factor in participants’ representations of neighbourhoods. The fact that some areas are 
zoned for commercial residential use influenced the representations of those 
neighbourhoods, explicitly mentioned by the architects, both European and Arab, as 
either mixed or expatriate-dominated. Of course class is an important factor in 
participants’ representations of neighbourhoods relating to this zoning. Those areas 
wherein apartment buildings and small rental villas were conceived of as South Asian 
and Asian dominated neighbourhoods because of the cost of housing and the held beliefs 
about the class of people of those origins. Ruwi is a good example, and is an area 
typically conceived of as poor, dense, and dominated by South Asian populations, and 
this conception of Ruwi and Wadi Kabir was held by all participants. Al Khuwair too is 
seen to be more affordable, having a higher density than other neighbourhoods, and 
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dominated by Asian, Indian and Arab expatriates, but also poorer Omanis. MQ is an area 
of larger villas and higher-end apartments, and therefore seen as European dominated. 
The acknowledgment of zoning and employer-sponsored housing as a factor 
wasn’t made by all participants, however, but were in part informed by participants’ 
preconceived notions about the expatriate populations apart from level of income. An 
Omani participant speculated that those Western-dominated neighbourhoods exist in part 
because that population prefers to live by the ocean. Another participant stated that some 
people prefer to live in a more bustling and lively neighbourhood. A European expatriate 
stated that her South Asian work colleagues preferred to live in Ruwi because of cultural 
reasons, preferring to be around their own people. An Indian participant stated that South 
Asians tend to stay in Ruwi not only because of their employment, but also because they 
prefer to live in close proximity to their children’s schools. 
Those areas zoned only for residential use were conceived of as Omani-
dominated neighbourhoods because of the allocation of land plots through a lottery 
system to Omanis. In addition, participants can tell, partially, whether or not a 
neighbourhood is mostly Omanis based on the size and style of residences. This 
conception of neighbourhoods like Azaiba, Seeb, and Ghubra as Omani dominated are 
informed by the presence of large single-family villas, and held by participants of all 
origins. 
Likewise, somewhat unrelated to the level of income of Omani residents, some 
neighbourhoods are conceived of as Omani neighbourhoods because of the historical 
development of the city. Muscat and Matrah, for example, are known as Omani areas 
because it is the core of the Muscat Capital Area, and this was expressed by Omani 
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participants most notably. The original architecture of the area, catering to the tourist 
gaze and desire for traditionality, is maintained in this area and likely influencing 
representations of Muscat. In addition, the Omani residents of this area are seen to be less 
wealthy than those living in the newly constructed residential areas. Likewise, Qurum is 
seen as an Omani area, or a mixed neighbourhood, because that is where initially people 
from the interior bought land at the start of the renaissance. Omani participants as well as 
an expatriate architect divide the neighbourhood of Qurum into ‘Old Qurum’ and ‘New 
Qurum’, where the former is conceived of as being occupied by Omanis and poor expats 
and the latter, more recently developed Qurum, is occupied by wealthier Omanis and 
expatriates of Indian, and European origins. The city is expanding towards Seeb, and so 
this area is largely seen as Omani dominated, for now.  
 Having explored the mental components of space at different scales, the following 
chapter will address the spatial practice, or lived space, of Muscat residence, paying 
particular attention to how participants’ negotiate, mediate, and adapt to the state’s 
identity project. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SPATIAL PRACTICE 
 
The physical field of spatial production can be observed in the network of places 
of everyday life and the connections between them. Bertuzzo (2009) states that physical 
space involves, 
 “continuous material production, through appropriation and mastering, of a society’s 
space by spatial practice, which dialectically propounds and presupposes it. The 
perceivable aspects of space are hereby concerned: material production and reproduction 
processes as well as specific places and spatial ensembles that are inherent to, and the 
starting point of, every social formation.... These places are never isolated, but always 
inter-related and inter-penetrated.” (p. 30) 
 
Spatial practice deals with both the urban reality and the everyday reality of 
actors. Urban reality is defined by Lefebvre as the routes of travel between spaces. The 
everyday reality is the everyday routines of actors, but differs from social practice in that 
everyday routines are controlled by the dominant ideology. “Like all social practice,” 
Lefebvre (1991) writes, “spatial practice is lived directly before it is conceptualized; but 
the speculative primacy of the conceived over the lived causes practice to disappear along 
with life, and so does very little justice to the ‘unconscious’ level of lived experience per 
se” (p. 34) 
According to Lefebvre’s (1991) trialectic model, spatial practice is informed by 
both global material (re)production (Level G), the spatial elements and material 
production at the level of the city (Level M), and by specific locations or places (Level 
P). Schmid (2008) summarizes spatial practice, saying it  
“...denotes a system resulting from articulation and connection of elements or activities. 
In concrete terms, one could think of networks of interaction and communication as they 
arise in everyday life (e.g., daily connection of residence and workplace) or in the 
production process (production and exchange relations).” (p. 36)  
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Elisa T. Bertuzzo (2009) summarizes that spatial practice can therefore “be 
defined as the visible and most directly observable ‘layer’ of a complex urban life, of 
which it represents the functional, operational dimension.” (61)  To uncover the 
“functional and operational dimension” that is spatial practice, this chapter will consider 
the everyday reality of participants. A discussion of the mental maps, which are more 
active representations of space, drawn by participants will supplement our understanding 
of the spatial practice of participants conveyed during interviews. The chapter will end 
with a discussion of the influence of both global processes and state development efforts 
upon Muscat residents’ spatial practices. 
Participants’ Spatial Practices 
The everyday reality is defined as everyday routines of actors, constrained by 
dominant ideology, discussed in Chapter 4, and the material reality it informs, discussed 
in Chapter 5. In order to uncover settlement patterns, everyday routines, and mobility of 
Muscat residents the following questions, or variations of, were asked during our semi-
structured interviews: 
- In what area of Muscat are you living now? 
- How long have you been living there? 
- Did you choose to live in this area? If so, why? 
- Have you lived in any other parts of the city? 
- Where do you work? How far away do you live from where you work/study? 
- Where do you do your grocery shopping? 
- Are there areas of the city that you try to avoid visiting or feel uncomfortable in? 
- Are there areas of Muscat you feel more comfortable in? Why? 
In reference to Table 6.1, the neighbourhoods of residence for interview 
participants include Azaiba, Al Khuwair, Bowsher, Seeb, Al Hail, Shatti Al Qurum, 
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Qurum, and Madinat Qaboos. Five participants live in the Azaiba neighbourhood. Two 
participants live in the Al Khuwair neighbourhood, and two participants live in Bowsher. 
Two participants reside in Seeb, in proximity to the Sultan Qaboos University campus. 
One participant lives in the Al Hail neighbourhood, and one resident lives in Shatti Al 
Qurum.  
Table 6.1 
Spatial Practice -Work and Residency 
P 
Neighbourhood 
Residency 
Length of 
Residency 
Choice 
Previous 
Residency 
Neighbourhood 
Work 
Commute 
(min) 
1 Azaiba 5 no Ruwi Seeb (Near SQU) 25 
2 
Madinat Qaboos 
& Qurum 
1.5 yes no Al Ain (outside city) 180 
3 Bowsher 2 no Al Khuwair Old Muscat 30 
4 Seeb (Al Hail) 1 no Azaiba Azaiba 10 
5 Al Khuwair 1.5 yes 
Bariq Al 
Shatti 
Azaiba 10 
6 Azaiba 2 yes Al Khuwair Azaiba 10 
7 Azaiba 10 yes Azaiba Azaiba 5 
8 Azaiba 6 yes 
Shatti Al 
Qurum 
Azaiba 10 
9 Azaiba 2 no Qurum Azaiba 1 
10 Seeb (Al Hail) 20 no no Shatti 40 
11 Al Khuwair 7.5 yes Ruwi Shatti & Mabelah 10 
12 Ghubra 22 no no 
Al Khuwair & 
Matrah 
5 
13 Seeb 15 no no Shatti 15 
14 Seeb(SQU) 17 no no Azaiba 15 
15 Bowsher 
.17 (2 
months) 
yes 
Madinat 
Qaboos 
Shatti Al Qurum 15 
16 Madinat Qaboos 15 no no Seeb 15 
17 Shatti Al Qurum 14 no 
Al 
Khuwair, 
MQ 
n/a n/a 
18 Qurum 15 yes Ruwi Shatti Al Qurum 10 
19 Al Khuwair 7 yes 
Ruwi, Wadi 
Kabir 
Shatti Al Qurum 10 
 
One participant, Omani Participant 2, splits his time equally between his family 
house in Madinat Qaboos (MQ) and his private flat in Qurum. I asked to clarify that he 
lives in both MQ and Qurum to which he responded, “Yea. How are you gonna say that, 
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haha, I live in two places...” Trying to make data neater, I asked at which residence he 
spends more time and he said, “Both. This is a flat that I rent.” 
The average length of residency in the current neighbourhoods of residence is 7.5 
years, with the shortest residency being two months and the longest being twenty years in 
the same neighbourhood. Many participants noted that they have, either with their family 
or singularly, moved between houses within the same neighbourhood. British Participant 
13, for example, has lived on a military housing compound near the Seeb airport for 
fifteen years, but “moved house four times on the same complex.”  
Nine participants did not have a choice in their current neighbourhood of 
residency because either they were children and it was the parents’ decision, they married 
and moved to the husband’s residence, or they were provided housing by their employer 
in a specific location. Portuguese Participant 3, who resides in the Dolphin Village in 
Bowsher, stated that the decision to live at the Dolphin was forced:  “It was a forced 
decision. Before I was staying in a hotel given by my employee. We had to find a 
solution in a very short time frame and that residential area was the only one available. 
Also the governmental contract…it was just easier.”  
Participant 7, an Indian female who initially moved to Muscat as a child with her 
family, explained that “wherever you work your company tries to find you a place nearby 
so that’s kinda what happened there. And my school was pretty close I used to go to the 
American School of Muscat.” It was a similar situation for Yemeni Participant 14, who 
lives on the campus of Sultan Qaboos University. He stated that his father has been 
working at SQU since they moved to Oman so the decision to live there wasn’t his, but 
said it’s a “great neighborhood though.” Likewise, Omani-Filipino Participant 17 lives in 
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Shatti with his parents since he was a toddler, and reasoned, “I guess my parents thought 
it was a good place to live in comparison to where we used to live.” 
Nine participants did decide to move to their current neighbourhood. Those who 
chose to move did so for the desire of privacy and space, lower cost of rent and/or 
increased convenience in terms of proximity to work and amenities. Some participants 
only cited convenience and location as the main motivation in choosing a neighbourhood 
in which to reside. Participant 8, a British male, said, “I used to work across the road so I 
had an apartment in Azaiba within the first year of moving to Oman and then I just got a 
new place in Azaiba because I like the area.” His wife, Participant 7 simply said, “This 
area it’s kinda where everything is happening in Muscat.” 
Bahraini Participant 15 said his current neighbourhood of residency “…was a 
convenient option because of rent price and location.” This was echoed by others, like 
Filipino Participant 19 who said “The rent is reasonable and it is close to work and 
school.” French Participant 5 was looking for both privacy and space, but more or less 
stated that, because of his expatriate status, privacy was more of a concern than living 
space. He conveyed, 
“Basically I was living in Bariq Al Shatti for 3.5 years and I had one of the flats 
on the inside. It’s one of those where you couldn’t open your curtains because 
your neighbour is literally peering down…so I was tired of having a quality name 
but not a quality life so I decided to change and I was looking at the time for a 
villa. But I wasn’t sure that I had this job I was going to Dubai to see my 
spouse…then I found this flat in this area and I said why not. At the time I didn’t 
have this job at NJP so if I had to move back to the UK or Dubai I can handle the 
flat easily and my spouse wouldn’t go crazy in a big empty villa.”  
 
Egyptian Participant 6 stated that when he was living in Al Khuwair, the 
apartment was rented by the company he works for and was ready upon his arrival, and it 
was a shared living arrangement with other company employees. He stated,  
“So I got an opportunity to be independent and got my own place. So I found a nice…my 
office was in Ghubra, so it was more near the office. And since that time I was here in 
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Azaiba so I shifted from my office to this company and I’ve been there now for five years 
and so I tried to find something that was near the office.”  
A theme of note emerged during interviews, for those of rural origins and those 
born and raised in Muscat, both expatriate and national, and that is the desire for peace 
and quiet in their residential preferences. For example, Sudanese Participant 1 likes living 
in the Azaiba area because, “It’s too quiet, and close to the airport.” This was echoed by 
Omani Participant 2, who in explaining his reason for choosing to rent a flat in Qurum 
said, “It’s quiet. I like quiet places.”  Participant 3, a Portuguese female who used to live 
in Al Khuwair, said, “I prefer Bowsher. Bowsher is quiet and close to everything.”  
Five interview participants had no lived in other neighbourhoods of the city. 
Participants who responded yes to having lived in other neighbourhoods have previously 
lived in the neighbourhoods of Ruwi (four participants), Azaiba (two participants), Al 
Khuwair (three participants), Shatti (two participants), Qurum (one participant), and 
Madinat Qaboos (two participants). Portuguese Participant 9 moved from Qurum to 
Azaiba because the business through which he’s employed relocated. Sudanese 
Participant 1 said he lived in Ruwi initially but “moved straight away to Al Azaiba.” I 
asked how long he and his family lived in Ruwi to which he replied, “Maybe over ten 
years. But not in one house. Ruwi is big.” Filipina Participant 18 also lived in Ruwi when 
her family first arrived in Muscat, as did Omani Participant 11, who said, “For one and a 
half years I was living in Darsait it is in Ruwi…near of Ruwi. I moved because I was 
studying there in Majan College part time so that’s why I lived there to be close to the 
college. So when I got my degree from Majan College I moved here near of my work.” 
Bahraini Participant 15 had previously lived in both Madinat Qaboos and Mawaleh in 
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wilaya Seeb. He said, “I moved because my work contract that provided the 
accommodation ended, also it is somewhat far from the city and my new job”  
This relocation from one neighbourhood to another within Muscat is important 
because it demonstrates the influence of the state’s employment policies, urban planning, 
and the adaptation and preferences of residents with their increasing time spent in Oman. 
In addition, for Omani participants, it demonstrates perhaps their economic growth and 
development in that they move from a more affordable neighbourhood, like Ruwi, to a 
more affluent area, like Shatti or Azaiba. 
The neighbourhoods wherein participants work and/or study includes Azaiba, 
Seeb, Shatti Al Qurum, Old Muscat, and Shatti. Four of the five participants residing in 
Azaiba also work in the same neighbourhood. One Azaiba resident studies in the Seeb 
area of the city. One Al Khuwair resident worked in Azaiba and the other worked in 
Shatti Al Qurum. One Bowsher resident works in Old Muscat, and one Bowsher resident 
works in the Shatti Al Qurum neighbourhood. The two residents of Seeb work in the 
neighbourhoods of Shatti and Azaiba, respectively. The Al Hail resident works in Azaiba. 
The Shatti Al Qurum resident is unemployed and therefore does not commute to work as 
part of his everyday routine. The Omani male participant who splits his residency 
between MQ and Qurum commutes 3 hours to Al Ain, where he spends two weeks at a 
time away from Muscat working in the oil industry.  
Omitting this outlier, the average length of interview participants’ daily commute 
is 12.7 minutes. The longest commute within the city was 30-45 minutes between the 
third participant’s residence in Bowsher and the location of her job in Old Muscat.  The 
shortest commute was less than a minute, as Participant 11, a Portuguese florist, lives in 
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the flat above his place of work in Azaiba. Most responded that it takes them between 10 
and 15 minutes to get to work, and nearly all participants stated that this number is 
dependent upon the time of day and amount of commute-related traffic. 
Carrefour Seeb, Carrefour Qurum, Sultan Center, LuLu Hypermarket, and Al Fair 
are the stores participants most frequently stated they go to for grocery shopping, but 
which stores they frequent is dependent upon convenience, necessity, and product 
preferences. You can see the frequency of stores mentioned or mapped in Table 6.2 on 
the following page. 
 Convenience seems to be the most cited reason for shopping at the locations 
discussed. Stores in relative proximity to participants’ homes are those most frequented.  
Omani Participant 10, a translator, said she buys groceries “most of the time at Muscat 
City Center, because it’s closer to me.” Mobility is an issue when it comes to grocery 
shopping for a couple of participants. Participant 9, for example, does not drive, and so 
he shops at Al Fair and Sultan Center in Azaiba because of their proximity to his 
apartment and place of employment. 
Several participants differentiated between quick shopping trips and longer, 
extensive shopping trips. If they needed a few items immediately the locations chosen for 
grocery shopping were usually near their homes or places of employment. If, however, 
participants weren’t constrained by time, or traffic, they chose to shop at other locations 
that have more affordable products, or products that appeal to their palates. For example, 
Participant 6, a male architect from Egypt, said, “There’s not much places in Muscat to 
shopping. Mainly Muscat City Centre for Carrefour and there’s a Carrefour in Seeb and 
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Carrefour in Qurum. Yea mainly Carrefour, sometimes Sultan Center it’s near the office 
and I can pick something up quickly.”  
 
Participant 4, a recently married female Omani architect with limited overseas 
experience, chooses grocery stores for larger trips based on product availability and her 
personal preferences. She said, 
“There’s a small shop near our house that I usually go to. It’s called Al Hail 
Hypermarket, but my favourite shop when I get the chance is Al Fair and Sultan Center. 
All these fancy fancy…hahaha. The closest Al Fair is a five minute drive from my house, 
but the closest grocery shop is two minutes. Everything here they have everything here.”  
 Participant 12, an Omani female with extensive overseas experience, mentioned 
that family dynamics is a factor when choosing a location for larger shopping hauls. She 
said,  
Table 6.2 
Market Activities: Shopping 
Location Neighbourhood Wilaya Interviews 
Mental 
Maps Total 
Muscat City Center Seeb Seeb 4 5 9 
Muscat Grand Mall Bowsher Bowsher 5 4 9 
Matrah Souq Matrah Matrah 2 4 6 
Avenues Mall Bowsher Bowsher 2 2 4 
LuLu Hypermarket Bowsher Bowsher 2 1 3 
Carrefour City Center Qurum Matrah 1 2 3 
Carrefour City Center Seeb Seeb 2 1 3 
City Center Qurum Matrah 1 2 3 
Al Fair MQ Bowsher 2 0 2 
Al Fair Azaiba Bowsher 1 1 2 
Sultan Center Azaiba Bowsher 1 1 2 
Al Hail Hypermarket Al Hail Seeb 2 0 2 
Al Fair Shatti Bowsher 1 0 1 
LuLu Hypermarket Matrah Matrah 1 0 1 
Maya Shop Ghubra Bowsher 1 0 1 
Mazoon Ruwi Muscat 1 0 1 
Ruwi Souq Ruwi Muscat 1 0 1 
Seeb Souq Seeb Seeb 1 0 1 
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“It varies. Mostly for immediate grocery shopping like things I definitely need its right 
nearby it’s the Maya shop...it’s a minute drive. You can walk to it. If it’s a big grocery 
shopping trip we definitely go to a mall because we can split ourselves, half can take the 
kids and go have fun and half would go and grab lunch and go do grocery shopping. We 
go to City Center Seeb.”  
Some participants were more motivated by product preferences and availability 
then other factors, and, interestingly, gave consideration to the presence of other 
shoppers. In my joint interview with newlyweds Participant 7, a woman of Indian 
nationality with extensive residency in the Gulf, and Participant 8, a British male having 
lived in Muscat for over seven years, palate was clearly an important factor. When asked 
where they do their grocery shopping, the two replied immediately and in unison “Al 
Fair.” Participant 7, an Indian female, was the first to elaborate, saying, 
“I like specific items that I can get here that only Al Fair sells. So we’ll go to the one in 
Shatti and MQ and Azaiba. And then I like going to Sultan Center because they have a lot 
more American stuff which I’m used to. Sometimes for actual vegetables we’ll go to 
Carrefour. We want to avoid Lulu’s like the plague.”  
 
When I asked why they avoid LuLu Hypermarket she said, “It’s hella large and 
hella crowded, really crowded.” Her husband, British Participant 8, cited another reason 
for preferring Al Fair to other grocery stores, and that’s the concern of running into work 
associates or clients. He relayed, “for me I tend to go to Al Fair because it’s the only 
account we don’t supply to, so I know I’m never going to bump into people…so I can go 
in my shorts and especially it’s around the corner.”  
Indian Participant 7, responding to the previous statement said, “We don’t go to 
the local grocery stores,” and, regarding their preference for Al Fair, speculated that “it’s 
really out of convenience. If there was a Carrefour near us we would probably go there 
too.” Addressing her British husband’s statement regarding Al Fair, she said “One thing 
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you forgot to say was that in Al Fair they have a lot of Waitrose stuff and it reminds him 
of home a little more.” He agreed, saying, “Yes that’s true.”  
For some, grocery shopping appears to be a gendered, domestic activity reserved 
for women. Participant 5, a French national of West African descent who was born in 
Spain but calls London home, greatly dislikes grocery shopping, and so rarely goes to the 
store unless it’s convenient and/or deemed necessary by his wife, a Moroccan national. 
He said,  
“I tend to do the complimentary grocery shopping when my wife says to get some bread 
haha. My wife does mainly the shopping and she does it in Carrefour and I get dragged 
kicking and screaming. But yea I do the complimentary shopping because I’m French and 
she likes cheese so I get it at Al Fair. And I buy water because I can carry those.”  
Participant 11, a religious Omani male who, in addition to working for the 
Supreme Council for Planning also runs an aluminum fabrication shop in Mabelah, also 
doesn’t do much grocery shopping. He said, “I used to cook by myself but now not too 
much because I have one business also and so I have no time for cooking so mostly from 
restaurants. I like to change restaurants…some nearby my area so I take lunch from 
there.”  This stands in contrast to the response of Participant 2, a more westernized 
Omani male employed by an American petrol company. When I asked where he does his 
grocery shopping I was met with silence and a cheeky smirk. He pointed to his flexed 
bicep, and I asked, “What does that mean? You don’t do your grocery shopping?” He 
replied, “Men don’t do that.” 
When it comes to shopping for non-grocery items, particularly clothing, the 
various malls in Muscat were frequented. However an interesting theme emerged and that 
is the lack of appealing local choices and the amount of shopping conducted outside of 
Oman.  
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Indian female Participant 7 cited the lack of choice, but said they go to the malls 
if the need something. Participant 1, a Sudanese male born and raised in Muscat said he 
shops at “City Center, um most likely City Center or...that’s all…or otherwise from 
outside the country.”  Omani Participant 2 stated that he buys his clothes in “Europe 
mostly” and when asked why he said, “I don’t get my sizes. I get trousers, and they’re 
very short here and I’m tall.” Omani Participant 11 of rural origins said he goes to the 
Grand Mall and likes to shop at a small shop in Ruwi called Mazoon Center. Being 
unfamiliar with the store, I asked what they sold to which he replied, in a surprisingly 
vernacular way, “Clothes …t shirt and whatever.” Participant 11 then added “…and from 
Dubai I like to shop in Dubai.”  
Specialization was also indirectly discussed. Participant 12, an Omani radio DJ, 
stated during our interview that she was in Ruwi the previous day shopping for fabric. 
“That’s the go-to place for fabric and tailoring so I went there.” Likewise, though Matrah 
Souq was mapped frequently, only three participants stated in their interviews that they 
go there often. Omani Participant 10 stated she goes to Matrah Souq “especially for 
silver” rings and necklaces. Portuguese Participant 9 stated that he goes to Matrah Souq 
because he likes its traditional environment, and likes to burn frankincense in his 
apartment, and Matrah is where you go for frankincense. 
Generally the participants interviewed stated they shop, visit with friends and 
relatives, go to the cinema, hang out at bars, and stay physically active for recreation and 
entertainment. Indoor and outdoor entertainment and recreation activities will be 
discussed separately. People again expressed that Muscat lacks options in terms of 
entertainment and recreational activities, and nearly all mentioned the season as 
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influential in where they choose to go. Indoor locations and preferred in the summer 
months, and outdoor activities are preferred when the weather is more permitting. Female 
Omani Participant 10 said, “Uh I hang out with friends, go out to the cinema go to the 
movies…shopping. You know there’s not a lot to do in here. There’s only malls, movies, 
restaurants that’s it.” This was echoed by others, including Omani Participant 11 who 
said, “There are no special places in Muscat except for Grand Mall…especially in 
summer it’s too hot so you can’t go except to these places for shopping, restaurants 
staying with friends…” 
Muscat City Center in Seeb, Muscat Grand Mall and Avenues Mall, both located 
off the main road in Bowsher, are those locations most frequently cited by participants as 
places they frequent for shopping and window shopping, in addition to the cinemas 
located within them.  Indian expatriate Participant 7 said, “I like malls because I’ve been 
brought up in Middle East and there’s a mall culture here so it’s in my system. I can 
window shop for hours.”  
Her British husband, however, laughed and said he doesn’t like going to the 
malls. He elaborated, saying,  
“For me I like to stay at home on the weekends or go to a friend’s house, so I don’t want 
to go to those malls because also the thing is we’re, like, an interracial couple and so you 
get stared at a lot. Like a lot. You know, I’m not bothered by it, but you get…it’s a 
culture thing it’s a culture thing you have to accept. A lot of people in this culture Arab 
culture, they don’t… I mean the women they don’t mix and marry…I met only 3 people 
who have done it and I’ve lived here 7 years. So that’s probably why if we do something 
we’ll go to like the Wave. Now we kinda stopped going out. We used to go out to drink 
at like Left Bank now it’s more like friends and BBQs.” 
 
In terms of restaurants frequented (Table 6.3), a lack of choice was cited, but 
personal preference, as expected, was the deciding factor in where people go. Indian 
Participant 7 stated that her and British Participant 8’s favourite Italian restaurant is 
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Tuscany, located in Shatti, and she said “Kargeen’s…definitely Kargeen’s.” Kargeen’s is 
a restaurant and shisha café located in Madinat Qaboos neighbourhood that is very 
popular amongst the younger crowd. I also frequented Kargeen’s often during my 
residency in Muscat. 
 
Table 6.3 
Leisure Activities: Restaurants 
Restaurant Neighbourhood Wilaya Interviews 
Mental 
Maps Total 
McDonald's Azaiba Bowsher 1 3 4 
Pavo Real MQ Bowsher 1 2 3 
Grand Fish 
Market Seeb Seeb 1 1 2 
Maeda Restaurant Seeb Seeb 1 1 2 
McDonald's Al Khuwair Bowsher 0 1 1 
KFC Al Khuwair Bowsher 0 1 1 
Starbucks MQ Bowsher 0 1 1 
KFC MQ Bowsher 0 1 1 
Pizza Hut MQ Bowsher 0 1 1 
McDonald's Shatti Bowsher 0 1 1 
Al Aktham Al Khuwair Bowsher 1 0 1 
Lai Thai Al Khuwair Bowsher 1 0 1 
Zaher El-
Laymoun The Wave Seeb 1 0 1 
Tuscany Shatti Bowsher 1 0 1 
O Sole Mio AL Khuwair Bowsher 1 0 1 
Anar The Wave Seeb 1 0 1 
Woodlands Ruwi Matrah 1 0 1 
Kargeens MQ Bowsher 1 0 1 
 
Omani Participant 10, an English translator, stated that she tries all the new 
restaurants, but loves Lebanese food, and therefore goes frequently to various Lebanese 
restaurants, especially at the Wave and Grand Mall. There were also many restaurants 
mapped that were not mentioned during interviews, as evident in Table 6.3 These 
restaurants include McDonald’s, Starbucks, and KFC. This could be the unintended 
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outcome of the wording of the interview question, which in many cases implied favourite 
restaurants, rather than those they frequent most. It could also be that such locations are 
conspicuous and serve and landmarks in participants’ spatial orientation. 
Visiting with family and friends, as alluded to already, was also a frequently 
mentioned leisure activity for participants, because “houses are a great place to hang 
out.” This preference will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter. Omani 
Participant 10, a female, said, “I have brothers and sisters in different parts of Muscat so I 
may go there and here some times. For example Al Hail, Mabelah, do you know the cities 
in here? I have relatives in Al Hail, Mabelah, Mawaleh so I go sometimes here and 
there.” One participant doesn’t consider socializing a leisurely activity. Omani Participant 
12, also female, said, 
“Usually I stay at home but I do hang out with friends…but I don’t know. For me 
recreation is on the weekends and on the weekends I choose to stay home. I’m mostly 
active during the weekdays so I’ll go for dinner and catch up with everyone but I find it 
more of a chore than recreation. If it’s me time its recreation if it’s someone else I think 
it’s more part of my social life but I don’t consider it recreation time.” 
 
Establishments that serve alcohol, including many restaurants mentioned, seem to 
be popular amongst participants. Participant 1 stated that he goes to Left Bank more 
frequently than he goes anywhere else, and this was echoed by Omani Participant 2, a 
petroleum engineer, who added Zouk to the list. French architect Participant 5 said,  
“I used to go to Left Bank before, but lately I feel like it’s a pub more than a bar. I used to 
like the wine bar. It felt really more like a pub… Sometimes I go to Trader Vic’s because 
I like to Salsa.” Participant 15, a young Bahraini male, said he goes to the cinema and 
enjoys “going out to pubs” on a regular basis and goes camping or to the beach on 
occasion.  Portuguese Participant 9, a florist, stated that he does go to the Wave every 
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week because it “feels like Europe” and he sees many “European faces,” but only 
window shops. He also said he doesn’t go out to the hotels in Shatti because the 
Intercontinental Hotel and Grand Hyatt “are too crowded now” and, more importantly, 
he’s saving his money. You can see the frequency with which specific venues were 
mentioned in Table 6.4 on the following page. 
 
 
Omani Participant 11, a recent city resident, stands alone as the one participant 
who conveyed that he prays five times per day, every single day. I asked where he prays, 
Table 6.4 
Leisure Activities: Indoor Recreation and Entertainment 
Location Within Neighbourhood Wilaya Interviews 
Mental 
Maps 
Total 
Left Bank n/a Qurum Matrah 6 4 10 
Shangri La 
Shangri La 
Resort 
Muscat Muscat 2 7 9 
Cinema n/a 
Shatti Al 
Qurum 
Bowsher 2 3 5 
Royal 
Opera 
House 
n/a Shatti Bowsher 1 4 5 
Zouk Crown Plaza Qurum Matrah 2 2 4 
Copacabana 
Club 
Hyatt Regency 
Shatti Al 
Qurum 
Bowsher 0 3 3 
Ghazal Pub Intercontinental 
Shatti Al 
Qurum 
Bowsher 0 3 3 
Cinema City Center Seeb Seeb 2 0 2 
Cinema 
Muscat Grand 
Mall 
Bowsher Bowsher 2 0 2 
On the 
Rocks 
Lounge 
Golden Tulip Seeb Seeb 0 1 1 
Feeney's 
Irish Pub 
n/a 
Shatti Al 
Qurum 
Bowsher 0 1 1 
Route 66 n/a 
Shatti Al 
Qurum 
Bowsher 0 1 1 
Trader 
Vic's 
Intercontinental 
Shatti Al 
Qurum 
Bowsher 1 0 1 
Rock 
Bottom 
Ramee Hotel Qurum Matrah 1 0 1 
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and where he chooses to pray. He replied, “It depends on where I am at the time of 
praying. So there was Al Fajal is near my home…and the afternoon there is one here I 
pray in the work we have a small mosque here. And also in the evening...so wherever I 
am I will go. I don’t have special place.” Looking for insight into the population 
frequenting the mosques in various locations, I asked who was praying alongside him. 
Omani Participant 11 said,  
“Different Muslim people. More of them India, Bangladesh. But of course it also depends 
on the area. The area which is accommodating they are Omani citizen so they will be all 
Omani. But when I go to industrial area, when I go to my workshop in Mabelah most of 
them from Bangladeshi…but there are some Omani but mostly Bangladeshi and Indian. 
When I go to Al Khuwair mosque they are Egyptian, from Jordan, many 
nationalities...only Muslims can go there.” 
 
As shown in Table 6.5, outdoor recreational activities were mentioned frequently 
by interview participants, and seems to be incredibly popular in Muscat. Participant 3 
stated that she doesn’t go out much, and said, “Usually I stay within my residential 
compound or the Crown Plaza. I like to go there for drinks and dinner. And during the 
weekends, I dive a lot so I go to the Dive Center a lot for diving.” 
Unsurprisingly, the time of the year greatly influences outdoor recreational 
activities of participants. For example, Egyptian Participant 6, an architect, said that he 
and his family go to “different places…the beach we also go to Sifa, sometimes the 
Wave. I like Qurum Beach, its nice place there especially in winter but you know in this 
weather it’s way too hot.”  Omani Participant 10 said she goes to Matrah and, in cooler 
months, enjoys walking along Matrah Corniche because “although it’s crowded it’s very 
beautiful.” Indian Participant 7, employed in the mental health field, said,  
“especially now that it’s getting hot we like to go on the boat, he (referring to British 
Participant 8, her husband) likes to fish. I hate fishing. Swimming stuff like that. But now 
that it’s hot and Ramadan now it’s kind of put a cramp on what we used to do...and 
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people always find an excuse to leave so our friends go on vacation….so our summer 
schedule changes a bit. I still like to be active on the weekends.” 
Table 6.5 
Leisure Activities: Outdoor Recreation 
Location Neighbourhood Wilaya Interviews 
Mental 
Maps 
Total 
Marina Bin de 
Rauda 
Muscat Muscat 3 2 5 
Qurum Beach Qurum Matrah 3 2 5 
Al Amerat Al Amerat 
Al 
Amerat 
2 2 4 
Azaiba Beach Azaiba Bowsher 1 3 4 
Oman Dive Center Muscat Muscat 2 2 4 
Shatti Beach Shatti Bowsher 1 3 4 
Islands (Bandar al 
Khiran) 
Muscat Muscat 2 1 3 
Matrah Corniche Matrah Matrah 2 1 3 
Oman Auto Track Bowsher Bowsher 1 1 2 
Ghubra Beach Ghubra Bowsher 1 1 2 
Muscat Beach Muscat Muscat 0 2 2 
Seeb Beach Seeb Seeb 0 1 1 
Marina The Wave Seeb 1 0 1 
Almouj Golf 
Course 
The Wave Seeb 0 1 1 
 
Omani Participant 12, a radio DJ with extensive residency in the West, advised 
that I should “focus on the migration that happens every weekend.” When I asked what 
she meant she said, “For example in Eid the streets are empty and that’s because 
nobody’s in Muscat nobody…very few of the population of Omanis have families who 
are originally from Muscat. Everyone has settled here but their forefather so everyone 
meets in their towns…” Omani Participant 11 stands apart from other participants in that 
he does leave Muscat every weekend, to visit his family house and check out natural 
attractions with his family. He said,  
“I like more to go outside Muscat for…we have good weather here in Oman in summer 
especially in Salalah good weather and rain also we have green mountain (Jabal Akhdar). 
I like to go more to green mountain because it is close to Muscat and has cold weather 
and also we can buy from there fresh fruits because the weather there is good so the fruits 
is more growing there, especially in the summer. In the winter and out of this month we 
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cannot go there because the weather will be too much. Also al Ashkara is good weather. 
Masira island good weather. Also I like some cities which are traditional like Nizwa. 
Nizwa has many old things. But in Muscat I told you there’s not much places to go 
except these City Center…Grand Mall.” 
 
The areas of Muscat that 
participants avoided include Ruwi, and 
Wadi Kabir (Table 6.6). Locations where 
participants felt most comfortable were 
Shatti, and Qurum (Table 6.7), though 
many stated that they did not feel 
uncomfortable in any area of the city.  
Unfamiliarity, lack of purpose, 
crowding, congestion, and traffic were frequently mentioned as the rationale behind 
avoiding certain neighbourhoods. Omani female Participant 4, an architect, said, “Yes 
there are some areas I try to avoid in Muscat due to the really tight street, traffic, and lack 
of parking.” Omani female Participant 12 doesn’t avoid any area of Muscat, and said, “I 
mean seriously during the week I’m all over the place. Maybe the one place I don’t go to 
is Mabelah but the reason is there’s nothing…there’s no attraction there except for a few 
friends that live there and the only time I go there is if they invited me.” Likewise, 
Participant 6, an architect from Egypt doesn’t avoid any neighbourhood specifically, but 
said,  
“I mainly stay in this area you know Azaiba, Al Khuwair, Qurum. I don’t go to the other 
side because basically our work is in this area and our shopping also is the same 
so…sometimes we go to Ruwi if we have something to be done there but I’m not going 
often… Maybe I’m not familiar with Seeb area but even Ruwi I can manage.” 
 
Table 6.6 
Neighbourhoods Avoided/Unfrequented 
Neighbourhood Total  
Ruwi 9 
Matrah 3 
Wadi Kabir 2 
Muscat Hills 1 
Dolphin Village 1 
Seeb 1 
Mabelah 1 
Ghubra 1 
Labour Camps 1 
Nowhere avoided 3 
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British Participant 8 mentioned labour camps as areas in which he felt uneasy. He 
said, “I mean I don’t like labour camps. I work in telecom distribution…I feel out of 
place in like labour camps.” Because of the lack of visibility of these camps, I asked 
where they are. He said, “All around in Ghala, Al Hail, even in Azaiba, there’s one.” 
Matrah was also avoided by a few participants interviewed. French architect Participant 5 
avoids Matrah during specific times because of the traffic and density of the area. He said 
he avoids Matrah, 
“…in the evening because it’s just too crowded. It’s Hell. My wife forced me to drive to 
Matrah after iftar she said, ‘do you want to park and walk with me?’ I said ‘Hell no, I’m 
gonna park at the fish market and when you’re done you call me.’ I was in the car for a 
half hour and it was hellish.” 
 
As you can see in Table 6.6, Ruwi was most frequently cited as a neighbourhood 
participants purposefully avoid. Darsait, which is really an extension of Ruwi, was also 
mentioned. Participant 3, a museum curator from Portugal, who works in Matrah, avoids 
Ruwi because, she said, “I always get lost. Haha I never go to Ruwi because I end up lost. 
I cannot drive there. I don’t feel unsafe, I just cannot get myself oriented there.” Omani 
female Participant 10 responded, “Maybe somewhere near Ruwi or near there because of 
the crowd. It’s all crowded all day and night.” This was repeated frequently by others, 
including Participant 15, from Bahrain, who responded, “I’d say Ruwi during general 
working hours just to avoid the usual traffic there. Nowhere else beyond that.” As well as 
Participant 11, an Omani male, who said, “Ruwi because…I was there because of the 
college but...and also Wadi Kabir. This two places I don’t like to go because of crowded 
and there is nothing there…nothing interesting to go. I only go when I have to go.”  
Female participants conveyed that, in addition to the congestion, they avoided 
Ruwi in part because of the nationalities of those residing in that area. Filipina Participant 
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19 said she avoided Ruwi because “…there are too many guys who don’t have a sense of 
personal space.” Similarly, Participant 7, an Indian female, stated,  
“As a woman I feel uncomfortable a lot more. I feel uncomfortable in places like Ruwi 
and Matrah. They’re a lot more crowded parts of Muscat. There’s a larger population of 
other nationalities there like a lot of Indians, Bangladeshi, Pakistani I guess it’s more 
concentrated in those areas. I’m not particularly comfortable there because there’s so 
much happening but apart from that, just anywhere as a woman you go alone sometimes 
it can get quite uncomfortable but just stay in well-lit areas.”  
French architect Participant 5 avoided expatriate compounds, which he referred to 
as ‘expat ghettoes’, because the introverted mentality of their residents. I asked where 
these locations of introversion are, to which he replied,  
“In Muscat I’d say there Muscat Hills, The Dolphin as well. You ask if there are places I 
avoid, then definitely. I don’t like expat, what you call expat homes because I just don’t 
like the mentality. If you’re coming somewhere to work, it’s a life experience. If I’m 
gonna go to the UK to be French, what’s the point of going to the UK? If I’m gonna go 
somewhere it’s also a personal development kind of.” 
The areas of Muscat Capital Area mentioned 
as those frequented or preferred, or areas in 
which participants felt most comfortable 
include Shatti, Qurum, the Wave integrated 
tourist complex, Azaiba, and Madinat 
Qaboos (See Table 6.7). Omani Participant 4, 
an architect, said she feels more comfortable 
in particular areas “because of the 
infrastructure facilities and organization.” 
Omani petroleum engineer Participant 2, 
though he was referring more to specific 
places than areas of Muscat, stated,  
Table 6.7 
Neighbourhoods 
Preferred/Frequented 
Neighbourhood Total 
Shatti 7 
Qurum 5 
The Wave 5 
Madinat Qaboos 5 
Azaiba 4 
Oman Dive Center 2 
Bowsher 2 
Mawaleh 2 
Al Hail 2 
Al Amarat 2 
Matrah 2 
Al Khuwair 1 
Seeb 1 
Mabelah 1 
PDO 1 
Ghala 1 
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“I like to go where I feel comfortable, but that doesn’t mean other places aren’t 
comfortable. It’s like I’m the type of person who finds a place where I feel comfortable 
and then get stuck there… I prefer to go to places where they respect me. Thing is when I 
go to a place, first impression, if I feel comfortable there then that’s it. And the 
atmosphere of course. The crowd, what kind of people go there…” 
 
Sudanese Participant 16, who holds Omani citizenship, stated that he’s 
comfortable everywhere because “everybody here is welcomed” but stated, “In my 
opinion I prefer MQ ‘cuz I’ve been living there for long and it’s my hometown.” 
As somewhat discussed in Chapter 5, many participants said that they frequent 
various beaches in the Muscat Capital Area, included Shatti Al Qurum, Qurum, Azaiba, 
Oman Dive Center near Qantab in wilaya Muscat, and the PDO compound in Qurum.  
Yemeni Participant 14, a software consultant, said he feels comfortable in “Azaiba, by 
the beach” because “it's more like a quiet zone that gives you a piece of mind.” Omani 
Participant 10, however, prefers another beach because of its development. When asked, 
she said, “Maybe somewhere near Qurum, because of Shatti Al Qurum you know the 
beach and all the restaurants on the beach it’s very nice.” Likewise, Portuguese florist 
Participant 9 also enjoys the Shatti neighbourhood because “it’s like Europe with the 
canopies (awnings)...and I feel comfortable to chill and drink coffee there.” He says both 
Qurum and Shatti are comfortable because “it feels like home.” In addition to these more 
Western areas, however, Portuguese Participant 9 also feels incredibly comfortable in 
Azaiba beach because of the people he sees. He said, again, all the fishermen and all their 
boats is an attraction of Azaiba beach because he loves “the traditional.” Participant 9 
stated, as previously mentioned, that he also likes to frequent and feels comfortable in 
Matrah and its corniche because it is both aesthetically pleasing and traditional. He added 
also that he likes to frequent places with some history, and the Matrah Souq and the 
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architecture of Matrah are “historical structures”.  It’s not just the historical structures he 
cited as appealing. He went on to say, “Port people are very traditional, and I love the 
tradition.” Likewise, Participant 10, an Omani female, also said in addition to the 
development beach areas of Shatti, “I like to go to Matrah. It’s very beautiful. Although 
it’s crowded it’s very beautiful.”  
French Participant 5 inferred that the reason he and his wife, a Moroccan national, 
like to go to and feel comfortable in certain locations is the freedom from the gaze of 
other. He said, “On the weekends I like going to the Oman Dive Center just to, you 
know, I’m the lounging type so I like being in the shade. My wife likes to tan. So we 
found a place where she can tan and, you know a bar and drinking.” The Wave was 
another frequently mentioned location participants enjoy or in which feel comfortable. 
Egyptian Participant 6 said that though is doesn’t feel more comfortable in one place over 
another, also he said he and his family also like to frequent the Wave, saying, “We like to 
spend to the Wave sometimes and enjoy the walk and the restaurants there. We like to go 
and spend some time there.” 
French architect Participant 5 also said that he enjoys going to the Wave because 
of its visual resemblance to Europe. “I like strolling in the Wave,” he said, “I find the 
new Wave quite interesting as an area. I mean it looks less like an expat ghetto and more 
like a little chantier, so I like that as well because you can stroll…and I like places where 
locals and expats mix.” This for his comfortability at the Wave was echoed by Participant 
9, the florist originally from Portugal. He loves to frequent the Wave every week 
because, he said, with the marina, the outdoor cafes along the walk, the window 
shopping, and the “European faces” the Wave has the feel of Europe. 
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Not entirely unrelated, other participants stated that they feel most comfortable in 
the areas closer to their homes, for different reasons, but overall familiarity was key. 
Bahraini Participant 15 stated that he feels most comfortable, “Around the Bousher area 
next to my apartment, as it is calmer than other areas. I’ve also become comfortable in 
Mawaleh, as I used to live there.” Indian Participant 7 stated that she and her British 
husband, Participant 8, tend to stay centralized around their apartment also, both for 
convenience and familiarity. She said,  
“We kinda stay in a central area of Seeb, Azaiba, MQ, Shatti area, and the thing is now 
Muscat is expanding more towards the Seeb area anyway and I wouldn’t say it’s getting a 
lot more westernized but it’s definitely catering to our tastes a little bit more I’d say. 
Avenues just opened up and MGM is there and now there’s another mall near MGM.”  
  
 Responding to her statement, Participant 8 elaborated on their choice of residency 
as being related to this centrality to other areas they frequent regularly. He responded, 
“That’s part of the reason we stay in Azaiba because it’s like ten minutes to MQ where 
we have quite a few friends and then its ten minutes to the Wave and then I work just past 
Muscat city center…so it’s quite a central area and we, you can basically say we go from 
the wave to MQ really, and Shatti sometimes.”  
Mental Maps: Active Representations of Space 
Mental maps demonstrate “that the city, to non-professionals as well as to 
geographers or architects, is what is lived at street level: what influences and 
accompanies everyday life, where desire can potentially be realized, and where everyday 
objects and landmarks play a part.” (Bertuzzo, 2009, p. 164) 
The mental maps gave some insight into the spatial practices of participants. With 
regards to routes and mobility, 18 November Street, Madinat Sultan Qaboos, and the 
Muscat expressway were frequently included on the map, but very few participants 
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labeled these roads on their respective maps (See Table 6.8). 18 November Street, 
Madinat Sultan Qaboos, and the Muscat expressway are utilized most in the mornings 
and the afternoons, corresponding with the workday schedule. In addition to serving as 
the main routes of Muscat residents in their daily mobility, these main roads orient 
participants spatially and serve as the spine of their mental conceptions of space, as 
evident in their inclusion in the majority of mental maps, and, for some, their abrupt ends.  
Table 6.8 
Major Roadways Mapped 
Road Name 
Drawn, 
labeled 
Drawn, 
unlabeled Total 
18 November Street 2 6 8 
Madinat Sultan Qaboos 1 9 10 
Muscat Expressway 4 5 9 
 
The mental map drawn by 48 year old French architect Participant 5 (Map 6.1), is 
rich in content. Firstly, he includes and labels all three major roads, but all three end 
abruptly in the Shatti neighbourhood, as located, and just east of his specified home 
location in Al Khuwair.  Neighbourhoods are also labeled and delineated, and seem to be 
small in size compared to their actual size. The neighbourhood is Ruwi is marked with a 
dashed line rather than solid line to indicate his uncertainty about its size and extent. The 
PDO expatriate compound and Oman Dive Center both seem much larger than they are. 
Similarly, City Center Qurum is also huge, the size of neighbourhoods, though it is a 
specific location. In addition, eastern Muscat seems to have compressed distances, and is 
shown to be much closer to the town of Sur than it is. Interpreting this mental map, I 
would assume that Participant 5 is more familiar with the area between Seeb and Shatti, 
less familiar with Muscat east of the neighbourhood of Shatti. Thus, I would conclude his 
spatial practices are concentrated in this west-central area of Muscat governorate.  
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The map drawn by 31 year old Egyptian architect Participant 6 (Map 6.2), for me, 
reflects a planner’s view of Muscat, which could be the case considering his occupation. 
Firstly, the coastline and mountain range, barriers to development, are both drawn with 
some detail. All three major roads are also drawn and labeled, and three main North-
South oriented roads are drawn, with three roundabouts included and labeled at the 
intersections of these north-south oriented roads and the three main roads of Muscat. 
Neighbourhoods are also labeled, and in his map are delineated by the road networks. 
The location of his home and his place of employment are also included, as well as PDO, 
which is stated during the interview is a location is frequents for work-related reasons. 
The mental map of Participant 6 ends in the neighbourhood of Qurum, signaling that his 
familiarity and spatial practice is limited past PDO and the neighbourhood of Qurum. In 
our interview, he made a statement that let it be known that the roundabouts drawn are 
landmarks in his mental map of Muscat. “Yea I go I’m handling a project for PDO they 
are one of our clients so I’m always going there. Moving always from here, Azaiba, to 
Qurum. This area is always..I go office and go home. It’s just two or three traffic lights.”  
24 year old Portuguese Participant 9, a florist who lives in Azaiba above his place 
of employment and does not drive, produced a mental map (Map 6.3) that reflects his 
limited mobility. It does not include any roadways and is less linear than the actual form 
of Muscat Governorate, which is developing in a strip between the sea and the mountain 
range. The triangular lines drawn, he stated, is more or less the extent of his daily spatial 
practice. Participant 9 stated that he absolutely loves Azaiba Beach, and loves watching 
the fishermen engaged in their work at this location. His pleasant illustration of Azaiba 
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Beach reflects his fondness of the area, and, because it is the only illustration, implies the 
importance of this location to others in his daily spatial practice. 
23 year old British Participant 13’s mental map (Map 6.4), on the other hand, is 
incredibly road-heavy. Participant 13 very much enjoy cars, from tinkering to driving, 
and his mental map reflects his mobility and mode of transportation. All three main roads 
are included, as are various on-ramps and roundabouts. There are only two roads labeled 
on his map, the on-ramp for the Muscat Expressway, and 18 November Street, which is 
actually labeled as “Wave Road / Racing Road.” His home is labeled, but no 
neighbourhood labels are present. Participant 13 also mapped two gas stations, and an 
automobile/go cart track. The rest of the locations included in his mental map are 
interpreted as being landmarks for spatial orientation. The extent of the map is limited the 
area of the city between the Wave and the western portion of Bowsher, perhaps because 
he started the map at a small scale are ran out of space. 
The mental map drawn by 25 year old Omani female Participant 10 (Map 6.5) 
includes her home, place of work, and the route between the two. The main road, Sultan 
Qaboos Street, is depicted as quite wide, an area in relation to the lines representing the 
other roadways. The airport and Muscat Grand Mall are also depicted on the sides of 
Sultan Qaboos Street. There are also two roundabout landmarks included on the map, one 
in close proximity to her home, and one in front of the Wave. From this roundabout, there 
are no other roads indicating that it is really just a landmark on the way to the Wave. The 
Wave is included, too, and behind a square depicting what I assume represents the front 
entrance, is the Walk, identifiable by the two rows signaling the buildings between which 
the walk is located. Participant 10 has also included Muscat City Center and one of her 
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favourite seafood restaurants, Grand Fish Market, which is next to Muscat City Center. 
Because of her gender, nationality, and neighbourhood of residence, Participant 10’s 
conception of Muscat is limited. In her interview she mentioned that she frequents the 
Wave and the two malls depicted, but said otherwise she doesn’t go out much for 
recreation and entertainment. She discussed enjoying Shatti for its amenities and 
proximity to the beach, but the extent of her map shows a limited, neighbourhood view of 
Muscat, indicating that perhaps she’s more familiar and comfortable in this area and goes 
to other areas infrequently. Thus I would say that this mental map represents the city as 
routine. 
The map drawn by 28 year old Omani female Participant 12 (Map 6.6) is 
incredibly linear and relatively abstract and functional in its depiction of Muscat. There 
are two lines drawn, depicting two main roads Sultan Qaboos Street and the Muscat 
Expressway. On either side of these major routes, and notably not in between, the 
different neighbourhoods of Muscat are outlined, and her reason for being in each is 
conveyed. This map gives us a lot of insight into her conceptions of each neighbourhood 
as they relate to her spatial practice. For Participant 12 mentioned during the interview 
that she visited Mabelah to visit friends infrequently. One can gather that she doesn’t 
frequent Seeb often, but when she does it is to access the beach. In Al Khoudh is where 
she does her shopping and dining, in addition to visiting family. One can reason that Al 
Khoudh has many Omani residents. She visits with family in Azaiba, but also mentioned 
McDonald’s in that location, as other participants have done. She lives in Ghubra, and so 
classified this area with home and the leisure area of “beach” in addition to daily errands 
of “groceries”. One could reason that most of her socializing occurs in Shatti/Qurum 
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because of the outlined activities in which she engages in that neighbourhood. Thus I 
would say from this map, the representations of space are based on utility and 
consumption 
The 25 year old Sudanese restaurant owner Participant 16 (Map 6.7) drew a 
mental map of Muscat that only includes neighbourhoods. Off the coastline he has 
located and labeled Seeb, Muscat, and Bowsher in addition to the cities of Sohar and Sur, 
for reference. Next to the Seeb label, on the inland side of the coastline he has written Al 
Khoud, Mawaleh, Al Hail. Next to the Bowsher label he has written Wattiya, MQ, 
Azaiba, Khuwair, Ghubra and Qurum. From this we can speculate on his representations 
of the city. Firstly, since the Muscat label is north of the Bowsher label, he conceives all 
of the Muscat Capital Area as Muscat, which I don’t think is unusual considering 
everyone references this metropolitan area as Muscat. But the fact that it is essentially 
misplaced could be evidence that he does not spend much time in wilaya Muscat, or Old 
Muscat, or even Matrah. Secondly, Since Al Khoud, Mawaleh and Al Hail are next to the 
Seeb label, he conceives of these areas as parts of wilaya Seeb. The various 
neighbourhoods listed in Bowsher would also indicate that he sees these areas as part of 
the larger wilaya. The fact that more Bowsher neighbourhoods are listed could indicate 
that he is more familiar with this area, which is both where he lives and where he works. I 
would consider this map to be a conception of Muscat as compressed. 
The map drawn by 22 year old unemployed Omani-Filipino Participant 17 (Map 
6.8) reveals a representation of Muscat as home. His place of residence is the center of 
the map, and includes very few labels. The gas station, McDonald’s, the Hyatt, and Shatti 
beach are labeled, in addition to a traffic light, an orienting landmark. In our 
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conversations it was clear that he rarely socialized outside of his home, preferring to have 
friends over to the family house instead to smoke, chat, and listen to Bay-area hip-hop on 
YouTube. Participant 17 also does not drive, and does not commute to work or school, 
but there are several roadways drawn. However, these roadways end abruptly, and show 
that his familiarity with those routes is limited. The only road he may be familiar with the 
main residential street off of which is his house. Really, Muscat is simply home. 
The map drawn by 40 year old Omani petroleum engineer Participant 2 (Map 6.9) 
reflects an active representation of Muscat as leisure. Both his family home and the 
personal flat he is renting are depicted. Also included on his mental map are landmark 
locations including the International Airport in Seeb, the Sultan’s palace, and the Matrah 
Souq. The remainder of the locations included on his map of Muscat are locations he 
frequents often, and are those leisure spaces that cater to Western tastes and serve 
alcohol. Such venues include the Mexican restaurant Pavo Real in Madinat Qaboos, 
Copacabana club in the Hyatt, Ghazal Pub in the Intercontinental Hotel, On The Rocks 
Lounge in the Golden Tulip Hotel, and the much beloved Left Bank Lounge. Participant 
2 does not work within the city of Muscat, and therefore his conception of Muscat is not 
one of work, but of leisure.  
Discussion 
Global economic forces have increased economic activity within Oman and 
Muscat in particular. There is more material production and consumption activity in 
Muscat than prior to 1970, and this changes the spatial practices of residents in that their 
more frequently engaged in such consumption and production. In addition to market 
activities, employment activity is on the rise in Muscat, and female employment in 
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particular has greatly increased.  The mobility of Muscat residents has also been 
influenced at the global level, with an increasing use of automobiles, in addition to the 
western-style car-oriented urban development of the city, also influenced by global 
forces. Lastly, the changing preferences of residents in terms of entertainment, clothing, 
and food, influenced by globalization, impacts the spatial practices of Muscat residents, 
who are choosing perhaps different locations than they would have if, for example, 
western restaurants were not abundant. Likewise, the availability of international brands 
and products catering to western palates also influences the spatial practices of residents, 
and can be attributed global forces of production.  
The state’s development plan influences the spatial practices of Muscat residents 
in several ways. With regards to residency, the state’s development plan is incredibly 
influential for the spatial practice of Muscat residents. As discussed previously, specific 
areas of the city are zoned for residential use and commercial residential use, which 
influences the population density, infrastructural amenities, the class and national origin 
of the neighbourhoods’ residents, and subsequently, the representations of those 
neighbourhoods amongst Muscat residents interviewed.  
The allocation of land plots to Omanis through a lottery system creates Omani 
dominated neighbourhoods, particularly in the northern area of the governorate in 
Bowsher and Seeb. The neighbourhoods of residency for Omani participants were 
Madinat Qaboos (1), Qurum (1), Al Hail (2), Ghubra (1), Al Khuwair (1), and Shatti Al 
Qurum(1), generally more wealthy and developed neighbourhoods of Muscat. The 
neighbourhoods of residency for migrant non-national participants included Azaiba (5), 
Seeb (2), Bowsher (2), Qurum (1), and Al Khuwair (2). For the five Western participants, 
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their current neighbourhoods of residency are Bowsher, Al Khuwair, Seeb, and two live 
in Azaiba. One European participant lived on an expatriate compound in Bowsher. For 
participants of Asian and African regional origins, another two live in Azaiba, one in 
Madinat Qaboos, one in Qurum and one in Al Khuwair.  The three Arab participants 
interviewed live in Azaiba, Bowsher, and Seeb.  
 Most participants stated that they had relocated within Muscat, from one 
neighbourhood to another. Half of the Omani participants interviewed had lived 
previously in another neighbourhood, which include Azaiba, Ruwi, Al Khuwair and 
Madinat Qaboos. However, only two stated that it was their decision to relocate. 
Participant 2 decided to rent a separate flat in Qurum to escape the family house, and 
Participant 11 left Ruwi once he graduated from a college located in that neighbourhood. 
The third participant to relocate within Muscat did so because she married and left the 
family house to live with her husband. The fact that the majority of Omanis interviewed 
did not have a choice in their location of residency serves as evidence of adaptation and 
conformation to the state’s identity project, in that the traditional social structure, with 
emphasis upon the family, is being adhered to. Participant 2, as an unmarried but middle-
aged man, and his decision to split is residency evenly between the family house and his 
own flat, is evidence of a renegotiation of that traditional expectation regarding marriage 
and living arrangements. 
For expatriates, this residential relocation can largely be attributed to the state’s 
employment policies. Upon arrival, many expatriates were provided housing by their 
employers, usually in a collective setting. The locations of employer-provided housing 
were, I was told, in relatively close proximity to the office. For Western expatriates, four 
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of the five participants lived in other areas of Muscat prior to their current 
neighbourhood. These previous neighbourhoods include Al Khuwair, Bariq Al Shatti, 
Shatti Al Qurum, and Qurum. For two Western participants the move was their choice to 
make. For expatriates of Asian or African regional origins, four of the five participants 
lived in other neighbourhoods of Muscat, including Azaiba (1), Ruwi (3) and Wadi Kabir 
(1). Three of these participants made the choice to move. For Arab participants 
interviewed, two had lived in other neighbourhoods previously, Al Khuwair and Madinat 
Qaboos, and it was their choice to relocate. 
Once more established in Muscat, participants stated that they relocated to another 
neighbourhood for the desire for quietness, privacy and space. Others mentioned that 
increasing wealth was the reason for relocation from one neighbourhood to another, and 
many had previously lived in the more affordable neighbourhoods of Ruwi and Al 
Khuwair, for example. I would characterize this as evidence of informal spatial 
segregation based on class, but also reflecting to a certain degree national origin. In 
addition, the choice to relocate from employer-provided housing in more affordable and 
more densely-populated expatriate neighbourhoods to a neighbourhood of their choosing 
is a method of negotiating or mediating the nation-building strategy of spatial 
segregation.  
The creation of labour camps and expatriate compounds changes the composition 
of residential neighbourhoods and influences the spatial practice of expatriates. A western 
female participant mentioned that they rarely leaves her expatriate compound, Dolphin 
Village in Bowsher, unless going to a Western-catering hotel for drinks. I would 
characterize this, too, as more formal and purposeful residential segregation based on the 
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dichotomy of Omani and ‘other’ to which some expatriates choose to conform or adapt. 
Other western expatriates, like Participant 5, however, purposefully avoid these 
expatriate compounds, considering them isolating and counter to their reasons for living 
internationally. These expatriates value the social interaction with the national 
population. I would classify this spatial practice as a purposeful renegotiation of the 
state’s nation-building project, choosing to socialize and interact as much as possible 
with the Omani residents of the city. 
When broadly asked what areas of the city participants frequent often or prefer, 
the responses correlated strongly with both the areas developed by the state as tourist 
zones and Western residency. Shatti, Qurum, and Madinat Qaboos were the most 
frequently cited by participants of all regional origins as neighbourhoods preferred. 
Reasons given included the infrastructure and facilities, familiarity, and comfortability. 
When asked what neighbourhoods participants purposefully avoid or do not frequent, the 
neighbourhood correlated strongly with areas identified as Asian and South Asian 
residency. Ruwi, Matrah, and Wadi Kabir topped the list as those neighbourhoods avoid, 
and Ruwi was a stand-out amongst the three. The reasons given for avoid these areas 
included congestion and traffic, and unfamiliarity. I found this interesting because Shatti 
and Qurum at specific times of the day become incredibly crowded. Traffic can come to a 
standstill and parking can be difficult to find, but this was not mentioned by participants 
as a reason to avoid these Western locations, but was quickly cited for Ruwi. Female 
participants of Asian and South Asian origins mentioned their uncomfortability in these 
areas based on the expatriate population residing there. There is a tendency for the men to 
stare and follow women, but European and Omani women did not mention this as a 
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reason. I was surprised that this particular reason wasn’t brought up with more frequency, 
as I personally have felt uncomfortable in Ruwi because of gender, and in a preliminary 
investigation, questionnaire responses were more forthcoming about the South Asian 
residents of Ruwi and the culture of the area being one that made women feel uneasy. I 
speculate that western women, like Participant 3, did not wish to convey this information 
for fear of coming across as racist. I also speculate that Omani women interviewed, given 
both their modest dress and their conspicuous national identity when wearing it, limited 
the level of blatant leering and touching when in the neighbourhood. 
The state also influences the spatial practices of Muscat residents when it comes 
to their engagement in market activities. Firstly, the zoning of Muscat into specific 
residential, commercial, and leisure zones means that generally participants are shopping 
and engaging in leisure activities in the same areas.  The locations of high coincidence in 
responses for market activities, conveyed by participants of all regional origins, including 
grocery and non-grocery shopping, were the numerous shopping malls, particularly 
Muscat City Center in Wilaya Seeb and Muscat Grand Mall and Avenues Mall located in 
Wilaya Bowsher.  
Secondly, the construction of infrastructure, particularly the network of main 
roads, roundabouts, parking facilities, and expressways, increases the mobility of 
residents, who can travel more conveniently, extensively, and more rapidly within the 
Muscat Capital Area. The commute time for participants was frequently between ten and 
fifteen minutes, though many said at certain times of the day, corresponding to the 
workday, the duration of their commutes was significantly lengthened. Nevertheless, the 
city’s infrastructure is increasing the extent of residents’ spatial practice. It is notable that 
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these shopping locations frequented most often are located just off the main roadway 
Sultan Qaboos Street, depicted on 10 mental maps, making these market locations both 
highly visible and, for those with cars, easily accessible. It isn’t just about sound 
infrastructure and accessibility, however. It was conveyed by participants, notably an 
Indian female born and raised in the Gulf, that she shops frequently at the malls because 
she has been brought up in  the Middle Eastern “mall culture”. This is evidence of 
adaptation and conformity to the local culture, as Omani female participants also stated 
that they frequent the malls often with their friends as a form of leisure or recreation. 
Other expatriate participants, like the Egyptian architect, stated that he and his family 
frequent the shopping malls more often in the summer to avoid the heat of the outdoors. 
However, a British participant, married to an Indian participant, stated he does not like to 
frequent the malls for hours with his wife because they are an interracial couple, and get 
many stares that make him feel uncomfortable. Choosing not to frequent the malls is his 
method of renegotiation and dissent against the local cultural norms.  
When reasons for grocery shopping at specific locations were given, convenience 
was the main reason cited, followed by product preference and availability.  Many 
participants stated that there wasn’t much choice for shopping, grocery shopping in 
particular, and that is why Carrefour in both Qurum and Seeb are frequented by 
participants. Many participants, Omani, Asian, and Western individuals, shop for 
groceries in locations in close proximity to their residences for the sake of convenience 
and expedience, especially if they don’t need any items. If, however, they are running 
quite low they will venture further away from their homes for large grocery halls. It is a 
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way to avoid the traffic and large crowds, outcomes of Muscat’s rapid development, as 
much as possible. 
Product preference and availability was the second most cited reason for choosing 
grocery shopping locations. An Omani participant stated that she likes to shop at Al Fair 
and Sultan center because of the “fancy fancy” products available. Though the products 
are not necessarily fancy, they are western and more expensive than goods sold 
elsewhere. An Indian participant with extensive western influence also stated she prefers 
Al Fair because they have American products, and her husband, a British participant, 
prefers Al Fair because they supply a lot of Waitrose items, or British goods. The fact 
that some Omani participants are preferring to shop, when possible, at these more 
western grocery stores is evidence that they are conforming to, or at least influenced by, 
the state’s identity project, in that they are choosing to frequent more cosmopolitan 
stores. Or this could be evidence of mediation, in that sometimes they choose western 
supermarkets while other times choosing local shops, like Maya. The fact that expatriate 
participants are frequenting the stores in which familiar products are sold is also evidence 
of conformation, in that they are shopping at stores that cater to their preferences, 
regardless of price. Or perhaps it is a form of mediation, in that they choose familiar 
comfort foods as a way to maintain their identities when it comes to diet while they 
engage in other more adaptive cultural norms. The empirical data doesn’t allow for more 
conclusion other than speculation.  
The souqs and stores in Ruwi, Seeb, and Matrah, though mentioned and 
occasionally mapped, were not locations visited frequently by participants, and if they 
were visited for commercial purposes, it was to obtain specialized services or 
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commodities, like fabric, silver, or frankincense. Omani female participants stated that 
they shop in Ruwi for fabric and Matrah for jewelry, specifically silver products. One 
Portugeuse male of a low economic class stated that he loves Matrah Souq and purchases 
traditional items there, specifically frankincense. It should be noted that this more 
specialized or ‘traditional’ market activity occurs in areas of the city that are older, and 
therefore characterized by mixed-use rather than specific activities. These 
neighbourhoods are also those conceived by participants as spaces that are more densely-
populated, not easily navigable, poorer, and dominated by poor Omani or Asian 
expatriate residency. Likewise, it was stated by an Indian participant, and echoed by a 
British participant, that they avoid LuLu Hypermarket because of the crowd. The 
customers of this store are overwhelming Asian and South Asian, and so this particular 
chain of grocery stores, regardless of whether or not it is in a South Asian 
neighbourhood, is avoided because of the customer base.  What I find interesting is that 
Omani women frequented these densely populated South Asian market areas are felt 
comfortable doing so. It could be that their modest dress that identifies them as Omani 
curbed any unwanted interactions.  
When it comes to leisure activities, the areas mentioned with frequency as 
locations of recreation and entertainment also demonstrate the influence of state zoning 
upon spatial practice. The areas in which participants feel most comfortable in or frequent 
most often also more or less correlates with the national origins of their residence. 
Participants felt more comfortable in neighbourhoods of Western expatriate residency, 
like Madinat Qaboos, Shatti, and the Wave while areas avoided or unfrequented are those 
identified as South Asian neighbourhoods, like Matrah and Ruwi.  The neighbourhoods 
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of restaurants mapped and/or mentioned during interviews include several in Madinat 
Qaboos, and Al Khuwair, both neighbourhoods in Wilaya Bowsher known for their 
expatriate residency and amenities that cater to western tastes. British and Indian husband 
and wife participants stated that they love Tuscany, an Italian restaurant in Shatti, as well 
as Kargeen Café, a traditional spectacle of a shisha bar in Madinat Qaboos, the British 
neighbourhood. An Omani participant stated that she prefers Lebanese food and frequents 
Lebanese and Omani restaurants located to the Wave, Shatti, or in Al Khuwair.  The 
types of restaurants most frequently mentioned or mapped, by participants of all origins, 
are American fast-food chains including McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut and Starbucks. 
These more affordable fast food chains are frequented the most by expatriates of Asian 
origin, or those whose incomes are lower, like Portuguese florist Participant 9, who stated 
he frequents the McDonald’s in Azaiba often. This is also due in part to his limited 
mobility, as he does not own or drive a car. In addition, these locations, particularly 
McDonald’s in Shatti and Pizza Hut in MQ, serve as spatially orienting landmarks for 
participants regardless of how often these establishments are frequented, particularly for 
those participants of a higher socioeconomic standing.  
The spatial practices of other city residents influence the spatial practices of 
participants in addition to state policies regarding migration and development. For indoor 
recreation locations mentioned regularly that serve alcohol, Shatti Al Qurum and Qurum 
are the neighbourhoods in which they are located, and many of them are either in or in 
very close proximity to the city’s beachfront hotels. Participants of Arab, Omani, Asian, 
European and African origins stated that they frequent the bars and lounges of the 
beachfront neighbourhoods, including Left Bank, Rock Bottom, and Trader Vic’s. It 
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should be mentioned that female Omani participants and the one religious Omani male 
participant did not convey that they went out to those alcohol-serving venues. Omani 
women in particular are quite constrained by both their nationality and gender, and are 
socially excluded from these locations because of the “Victorian” nature of Omani 
society. Being seen in these establishments by Omani male patrons and the questions it 
would raise amongst Omanis regarding their character are too damaging to risk.  
Purposefully avoiding these venues is evidence of conformation to Omani cultural and 
social norms that are deemed to be ‘traditional’. Omani female participants instead stated 
that they frequent the cinema and restaurants, including those in the upscale Royal Opera 
House, and visit with friends at their residences, for recreation. One Omani female 
participant stated that she prefers to just stay at home for her leisure, and doesn’t consider 
socializing with friends as a recreation activity. This is likely the result of the Victorian 
approach to female conduct. The fact that she called socialization a chore is another 
indication of the importance of her reputation, and her conduct in public requires a great 
deal of self-regulation. It is therefore more pleasurable to remain inside, away from the 
public eye. 
Another example of how spatial practices of other residents combined with state 
policies regarding migration and development was conveyed by Participant 5. He, a 
professional European participant, stated that he used to frequent Left Bank, but the 
atmosphere of the establishment changes with the renewal of Muscat’s expatriate 
population, and so it is no longer to his liking now that it resembles a lower-class pub 
rather than a classy lounge. Similarly, another Western expatriate mentioned the crowd 
size of the Intercontinental and Grand Hyatt Hotels as being a deterrent in addition to the 
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pricey cost of such locales. In the juxtaposition of these two examples we can see that 
national or regional origins of patrons is a factor, but class seems to be more influential 
than nationality when it comes to spatial practice and comfortability. This is an example 
of mediating the state identity project in that individuals are adjusting their spatial 
activities based on cost and patron preferences that change with the expatriate hiring 
cycle. 
Similarly, in addition to these hotel or beachfront venues, the integrated tourist 
zone The Wave was frequently mentioned and mapped by participants a lot as the 
location to which they go for recreation and entertainment. Again, the types of patrons, 
be it their class, or regional origins, or both, seems to be a significant factor. Omanis also 
frequent the complex, particularly for the restaurants and shopping available within, but 
they are usually of a higher socioeconomic standing. British and Indian husband and wife 
frequent the Wave more so than other public areas because they are an interracial couple 
and are therefore stared at less, making them feel more at ease in this integrated tourist 
zone. A French participant stated he enjoyed because of its resemblance to Europe and 
the racially mixed crowd observed there. Likewise, a Portuguese participant in the service 
industry stated that he frequents the Wave, even if only to window shop, because of its 
European aesthetic and architecture in addition to the “European faces” he sees. The look 
and feel of the Wave in addition to the European expatriate presence makes him feel at 
home there, and so this would be a method of adaptation and/or conformation to the 
state’s national identity project. He enjoys the Wave when he is homesick because it 
resembles his Europe, drawing in other Westerns for the same reason, which are both 
intentions behind the Wave’s development. 
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 Indoor recreation in private spaces was also frequently cited, especially by Omani 
female participants, as previously mentioned. However, other participants made similar 
comments. The British and Indian married couple interviewed stated that the way their 
interracial marriage is received has pushed them more towards the Wave, as mentioned, 
but also increased their preference for private gatherings and BBQs with friends. This is 
significant in that the closed group of friends allows for more social and cultural 
familiarity and comfortability. This is evidence of mediation of the informal social and 
cultural controls.  
The cited outdoor leisure and recreation of participants of various origins reflects 
closely the state’s promoted identity elements that emphasizes its seafaring tradition. 
Outdoor leisure locations were, like the locations of indoor recreation save for private 
houses, more or less concentrated along the coast, within or near the integrated tourist 
areas and zoned leisure areas. This locations included the beaches in Azaiba, Qurum, 
Seeb and Shatti. Participants of all regional origins conveyed that they frequent these 
beaches, but the reasons cited differ. An Arab participant stated he likes the beach in 
Seeb because it is quiet and peaceful. Another participant, an Omani woman, enjoys the 
beaches in Qurum and Shatti because of its development and the presence of shops and 
restaurants. A European participant stated he likes the beach in the Azaiba 
neighbourhood because he enjoys watching the fishermen engage in their traditional 
occupation, but also enjoys the beachfront in Shatti because it resembles Europe and feels 
like home, Portugal. These are ways of mediating the state’s identity project in that, 
individuals are seeking out different spaces depending on whether they wish to access 
more traditional Omani culture or more cosmopolitan amenities.  . 
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Though many of the cited locations of outdoor leisure activities reflect the 
locations of cosmopolitan development, reflecting the leisure zoning of those areas, 
which attempt to spatially segregate such activities and their potential influence upon the 
promoted Omani culture and identity, several of those frequently mentioned outdoor 
recreation locations were in wilaya Muscat and Matrah, a bit further south than the 
spatiality observed for indoor recreation. The Matrah Corniche was mentioned by 
European, Omani and Arab participants as a location enjoyed in the cooler months. 
Individuals expressed that they enjoyed the traditional environment they viewed while 
walking the corniche, despite the crowd. This area is the oldest in Muscat, and has been 
purposefully kept aesthetically traditional in promotion of a shared history and cultural 
longevity.  
However, many of these more southern outdoor recreation areas are frequented 
because of privacy, not for the traditional culture. Arab, Asian, and European participants 
stated they enjoy going to Sifa Beach or the Oman Dive Center because they feel more 
free to dress and act as they wish. One of these locations is Bin De Rauda, a marina 
wherein people dock their private boats, and is the location from which individuals travel 
just off the coast to Bandar al Khiran, a cove where yachts and boats are anchored, to 
engage in leisure activities of their choice. This is essentially mobile privacy, and is a 
way to avoid the public eye and the potential damage to reputation while enjoying public 
space. 
The concentration of economic activity and employment opportunities in the 
Muscat Capital Area influences the spatial practices of Omani Muscat residents in 
multiple ways, but when it comes to recreation and leisure, it has created a weekly 
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weekend exodus out of Muscat.  Since the concentration of development in Muscat 
resulted in massive amounts of rural to urban migration, there is the trend amongst 
Omanis to leave Muscat on the weekends to visit with parents and extended family, and 
this was conveyed as a significant spatial practice by an Omani female participant. 
Another Omani participant stated that he does leave every weekend for the interior to 
visit with family and, leave the development city as he preferred the countryside, 
physically and culturally. This is a method of negotiating the state’s development project, 
in that, when presented with the choice, prefers the village lifestyle over the congested 
cosmopolitan city.  
Having discussed the spatial practice of Muscat residents and the ways in which 
participants conform, adapt, and renegotiate the state’s identity and development project, 
the following chapter will discuss social space and socialization amongst city residents. 
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CHAPTER VII 
REPRESENTATIONAL SPACES: SOCIAL SPACE 
 
Having discussed the physical and mental productions of space, including 
representations of the Muscat generally, representations of Muscat’s neighbourhoods, and 
the spatial practices of participants, social space, that is lived space, will be discussed. 
Bertuzzo (2009) states that,  
“The physical and mental processes of production of space are integrative of lived space, 
called social practice. This social level of production of space directly implies time: 
social practice originates from history, that of peoples as well as of individuals. This is at 
present the field of a dominated, and hence passively experienced, space, whereby 
‘desire’ and imagination seek to change and appropriate it….it represents social values, 
traditions, dreams, collective experiences, imagination, as well as ‘desire’... Socially 
produced space is imaginary, directional, situation (or relational), transversed by 
symbolisms and history, essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic…” (pp. 31-32) 
This chapter will first discuss the social experiences as conveyed by participants, 
followed by the researcher’s observations in some of the representational social spaces 
identified through interviews. Particular attention is paid to spaces of social interaction 
because “the effective centres of social practice are the loci of passion, of action and of 
lived situations: the ego, the bed, the bedroom, the dwelling or house, but also the square, 
church and graveyard.” (Bertuzzo, 2009, p. 32) The nature of participant observation is 
one that emphasizes vibe and atmosphere more so than description of space. This is an 
attempt to follow Lefebvre’s concept of rhythymanalysis, focusing on time more than 
space, where the researcher “strolling about perceives more the ambience of a city, rather 
than the image flattering the eye; more the atmosphere than the spectacle. He is all ears 
but hears not only words and sounds.” (Meyer, 2008, p. 156) 
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General Socialization 
Asking more broad questions relating to socialization allowed insight into general 
Omani-expatriate interactions. Participants were asked with whom they socialize with 
most, and if they’ve ever been treated differently based on their national origins. 
Participant 17, who is half Filipino and half Omani, stated that he interacts with both 
locals and expatriates every day, but said, “Most of my friends are full blooded Omanis.” 
Likewise, when asked how often he interacts with Omanis, Sudanese male Participant 1 
said,  
“I do a lot.  I know a lot of Omanis. I’ve been living with them I mean like, I’ve been 
growing up with Omanis. I’ve been growing up you know what I mean. They’ve been 
growing up with me. They started speaking my language. Some of them speak my 
language also. I grew up with them in the hood, like, the neighbourhood.”  
 
Portuguese Participant 9 conveyed that he has a group of friends with whom he 
hangs out almost every day. When I asked where they were from he said they are 
Europeans, including, “A Serbian man, and Russian women” in addition to a couple of 
Omani families. Filipina Participant 18 stated she interacts with Omanis mostly at work, 
but stated “I have a few local friends from my previous work, and some of my Pakistani 
classmates are now Omanis. I do socialize with them too, does that count?” 
Omani female Participant 10 rarely socializes with expatriates. She said,  
“I actually don’t have foreigner friends. But if I do have one I don’t mind hanging out 
with them. In terms of interaction I guess it’s nice ‘cuz they don’t interact that well I 
mean….from my experience from our neighbourhood we have some foreigners but we 
don’t visit them they don’t visit us. We don’t really interact.”  
 
Likewise, Omani Participant 11 doesn’t socialize much with anyone in Muscat, 
and expressed his discontent with the individualistic nature of Muscat, preferring the 
collective lifestyle of the village. He said,  
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“I like out of Muscat because it’s very quiet, and the people there are very friendly very 
you know…in society or socially they are help each other and ask about each other more 
and here in Muscat sometimes your neighbours don’t know if you are home, if you are 
travelling, and sometimes they don’t know your name... Maybe they know your name but 
they don’t know if you’re sick or you’re not sick or you’re out…but there it’s different.”  
I asked if he knew or talked to his neighbours, and he said, “No. I feel they like this type, 
I can’t go to them even because I feel they like this style, private and being alone. But not 
all of them… There is very big difference between here and outside of Muscat.” 
When asked with whom she socializes and where they go, Omani female 
Participant 12 said,  
“I’m kind of a friend of different walks of life so they have different preferences. You 
have a bunch who don’t like to talk much so we go to the cinema. I think those are the 
ones really don’t have much of a social life but I just ended up being there friend. Then I 
have, how do you say, Indian friends, who prefer to go to Ruwi because it’s nearby to 
where they live in comparison to where I live, where I live there’s nothing no attraction. 
And then you have the other friends who are quite active and go everywhere so we’ll go 
to a coffee shop or go to the mall.”  
 
When I asked if she socializes more with Omanis are expatriates, Participant 12, who has 
lived in both Europe and the United States, indicated that she mostly socializes with other 
Omanis because of the shared culture and understanding of cultural context. When I 
asked why, she replied,  
“Maybe because we come from the same background they understand where I come from 
and if I complain about something in particular you can easily catch on but if you speak 
to a British person or Indian person you kind of have to explain like ‘based on our 
tradition, our culture…’ before you go into the story so I find if I’m friends with Omanis 
I can easily talk about something without being…I mean…without being politically 
correct I would say..…it depends on the story I would tell. I wouldn’t share it with 
someone who wasn’t Omani because maybe they wouldn’t understand. For instance if 
I’m with a foreigner, generally, I would explain I went on the beach and swam and all 
that because they’d say ‘so you swim and your head is all covered?!’ ‘Oh, God.’ And go 
through that whole process again.” 
Likewise, even though he doesn’t socialize much in Muscat, Omani Participant 
11, of rural origins, inferred that shared experience is also a factor in terms of 
socialization. Regarding his local group of friends he said, “Most of them are Omani. I 
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have one Egyptian guy friend. I have also one from Jordan, but most are Omani and from 
different cities but they’re living in Muscat. Like me.” He did also state that he prefers to 
hang out with his family, in the interior, though he does acknowledge that he thinks 
everyone else prefers spending time with friends over family. 
British Participant 8 said, “I probably socialize with Omani a lot basically when I 
came to Oman all my friends were Omani.” But his wife, Participant 7, an Indian expat 
with extensive Gulf residency, wanted to clarify on his behalf that his mates are 
westernized. She said,  
“Even the Omanis, and are more westernized. Actually all of his Omani friends are quite 
westernized. Let’s just put that straight because people you actually give time to…mates-
mates, are definitely westernized. I mean I do have a few Omani-Omani girlfriends but 
they still have a lot of western exposure and a lot expat friends because I went to an 
international school here so all my friends are westernized. Since I met [Participant 8] my 
friends have become his and it’s all meshed into one giant group.”  
When asked whether participants have been treated differently for not being or 
being Omani, responses varied. Several participants stated that they’ve never been treated 
differently. Participant 1, who is Sudanese but has Omani citizenship, said,  
“To be honest, not really. They keeping everybody in the same level. Which is really 
good...and you don’t see that in other countries. Like you see but, but like you know 
maybe you hear something different about other countries in the media, blah blah blah, 
but it ain’t really true.”  
This was echoed also by Participant 6, an Egyptian. When asked if he’s been treated 
differently he said,  
“No. The thing about the country is that when you stay here long you like it. Because the 
people are friendly… Of course there are some cases where you might meet people that 
are, you know, not very, yaani, they’re not very open to deal with you. But in most of the 
cases, I’ve been here seven years I never run across any judgment or anything.”  
 
However, despite Participant 1’s statement that he hasn’t been treated differently for 
being Sudanese, his friend Omani Participant 2, expressing his enjoyment of our 
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interview, said, “This is nice this is different. Because me and ‘[Participant 1]…” and he 
then proceeded to imitate a generic African language with clicks to describe his 
conversations with Participant 1.  
In some responses, participants conveyed that they have been treated differently, 
but think they’ve actually been treated better. Portuguese Participant 3, when asked if 
she’s been treated differently because she’s not Omani said, “Yes sure. I think everyone 
was more nice to me. They treat me nicer and offer me more things because I am not 
Omani. More generous yea.” Related, Participant 15, a Bahraini male with unusually pale 
features, relayed that during his interactions with Omanis, his language use resulted in 
friendlier dealings. He said, “Omanis tend to assume I’m foreign and tend to begin 
conversations with me in English. When I respond in Arabic they tend to become 
friendlier and more receptive, not that they weren’t friendly to begin with.” Egyptian 
Participant 6 also mentioned the benefit of common language in his interactions with 
Omanis. He said,  
“But about the culture also its easy to interact with them because my mother language is 
Arabic…especially Egypt we are...for some time our people, like teachers and others, 
were coming to this country to teach a long time ago and still come to this day. People 
know the accent, the Egyptian accent…from movies and TV series so they know our 
accent very well. If I go to somewhere they can easily understand me and we can interact 
very well so it’s good to be here.” 
 
Other participants, however, say they have been treated differently, and that 
different treatment has been negative. When asked if he’s been treated differently 
because he’s Filipino, Participant 19, who has lived extensively in Muscat since 
adolescence, said “Oh definitely, most of the time.” When I asked by who, he said, 
“Omanis, Arabs, and other expats.” I asked him in what ways he’s been treated 
differently for being Filipino and he replied, “Being cut in line, being cut in traffic….” 
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Participant 9, a Portuguese florist, stated that sometimes, when drinking, Omani men 
shout mean things at expatriates. He didn’t elaborate further, and because he was shy and 
nervous in the interview, I didn’t press further. Participant 18, a female from the 
Philippines, made a similar comment, saying,  
“I don’t appreciate…how some locals shout out ‘kamusta ka’, meaning ‘how are you’ in 
Tagalog, or yell ‘Filipini’ or anything of that nature. I’ve somehow gotten used to it by 
now, but it gets uncomfortable at times.” Even in light of this, when asked if she knew 
why she’s been treated differently because she is not Omani, she said “perhaps it’s 
because of the language barrier more than not.” 
Even those with Omani lineage have been treated poorly. Participant 17, who is 
half Filipino on his mother’s side, stated, that he has been treated differently because he 
is not full Omani. He said,  
“I used to go to a predominantly Omani school and got bullied almost every day for not 
being full Omani. I still sense a slight lack of respect nowadays when interacting with 
some of my Omani friends and the people they introduce me to when they find out I’m 
not fully Omani. But I’ve learned to cope with this.”  
Social Spaces 
 In terms of specific locations of Omani-expatriate interaction, the places cited 
frequently as spaces of social interaction between nationals and non-nationals include 
both public spaces and private spaces. Public spaces mentioned include hotels and their 
bars and lounges, organized sports and recreational facilities and spaces, and places of 
work and study. Private spaces of socialization includes places of residence, excluding 
family homes. 
Public Spaces 
Public spaces are an important arena for understanding the influence of both the 
state’s nation-building project and the impact of migration upon culture and identity. 
According to Meyer (2008), “state power and the citizens contend with one another for 
urban public space. Political power tries to intervene, to dominate space with its own 
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monuments. The monuments and squares, the churches and palaces begin to play a role.” 
(p. 158) He asks,  
“Who will emerge victorious? The citizens live their everyday and business rhythms in 
this struggle for the appropriation of public space. By making this urban public space the 
place of strolling around, of encounters, of discussions and negotiations, of intrigue and 
spectacle, they appropriate it spontaneously.” (Meyer, 2008, p. 158) 
Places of employment and study were cited by nearly all participants as the 
location in which they most frequently interact with Omanis or expatriates. Sudanese 
Participant 1, who holds Omani citizenship and has lived in Oman since childhood, said 
that he studies with mostly Omanis but “there is few like from Jordan, from Egypt. 
Sudanese also.” Filipina Participant 18 stated that she studied at the Philippine School 
Muscat and that the majority of students were also Filipino, but “there were Sudanese, 
Indians, Pakistanis, and other national who’ve enrolled while I was there. I had the 
pleasure of interacting with them a lot since there weren’t too many student at that time. 
To give you an example, in my senior year there were only 15 of us in class, and almost 
of them were non-Filipinos. It was cool.” In addition to learning some Arabic during her 
residency in Muscat, she said,  
“Oh! And I’ve picked up a few Hindi/Urdu words since I’ve been here as with most of 
my Filipino classmates…on a different point of view, I think we, as Filipinos, did rub off 
on some of our non-Filipino classmates. They now know a few Tagalog words and crave 
some Filipino foods.” 
Participant 17, who is half Omani and half Filipino, expressed to me that he was 
harassed by classmates at the government school because of his blended heritage, and 
only found relief from the bullying upon transference to The American International 
School of Muscat (TAISM).  As a fan of spoken word and American underground hip-
hop from the Bay Area of California, he provided me a song he wrote narrating these 
experiences. In his rap he said, 
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“A little weirdo, that fact was obvious. In his seat relaxed that was all he did. The 
Filipino, half-caste Omani kid you couldn’t see in class, yea, he often hid….I 
didn’t have a posse, I just sat there watching my Tamagotchi. Got bullied for 
being half Omani, the Zanzibaris and Pakistanis would laugh and mock 
me….soon enough some bastards from grade ten were laughing away as they 
battered my face in. I thought they would stop but I was sadly mistaken. I’m 
happy to say that I transferred to TAISM where people were nice and the snacks 
were amazin’, an actual great international haven for me. See I wasn’t angered 
‘cuz they didn’t laugh when I said I was Arab and Asian.”  
 
In addition to places of study, Filipino Participants 18 and 19 also both stated that 
they interact with Omanis every day, mostly in the workplace. Participant 15, an events 
manager from Bahrain, said he interacts with Omanis “Often through work, as well as 
occasionally Omani friends I made from my previous job.” Bahraini Participant 15 stated 
that he finds Omanis pleasant and welcoming even in the work environment but said, 
“However, when it comes to work and being efficient, things tend to take longer than 
they should. I feel the culture lacks a sense of urgency in that regard.”  
Egyptian Participant 6, an architect, had some insightful comments about the 
work environment in Oman, and his statement echoes those made by others regarding 
local work ethic. When I asked him if he wanted to stay in Muscat permanently, he said,  
“The problem is once you start to live and you get used to the …for each country their 
own type of system of work goes on. It is very unique and different between countries. 
The system of work in Egypt is very different than it is here is Muscat. The tempo of 
work for example sometimes in Egypt we are a very big country we have over 90 million 
people so the competition, the way of work, the standards are different than what we are 
using here in Oman. You’ll find that when you want to go back to your type of work 
you’ll find some difficulty.” 
 
Portuguese Participant 3, who works at the National Museum, said she interacts 
with Omanis “every day” but only in a professional capacity. She stated that she thought 
Omanis were a “very cheerful and happy people…” but that, “it’s very different from 
how people react when they are at work.” She also said, “Unfortunately I wasn’t able to 
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establish relationships on a personal level with Omanis.” I ask her if she could think of a 
reason why it never happened, and Participant 3 responded, 
“I tried. Some colleagues from work. I was even invited to their houses…in the 
countryside not in Muscat. Um but I think it’s a cultural gap there is and suddenly there is 
not much more talk. I used to have a friend, he was a guide tour and he used to take us 
out every weekend in the first 6 months. I still keep in touch with him, we just don’t have 
any else to do together. And he is married and has a family so I don’t think it’s okay to 
just invite him for coffee when his family is at home. And I never got to know is family 
and I don’t know why. So I felt weird and I stopped that. It’s because I was with a group I 
was not alone, so everyone has left and I’m still here…I don’t find it appropriate 
anymore.” 
Omani English translator Participant 10 stated that her interactions with 
expatriates at work are pleasant, saying “we have some foreigners here and the 
interaction is good. They respect the traditions and habits. They respect the culture here 
which is good. We had one Israeli…and some other expatriates…” Omani Participant 2 
said he works with Americans because, “It’s an American company” but said the 
composition of workers is mixed. He said there are also Indian coworkers, “but not much 
because of Omanization. Like two last Indians were gone because they were old and 
that’s it. No one new. Omanization is very working hard on it.” I asked Portuguese 
Participant 3 what she thought about Omanization of the workforce, to which she replied,  
“Omanization, I think it’s positive. I think just by trying to do it by law probably might 
not be the best way because what I see is that…it’s complicated. People want to learn but 
there is no management sometimes behind some companies or some sectors to allow the 
people to learn. People are employed but sometimes they’re not given tasks and I think 
that’s very brutal and very sad.”  
Participant 19, a Filipino with extensive residency in Muscat, stated that he’s been treated 
differently in the workplace because of his nationality, implying that Omanization is the 
cause of such discrimination. He said, “If you work outside you will never get the senior 
position, there is always an Omani manager higher than you, even if you are more 
qualified and experienced.” 
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Omani Participant 2, a petroleum engineer, stated that his interactions with his 
expatriate coworkers is positive, and implied it has a positive impact on him personally. 
He said,  
“When you ask me if I like the Americans I work with. Of course. They taught me the 
job, first of all, and they treat me with respect. And they’re very ‘you work hard you go 
there if you don’t work hard you don’t go there’ it’s something that I respect, and it’s 
something we don’t have much here by the way.”  
I asked what he meant and he replied, “Among ourselves, we don’t love each other that’s 
the problem. We don’t help each other.” I asked him why he thought that was the case, he 
said,  
“I don’t understand, and I don’t know. I’m not like that. I wasn’t raised like that. But I’ve 
seen it. If you have a supervisor who is Omani, he will treat his Omani employees very 
bad. But if the supervisor is American or British, he’ll treat them good. Then I came to 
find out that’s everywhere in the world, you know that? I saw an Indian supervising 
Indians, he gave them shit like hell. It’s like human nature…I don’t know. It’s something 
that…I think should change.” 
Omani Participant 12, who works in both the public and private sector, said she 
worked with expatriates at both her places of employment. She said,  
“Well now this is confusing. So like the radio job, the manager’s a Lebanese guy and the 
other presenters are Brits and then the other job my direct supervisor is French 
Lebanese...it’s like I’m haunted by this nationality haha and then the CEO is Tunisian 
and then you have the Indians so it’s kind of a mix.”  
 
I asked if there were other Omanis to which she replied, “There are loads…but the radio 
job I’m the only Omani.” I asked why she thinks that is and she said,  
“I’m doing English so it’s not an Arabic station so it’s difficult to find an Omani who is 
interested in or has the same level of expertise that I do and then unfortunately the radio 
station was not very impressed they tried to hire Omanis but their work contact wasn’t 
the best. They don’t show up when they had a show if you’re a radio presenter you have 
to be there unless you’re really sick and don’t have a voice. It’s not an office job where 
you can just call in late. And then when you contact them it’s like ‘yeaaa…I wasn’t 
feeling well.’ At least inform someone, you know? So based on that experience they stop 
trying to train locals and we’ll just stick to what we know and hire someone from abroad 
who has experience.” 
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Omani Participant 11, who works in planning in the public sector in addition to 
owning his own aluminum fabrication business, said he interacts with expatriates at work 
regularly. He said,  
“Yes when there is any work related between my job and their job. Sometimes meetings 
sometimes when we trade information…once a week twice a week. Yaaani…I think if 
you know Simon, I was work with him many time because especially when we have team 
formation we have to work together for team evaluation of proposals of these 
companies… Simon was from Australia and before one guy was from Netherlands and 
most of them from Sudan…yes most of them Sudan.”  
 
In terms of his professional interactions with expatriates, Omani Participant 11 stated, 
“We are one team so not Omani or not any other country we are one team and one work 
so we focus and give all our attention to the work we are doing...and we understand each 
other and they are very helpful guys. Until now I haven’t faced any difficulties or 
obstacles with them.” I asked him what it was like, the work environment, and Omani 
Participant 11 emphasized knowledge acquisition as a major benefit of work interactions, 
saying,  
“This kind of job learn me new things and also practice language and also discover new 
things and learning new things. New ways. You are dealing with different minds so I 
learn from them. And they are experts and have good skills so we learn from them. But 
when we stay in the office there is nothing new. During the meeting most of them come 
with new style of work, new idea, also when we review technical proposals…how to 
evaluate…we have criteria to evaluate proposal in accordance with criteria. But this 
criteria come from experts…so every expert has good ideas to evaluate and give good, 
right scoring for company proposals.” 
Leisure and recreation locations are another public space characterized by Omani-
migrant interaction. Sudanese Participant 1, when asked where he interacts the most with 
Omanis said everywhere, but mentioned a change in crowd over time, saying, “Back in 
the days, you wouldn’t see it. But they took over.” I asked to whom he was referring and 
he said, “Omanis. Bar side. Some of them back in the day some would go to bars but 
nowadays you see so many of them. So many. Just a few Omani before and now many all 
 211 
over.” Omani Participant 2 said he interacts with non-nationals daily “when it’s not 
Ramadan, because now I don’t go out much.” He said, “When I go to Left Bank I meet 
everybody. It’s a daily thing, unless I’m sick.” When asked where Omanis and 
expatriates most frequently interact, Participant 2 also unhesitatingly said,  
“Bars. Hahaha. After Ramadan go to any bar you will see. After Eid, that’s the day. You 
will see Omanis and foreigners they all get drunk and turn out. Coffee shops, bars. You 
name it. Wherever you guys go, Omanis go.” Participant 2 also said he only socializes at 
“Left Bank, [Participant 1’s] parties, and Zouk. You know Zouk? Left Bank, Zouk, that’s 
it.”  
French architect Participant 5 used to go to Left Bank as well, saying, “I used to go to 
Left Bank before, but lately I feel like it’s a pub more than a bar. I used to like the wine 
bar. It felt really more like a pub.” I asked what he thought was the cause for the change 
in atmosphere, to which he replied,  
“Yea a change of crowd, being here in Muscat for 4 years, the expat crowd kind of 
renews itself every September, so the current crowd of expats is more pub-like. So I think 
they’re trying to bring it back to being a lounge bar. The difference between a pub and a 
bar is that in a pub you’re there to drink and chat whereas in a bar you’re there to lounge, 
listen to the music, and occasionally chat with friends. It’s a different vibe. I’ve been to 
New York once that only thing I can compare it to is that the pub is like a sports bar and 
the lounge is where you have ambient music.” 
 
Locations of physical recreation and organized sports were also cited as spaces of 
interaction, as were other social or volunteer-oriented groups. When asked if she’s a 
member of any clubs or organizations, museum curator Participant 3, from Portugal, said, 
“I do yoga with a local group…so yea I do. It’s not an organized group just people who 
do the same thing but it’s always changing. Tourists as well. It’s in the Safari village next 
to the Hyatt hotel.” When I asked what nationalities were present she said, “All 
nationalities. Indian, Malaysian, Sri Lankan, Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Iranian, a lot. 
Hahaha. They are very popular classes.” Omani Participant 10, an alum of SQU, is part 
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of a “Sultan Qaboos University female swimming club...only for students and employees 
of SQU. They have a separate club only for women. Everything is separate here.” 
Filipino Participant 19 is a member of a bible study group, and said he joined, “to 
worship God and interact with members of my own Philippine community.” He also 
plays basketball for a team as part of the Philippine community’s basketball tournament. 
Omani Participant 11 did state that though he typically leaves the city on the weekends, 
in Muscat he engages in organized sport for recreation.  He said, “In Muscat I only make 
sport near of the sea. So the beach, running and each Tuesday playing football with my 
friends…but other days sometimes walking sometimes running.” Similarly, British 
Participant 8 said in our interview,  
“I play football twice a week with two Omani groups. So I was lucky when I first came to 
Oman I went to school with three Omanis so when I came to Oman they literally I landed 
and within a week I was meeting people and going out for drinks. So at first I was going 
out and socialize socialize socialize…”  
 
Sudanese Participant 1 conveyed that he used to partake in organized sports saying, “I 
used to gym, and um I used to play football and basketball. They were Sudanese, you see 
uh Egyptians they come around the way, Omanis, Italians, some whatever. It depends on 
the other team. We trying to be against with.” 
In addition to organized sports, Omani Participant 11 also regularly engages in 
community service as a volunteer. When asked about his membership in social clubs he 
said,  
“In my area I have social group but I’m not close with them because of my work…this 
group is a football team but not only for sport. We do something new there in that area 
like preparing a good new place a park. We need to clean one area, cleaning…so we have 
to get together and arrange with other places to finalize new projects. We make a wall 
around the graves you know…new activities also yaaani there in my area this is usually 
open it should be closed…so we do it something like this.”  
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Likewise, Omani Participant 4, an architect, also volunteers her time for the benefit of the 
community. She volunteers for an educational program that teaches engineering concepts 
to young children, and is involved in a charity organization as well. She said,  
“The organization basically provides the necessity and needs for people that are less 
fortunate and also gives then the skills and needs to be more dependent. A few things the 
organization does is supply kids in school with all the stationary they need and uniforms 
and meals for the entire academic year. Another one is providing cooking and baking 
class's for women to use the skills and turn them I to businesses to support 
themselves. We also help build and renovate shelters for people affected by any natural 
disaster, and provide monthly grocery allowances for families in need.”  
Private Spaces 
Socialization largely occurs in the private spaces of residents’ homes, and these 
private spaces are where the most extensive Omani-expatriate interactions occur, given 
its privateness. French Participant 5, like many other participants of various origins, 
stated that that one of the reasons there are so many house parties is because of 
repercussions of gossip, as discussed previously. He said,  
“You cannot be seen. For example I have a friend who was dating a royal, not very close 
circle but she’s royal and she could not be seen in Rock Bottom. She could barely be seen 
just eating in Trader Vic’s. She could not be seen in the bar area because ‘what would 
people say? What would they think?’ And she could not go swimming unless it was at 
her place because she’d be seen in a swimsuit.” 
 
I asked Participant 5 if he’s treated differently as a western man, asking specifically if he 
felt he had more freedom and less judged. He replied, “Yea but still, because you see my 
wife is Moroccan and we have a take on the customs and things. So we have a lot of 
friends some of them don’t care and do their own things and others are completely 
constrained in public and then really chill and relaxed at home.” 
British telecom manager Participant 8 addressed the lack of house gatherings in 
the homes of Omanis, and related it to the traditional social structure, fundamentally, the 
family. He said,  
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“The difference is for expats going to people’s houses is…with local people I don’t think 
it is so much because the culture. You have houses and cars and it’s all kept in the family. 
You marry your cousin or….not so much anymore but you’re marrying into another 
person’s family and you can’t leave your house as a man or woman until your married. 
And still sometimes what happens you have the house next door that you’ll move into or 
there will be an extension like two houses where one brother will go and the other brother 
will go. This culture means that you don’t…my friends who I play football with who 
aren’t married, there’s no chance that…there’s hardly any chance that they’ll invite 
people around to have a drink.” 
 
Another cited reason for the preference of socialization in private spaces was the 
nature of expatriate life in Muscat, characterized by transience, uncertainty and 
spontaneity. Participant 7, Indian mental health administrator with a thick American 
accent, stated, “We go to people’s houses again…houses are a great place to hang out. I 
think another reason people like going to houses is because overseas if we go and call 
someone as say let’s hang out they go ‘uhm no.’ You kinda gotta have a plan. Here you 
can just get together anytime there’s not a lot that goes into it, people just come around. 
They’re a lot more accepting to have you in their homes. “ 
Similarly, when asked why he thinks house gatherings are preferred, British 
Participant 8 stated,  
“It’s a lot more…like, I dunno…it’s a lot more social I think. As in you know it’s…I 
guess you’re in an environment when people are always in and out and your more on 
your own when you’re in someone else’s country. It’s not like I’m back in England where 
I have my routine or go to a pub and I know everyone there. It’s more like someone 
would say we’re doing this this weekend, we’re doing that this weekend. It’s like people 
are more willing to do stuff here. They make effort and you say ‘yea okay let’s go to the 
beach or let’s do this or…’ Like now, I don’t know, one of my friends has just messaged 
me 13 minutes ago. We’ve got no plans tonight but I’m sure in the next half an hour we’ll 
probably know what we’re gonna do. Because we’ll ring a few people and see. And also 
you can drink and it’s quiet, and you like everyone that’s there. I’m not saying every 
week there’s a house party, but one or two people over and have a bottle of wine and 
that’s about it.” 
 
Participant 7 responded to her British husband’s comment to emphasize the exclusiveness 
and clarify on the size of such crowds. She said, “With the whole house get-togethers, 
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I’m not gonna call them parties, there’s rarely a new person in the mix, it’s more or less a 
regular crowd. So with that being said if one didn’t have the connections, it could be a 
very lonely place to be, because it’s difficult to just be like ‘Hi, can we hang out?’ you 
know?” Responding to this comment her husband said,  
“You kinda have to, you’re forced into it. Like I had friends I was introduced to but then I 
was forced to…like if someone said ‘we’re doing this, would you like to do this?’ 
Normally I would say no I just met you I’m not coming to your house. But when you’re 
at a point where you don’t know anyone except at work you’re then like ‘okay we’re 
going’ like sometimes you even joke. Like when I go home, I have my friends: all the 
same demographic, same age, same sort of like marital status, same income, all like you 
know. But here one of my best friends is probably like 40. And sometimes she’ll come 
it’s a weird mix.” 
 
I asked if “weird mix” included people of different national origins in addition to 
socioeconomic class, and Participant 8 said, “Yea definitely. My best friends you could 
say like in the social ladder or even high, and normal people from England and other 
people from Sweden. Because I work in telecom I have a lot of friends who are Swedish, 
Danish, you know. I like it. I love it. Greece, Lebanon, Palestine.” His wife, Indian 
Participant 7, verified this level of diversity saying that common interests, rather than 
common cultural or social backgrounds, become the unifying factor in expatriate social 
circles. She said,  
“All different ages, incomes, interests. That’s the thing I notice a lot of things back home 
they rarely moved away and they stayed stagnant. Here is just interesting because his 
mates are much older than he is, late thirties or forty-something and it’s interesting to see 
how they react with each other because I mean they’re from various ages of life so your 
interests become a focal point here which is good, not just how you’re similar.” 
 
Participant Observation 
Public Spaces 
 
Al Hail Beach, Seeb. (Photos 7.1, 7.2, 7.3) In public spaces, there is the presence of both 
national and migrant populations, but the socialization between the two appears limited. 
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Many residents frequent the beach on a daily basis after work and dinner to exercise and 
play organized sports. At Al Hail Beach in Seeb, just north of The Wave, I observed huge 
crowds that began arriving around 5:30-6:00 pm, when the sun begins to set and the 
temperature drops a bit. The majority of beachgoers were Omanis, but there were a few 
Western expatriates and South Asian expatriates observed. The activity seemed to be 
either a family or team-sport oriented. There were families with small children swimming 
in the water, and interestingly on one occasion I noticed a group of young Omani girls, 
teenagers, wearing the traditional, colourful Omani attire, rather than the black abaya 
most commonly seen in the city.  There were pairs of old men walking along the water, 
talking, and others running the length of the beach, some running solo, others in pairs, 
and I observed running groups of 7-15 individuals, who, I assume, are teammates in these 
informal soccer matches. Soccer matches, too, took up a large portion of the beach area, 
with the ‘fields’ essentially touching, goalpost to goalpost, creating a chain down the 
beach. Those playing soccer were younger in age, and exclusively male.  
 
Shatti Beach, Shatti (Photos 7.4 & 7.5) The public beach near the Intercontinental and 
Grand Hyatt is more diverse than that in the Al Hail neighbourhood, but the contact 
between beachgoers of different national origins is also quite limited. I went a bit earlier 
in the evening, closer to 4:30-5:00 pm, with a friend of British nationality who had grown 
up in Muscat. Again I observed many families, Omani, South Asian, and Asian, 
lounging, eating food, smoking shisha and enjoying the environment and the company of 
their relatives. There were more young children at this location than I recall seeing at Al 
Hail Beach. Another sight I hadn’t seen in Al Hail was the presence blue-collar labourers 
checking out the beach, but they did not converse with anyone else, and no one 
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approached them. It was largely families taking their children to the beach, or couples 
enjoying the environment without much interaction. If there were groups together, as far 
as I could tell, they were not of mixed Omani-expatriate origins. 
 
Oman Club, Al Khuwair (Photos 7.6 & 7.7) I attended basketball practice games with 
an old Filipino friend at the Oman Club in Al Khuwair, The Filipino Community has a 
basketball league and the Filipino team on which my friend played were preparing for a 
league tournament, solely Filipino. During my time living in Oman, I served as this 
team’s Mascot for a previous tournament, and, since I would be gone by the time the 
tournament began, was there only to visit with my old friend, and also keep score and 
time. There were also three Filipina spectators/girlfriends attending the basketball 
practice. At this practice game, everyone was speaking Tagalog for the most part, the 
only exception was if they were speaking to me directly, but that was a rare occurrence. 
At one point one player animatedly said something in Tagalog to another player after he 
missed a basket and everyone totally erupted in laughter. My former coworker, not 
wanting me to feel left out, told me “He said to him ‘you were a better player when you 
were a Christian.’” That player had recently converted to Islam since living in Muscat. 
Even in the evening the heat and humidity was intense, and I wondered why, in spite of 
the fact that our sweat wasn’t evaporating, the sports facilities were always busy. In 
addition to the two Filipino teams practicing, there were several friendly games of soccer 
between on the adjacent soccer fields. There were about ten individuals engaged in that 
soccer match, they were speaking Arabic and learned Arab, though I can’t say with 
certainty whether or not they were Omani. The overall atmosphere of this social event 
was fun and light-hearted, and, though I couldn’t understand what was being said, the 
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tone of delivery and responses of others let me know that there was a lot of joking and the 
kind of benign “trash-talking” you’d expect amongst close friends and teammates.  
 
Qurum Park, Qurum I only briefly went to Qurum Park, close to City Center Qurum 
and the shopping complex in Al Khuwair, with a Yemeni friend to rendezvous with 
another individual who needed a lift. What I observed, only briefly, was that the park 
patrons were mostly Omanis, usually as a family unit, and South Asian expatriates. There 
was also one South Asian woman walking with an Omani family. I assume she was their 
housekeeper, and was there to take care of the children, and other errands the family 
deems necessary. 
 
Royal Opera House, Shatti. There is also a separation of the expatriate and national 
communities based on economic status. Certain places of prominence, like the Royal 
Opera House and its amenities, is informally off limits to the majority of the expatriate 
community because of cost. Omanis frequent these shops, restaurants, and cafes 
frequently, but expatriates do not. In addition to cost, expatriates feel informally excluded 
from these areas, as their presence was marked by discriminatory comments and glares. I 
went to the Royal Opera House three times, the first time I was meeting an Omani alum 
of University of Oregon to chat over lunch, in the interior, commercial area of the Opera 
House. I observed only Omanis and Western expatriates, with the exception being those 
working the shops and restaurants, though some employees were western expatriates.  
The second time I went to the Royal Opera House was with an Omani friend I 
initially met back in high school in South Africa. Through her work at the National 
Museum, she made acquaintance with and befriended Anil Khimji, a wealthy 
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businessman from one of Muscat’s most influential Indian families. He owns an upscale 
Indian restaurant in the Opera House, and we were invited for a private dinner in his 
company. Also in attendance were two Italian women of middle age. I wish not to share 
that majority of that conversation considering that I wasn’t there in a research capacity, 
but Mr. Khimji did convey that he may have to relocate this restaurant because of the 
high rents at the Royal Opera House, in addition to liquor license issues impacting the 
revenue the restaurant generates. He also mentioned that his family has been in Oman 
continuously since 1870, and that is why he wears the dishdasha and takes pride in doing 
so. 
The last trip to the Royal Opera House was with my high school friend, two of her 
three sisters, and four of their female cousins. We ate iftar at Al Angham, an upscale 
traditional Omani restaurant, serving only Omani foods, and employing only Omani wait 
staff. It was really pricey, and, actually, now that I think about it, during each visit to the 
Opera House I felt sloppy and underdressed in comparison to other patrons. The topics of 
conversation over dinner were mostly relating to family drama and gossip, which, I came 
to realize, is what dominates conversation between Omani women. 
 
Muscat City Centre, Seeb. (Photos 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, & 7.11) I went to City Center Seeb 
several times because of its proximity to where I was staying and the need to occasionally 
buy groceries. Sometimes my high school classmates and I would go to the mall for 
clothing, but it was only occasional. In the summer, and especially during Ramadan, the 
time of day changes the atmosphere of City Center Seeb. Before 5:00 or 6:00 pm the mall 
will be sparsely populated, the exception being, obviously, those employed there, but also 
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western expatriates, including myself. Though I did fast during Ramadan while there, the 
presence of only westerners could be because they aren’t constrained by fasting, and so 
their schedule was less nocturnal. 
I went to City Center Seeb on a weekday at 5:00 pm, though, and it was as 
crowded as I anticipated, given the shopping culture and popularity of malls in Muscat. 
Mall-goers I observed were mostly Omanis, conspicuous because of their national dress. I 
saw many family units and many, many children. I also observed several groups of 
teenagers, Omani teens mostly, who were, like teenagers at malls all across the world, 
traveling in packs, window-shopping, and just generally being awkward and silly, 
especially when around the opposite sex. I saw one woman of middle age wearing a 
Bedouin-style niqab, which I had not previously seen being worn in the city, and only a 
couple times had I seen it worn in the interior of Oman.  
After wandering around and taking in the atmosphere, I posted up at the Starbucks 
on the edge of the food court, near H&M, Chili’s restaurant, and The Body Shop. The 
employees of this Starbucks were South Asian.  Sitting behind me was a sizable group of 
Filipino friends, both male and female. In front of me was a table of three Omani men, 
two of whom were wearing kumas and the third was wearing the Bedouin style hat. 
Observing the people walking by, I observed a lot of South Asian men in western 
clothing hanging out together, a few family units of western origin. I also observed three 
men wearing Saudi national dress walking together, which was worthy of note because, 
from what I have seen and what was conveyed in interviews and off-the-record 
conversations, there are not many Saudi nationals in Oman. I also saw one Indonesian 
housekeeper shopping with an Omani family. At one point a Western man and black 
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woman, I won’t speculate as to her nationality, walked by together. Because of what I 
had heard from participants about their experiences as part of an interracial couple, I 
looked at others around me to see their reaction. For the most part everyone was too busy 
or distracted to take notice, but I did notice a lot of people looking at them, or I saw 
moving as if watching the couple walk. Otherwise the reaction to their presence was, 
thankfully, uninteresting. 
Muscat City Centre, Qurum. I went to City Center Qurum on a Friday night around 
10:30 pm to catch a movie with some new friends, accompanied by my old classmate. 
The group we were meeting up with included two South Africans, cousins, one Ugandan 
female, and a Yemeni male. There were a lot of Omani families at the mall, but the 
quantity of teenage hordes was notably increased. Again, these groups of teenagers were 
divided by gender, and more or less aimlessly walking the halls chatting with each other, 
and, when another group of teenagers was encountered, of  the opposite sex anyway, they 
would chat and flirt with each other in that familiarly awkward and self-conscious 
teenage way. 
LuLu Hypermarket, Avenues Mall, Bowsher (Photos 7.12, 7.13, & 17.14) I went 
grocery shopping with my female Omani friend to LuLu Hypermarket at Avenues Mall 
on a weekday afternoon. The store itself is incredibly large and two-stories, with products 
ranging to food stuff to clothing to electronics. The food was a variety of products that 
cater to both Asian and Middle East tastes. Looking at the labels of some food items, 
origins included India and South Africa. There was a very sizable seafood section that 
partially resembled an aquarium, with both live and dead fish for purchased. The produce 
section was incredibly different than that of other grocery stores like Sultan Center and 
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Carrefour because of its variety. The, dare I say, exotic variety of fruits and vegetables 
were of Asian origins. There was a notable dates, nuts, and dried fruits counter that was 
busy. LuLu was in fact very crowded as conveyed by Participant 7, and the majority of 
the shoppers were of South Asian and Asian origin. I did observe, however, many Omani 
shoppers.  
Al Khuwair Shopping Complex, Al Khuwair (Photo 7.15) In this commercial area in 
close proximity to City Center Qurum the majority of shops and business are fabric and 
tailoring related. There are also jewelry and ready-made clothing stores a pet store, and a 
miniature tourist-friendly souq-style souvenir shop. There is also a couple electronic 
shops, and an Amouj store, which is an Omani perfume company that’s insanely 
expensive. Amouj perfume has a particular heaviness to it that to me smelled typically 
Arab, if that makes any sense. It’s a thick, strong, and expensive type of scent, rather than 
the subtle perfumes popular in the United States. In this shopping area, most store owners 
were Asian or South Asian, as were most employees. The patrons I noticed were mostly 
Omanis, but I also saw Asians, South Asians, a just a handful of westerner expatriates.  
Matrah Souq, Matrah (Photos 7.16 & 7.16) My female Omani friend and I went to the 
souq in Matrah to buy fabric and trim for her older sister, who has interest in clothing 
design. We went on a weekend afternoon during Ramadan, so the souq was relatively 
slow and empty except for the store owners and a few Omanis who seemed to just be 
passing through. The souq is largely underground, for reasons relating to climate, and is a 
labyrinth of small alleys connecting to a larger thoroughfare like spokes, the center of 
which is a larger circular intersection with a stained glass ceiling. The fabric ‘section’ of 
the souq is towards the back, in a side alley passed the tourist and souvenirs section, 
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which is immediately upon entrance. The store owners looked and sounded to be of 
South Asian origins. The business interaction was professional and actually somewhat 
unfriendly. I assume this is because we were females and she was Omani, so familiarity 
in our interaction would be inappropriate for the place and context. When we left, there 
was an elderly Omani male in clothing that would indicate rural origins. He had a 
wheelbarrow of lemons to sell. When it tipped over and I assisted in placing the loose 
lemons back into the wheelbarrow, there was no conversation at all, including a thank 
you. I can only speculate as to why, and think either my action was expected, or again, 
that I was female and the older generation would not engage with me because of my 
gender. 
The smaller alcohol-serving venues, like Irish pubs and the various lounges were 
spaces of interaction. Though you can see both populations, identifiable partially by the 
wearing of national dress, in the bars of the international hotels, there is still segregation 
and limited contact between the two. For example, though some Omanis were sitting with 
a group of friends of various origins, including the group of friends interviewed, there 
was an entire table of men in dishdasha drinking pints and singing their own songs 
without so much as an acknowledgement of others around them. Many Omani men were 
visible in the bars, but often came alone and would stand aside observing others. 
Rock Bottom, Ramee Guestline Hotel, Qurum (Photo 7.18)  My first trip to Rock 
Bottom was on a weekday even from 1:30-3:00 am, and the venue was very crowded. 
The type of music played on this weekday night was electronic/techno music, as many 
top 40 pop songs from the UK and a few American pop songs. The crowd was 
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particularly pleased to hear Bailando by Enrique Iglesias, and many more people joined 
the crowded dancefloor upon commencement.  
Based on external appearance including race and clothing and languages 
overheard, as well as random short conversations with fellow club-goers, I estimate that 
roughly 2/3 of patrons that night were expatriates of African, Asian, South Asian and 
European origins. I spoke with Filipina females, one Latina female, and one Romanian 
female. There were several, roughly a dozen, Omani males wearing dishdasha. Some of 
these conspicuous Omani males were drinking, while others were just standing, 
observing the dancefloor keenly.  The number of male patrons greatly outnumbered 
female patrons, and I did not observe any Omani females.  The patrons of European and 
African descent dominated the dance floor, with groups of males cheering on an 
enthusiastic performance of a single friend as well as doing choreographed dances as a 
group, specifically the African expatriates. In the smoking section of the location, a 
poorly-ventilated fish tank-style glass room to the right of the dancefloor, I casually 
conversed with several British expatriates, male, and Indian expatriates, male. There were 
several Omanis in the smoking room. Substances being smoked included both tobacco 
cigarettes and dokha pipes. 
On my second visit to Rock Bottom, at roughly 2:00 am, I went with a couple 
British expatriates in an impromptu and last minute continuation of the nights’ festivities. 
Again, the room was mostly occupied by expatriates of Western and South Asian 
descent. There were many, many more Asian women than the previous visit. I noticed a 
group of 3-4 Asian women dancing under the watch of an Arab man. Dancing up towards 
them and introducing myself, their enthusiasm to dance with me seemed genuine, and 
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somehow slightly flirtatious. When I asked one of the women where she was from, she 
said the Philippines. When I asked if she was with the man at the bar, she nodded yes and 
said “…and also my friends.” The Arab man watched me intently and when the woman 
approached him at the bar they had a brief verbal exchange, he looked back at me 
suspiciously but never left his barstool. I began to realize that these women were 
prostitutes. On the dancefloor I asked the friendliest of the group with whom I had been 
conversing if she was okay. The question was met with confusion and no answer was 
provided. Not wanting to bring unintended consequences to her, I quit asking questions 
and just continued my observations without direct communication.   
Left Bank Lounge, Qurum (Photo 7.19) My first trip to the frequently cited and much-
loved Left Bank Lounge took place on a weekend night from 11:30 pm to 1:00 am. I 
attended at the invitation of several interview participants. I was told that this place was 
“the new Zouk”, a reference to a since-closed club that was incredibly popular amongst 
the club-going crowd. Indeed it was a very popular and very crowded venue atop a steep 
hill. Most patrons drove together to Left Bank, and parking atop the hill was imperative, 
as walking up the hill was definitely strenuous. The music was of an understated, 
European lounge variety, and there was no dance floor, as dancing was not the focus of 
the venue. The outdoor tables, where smoking was permitted, was prime real estate, and 
every group that came in after us I observed at least peaking outside to look for available 
space.  
I couldn’t help but feel that I was amongst the city’s hippest and most globalized 
residents. Many, many expatriates of numerous origins were gathered in the space.  The 
group with whom I met up with were expatriates of Sudanese, Iranian, Ugandan, Omani 
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and Yemeni national origins.  I spoke with expatriates from Lebanon, India, Sudan, the 
UK, and China at the same table we were occupying. I made acquaintance with Omani 
men in western dress, and observed a table of four: three Omani men in dishdasha and an 
Omani girl dressed modestly Western but without abaya or hijab. They were largely 
silent and observant, and, to be honest, looking rather uncomfortable, the reason for 
which I cannot say. It could’ve been that the environment of indulgence was 
overwhelming and they felt out-of-place, or that, given the culture of gossip, secrecy, and 
the importance of reputation, they hoped not to make eye contact with familiar faces. I 
returned to Left Bank twice more. The second visit was much like the first in terms of 
crowd demographics, size, and music choice with the exception that I observed more 
Omanis in dishdasha than I had on my first visit. However, the last time I frequented this 
venue it was a Sunday during the early evening. I was with three Omani sisters, 
childhood friends, and we attended specifically because the youngest sister learned that 
Left Bank had a Sunday Roast dinner every Sunday. This was appealing to her as she 
attended university in the UK, and felt a sense of nostalgia for the tradition. 
Cornucopia, Grand Hyatt, Shatti. I was invited out with a group of participants to 
Cornucopia after spending a few hours at Left Bank. It was a weekend night between 
1:00 am and 3:00 am. The group with which I was socializing included 3 Sudanese male 
expatriates, two Ugandans, one male and one female, an Omani male, a Yemeni guy, a 
Lebanese guy, a girl from Venezuela, 3 British females and one British male, a girl from 
Ukraine, and a Chinese female. The venue was largely empty, maybe 20 patrons, when 
we first arrived but as the night progressed the venue became more crowded. There were 
many Omani men in dishdasha amongst the small group, more than I had seen in other 
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venues. There were expatriates as well, and I spoke with a Lebanese male, and observed 
expatriates, both male and female (but again, mostly male), of Asian and South Asian 
origins. House and techno music was the dominant genre, with sampling from Western 
pop and hip-hop, but the majority of patrons were not dancing, the men in dishdasha 
were lined up along the periphery of the dance floor just observing those who were. Over 
the course of our time in Cornucopia I observed African expatriates dancing. Our diverse 
group danced all together, and our enthusiasm seemed to embolden some to also dance. 
The most interesting observation at Cornucopia occurred for me upon our group’s 
arrival at the venue. I realized that the only other people dancing were three transvestites 
of Asian origin. Even more surprising was the observation that a man in dishdasha was 
dancing with and physically/sexually groping one of the transvestites, who was, with her 
heels and bunny ears, literally towering over the Omani man.  When I asked an 
acquaintance about the very visible engagement of the Omani man and Asian man in 
woman’s clothing, I was informed that though being homosexual is still illegal in Oman, 
it’s gradually becoming more socially accepted, and that in a place like Cornucopia 
nationals are feeling more comfortable publicly engaging with male prostitutes.  
Another notable observation at Cornucopia occurred on my second, and last, visit 
to the venue. It was Arabic Music Night and I immediately noticed several, maybe 4 or 5, 
Arab women in abaya dancing together on the dancefloor. If I saw Arab women in club 
environments they were usually in Western clothing, so the presence of these women was 
conspicuous to me. Intrigued by their dress and presence in such an environment, I turned 
to my Omani acquaintance and asked what the deal was with the Muslim women on the 
dancefloor. I asked if this was acceptable to their families. I was informed that these 
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women were not Omani, but Moroccan prostitutes that are collectively called ‘Arab 
Princesses’. With the exception of the women in our group of friends, I got the 
impression that all the other women in Cornucopia were sex workers. The nightclubs 
seemed to serve a specific purpose, and our presence as regular party-goers was seen as 
odd in such establishments. 
On the Rocks Lounge, Golden Tulip Hotel, Seeb. At the invitation of a participant, I 
went to On the Rocks Lounge on a weekend night between 10:00 pm-2:00 am. The venue 
had an ‘icey’ feel with modern furnishings and a cool colour scheme. At the back wall 
was a DJ booth with a sizeable dancefloor in front of it. A VIP section was to the left of 
the DJ’s booth, and it was elevated above the rest of the room. There were several tables 
in addition to the bar sitting area. It was Hip Hop and R&B Night at the venue, and the 
music choices were popular amongst the crowd. Genres of music played included Rap, 
Hip Hop, Dancehall, and the occasional R&B slow jam. The Yemeni participant and I 
met up with a larger group of friends. The group consisted of Bahraini, Omani, Swiss, 
Yemeni, Lebanese, Sudanese, Ugandan, Ukrainian, South African, Russian, and Egyptian 
nationalities. The Swiss female in attendance was visiting her Yemeni boyfriend, and it 
was her first visit to Oman. She and her boyfriend had met while training to be pilots in 
the UK. The group made sure to make her feel welcomed, as she was quiet and reserved. 
In addition to our group, I observed that many of the patrons were of African origins, a 
larger turnout than present during other participant observation experiences. The dance 
floor was more or less informally segregated, not by race or ethnicity but by groups of 
friends who arrived together. As the night progressed, however, these dancing groups of 
friends intermingled, cheering each other on when sweet dance moves were attempted. 
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The vibe of setting was one of easy-going, casual friendliness that reminded me of social 
interactions I experienced living in South Africa.  I don’t know if that is necessarily 
accurate, but it was a friendlier and more informal atmosphere amongst strangers than 
previously observed. 
Route 66, Shatti Al Qurum (Photo 7.20) I went to Route 66 three times with 
acquaintances and several interview participants for their weekly Wednesday Karaoke 
Night, usually earlier in the evening around 9:00 or 10:00 pm. The nationalities present 
included Yemeni, South African, Sudanese, Filipino, Indian, Omani (men), Palestinian, 
Lebanese, British, Moroccan, Macedonians, and Chinese.  The employees of Route 66 
were mostly Filipinas, including the bartenders and servers. The songs chosen by patrons 
to sing included American songs, like Mustang Sally, and songs by the Black Eyed Peas, 
Madonna, and Beyoncé. European pop songs were also chosen, like Zombie by the 
Cranberries, an Irish band. Wasn’t Me by Shaggy, a Jamaican artist, was the chosen song 
by an Omani in dishdasha, who sounded so similar to the original artist that the crowd 
erupted in cheers of encouragement. There were many Omani males in attendance as 
compared to my observations in other public drinking venues, conspicuous because of 
their national dress. However, the Omanis seemed to be less keen on interacting with 
others, preferring to sit together drinking pints and singing Arabic songs in unison 
instead. The atmosphere of Route 66 was the most informal of any bar or lounge visited, 
as people weren’t dressed to the nines or particularly concerned about being seen with 
their hair down. It was an incredibly friendly and relaxed vibe between all patrons and 
employees, though interaction between groups of friends was rather limited. 
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Private Public Space 
Before I discuss my experiences in private spaces, I should first discuss a social 
space somewhere between private and public. Because of the strict cultural social 
segregation of men and women, as well as the cultural norm that an individual only 
leaves his or her family home once married, the role of cars in socialization is significant. 
Women and men can’t openly hang out together in public spaces without fear of gossip 
or tarnished reputation, and their families won’t allow for such conversation or 
socialization to occur at the family house, and I doubt individuals would want to socialize 
under their parents’ roof either, whether or not the opposite gender would be in 
attendance. However, despite this ‘traditional’ gender segregation, a cultural shift 
towards courtship and dating is happening. So the automobile is also a vehicle for 
intersex socialization, and other socialization activities deemed illicit or otherwise 
inappropriate in public spaces. This seemed to be more pronounced with Arab and 
Muslim participants than others, though respect for local values limited such behaviour 
on the part of non-Arab and non-Muslim participants, who are also not immune to the 
problem of gossip. It was a very common sight to see cars, several in close proximity, or 
several with a bit of distance between each car, parked just off the roadway. Having 
asked participants and acquaintances, dating was cited frequently as the reason for their 
presence. The location of these parked cars was usually in an undeveloped open space, 
but not necessarily in an unfrequented area. In addition to parking in close proximity to 
roads, their presence was conspicuous given that this social activity usually occurred in 
the evening and drivers left their headlights on. For me, this is a significant point because 
these individuals are concerned enough about privacy and the disapproval of their 
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activities, but not concerned enough to warrant attempts to be invisible to police or other 
residents. 
Younger residents would drive around with friends and engage in whatever 
activities they did without having a destination. In an informal conversation with 
Participant 17 and several of his friends, drug abuse and government censorship was the 
topic, and two of the friends relayed a story wherein they were stopped at a traffic light 
and the passenger door of the car in front of them opened. The passenger vomited on the 
road, then shut the car door. With a flabbergasted tone these two individuals said no more 
than half a minute after the passenger vomited the driver’s side door was opened and he 
too vomited on the road. Missing the significance of this, I said, “Okay, they got sick. 
What does that mean?” and one friend said, “Morphine. Nausea is a side effect of 
morphine.” It is this conversation that first alerted me to the use of cars in socialization, 
and the reason why the younger population is so fond of the car culture: the traditional 
family living arrangements and a lack of fixed private spaces. The conversation quickly 
changed to how dangerous it was for so many young residents to be driving around under 
the influence of such narcotics, and in this informal conversation it was speculated that 
this use of the car as a social space is a factor in the frequency of auto accidents in 
Muscat. In terms of hashish smoking while driving, the company was more agreeable and 
believe it to be a nonissue, especially in comparison to driving while under the influence 
of morphine and tramadol.  
In other participant observation experiences, acquaintances, of Indian and Arab 
origins, showed me other locations whereat one could typically see several parked cars in 
close proximity. These transgressive areas were at the margins of residential 
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development, in areas under construction, where pavement abruptly meets the sand. 
Usually, they were more secluded than those areas I observed at the beach, and higher in 
elevation with scenic nighttime views of Muscat. Upon our approach, I noticed headlights 
were off, and also noticed looks of suspicion towards our vehicle and nervousness in the 
eyes of those already in the area. Once, however, we parked and exited the vehicle to 
enjoy the view, the others continued with their socializing, probably, I assume, because 
they were certain we weren’t the Royal Oman Police. Whereas in other intimate social 
gatherings people tended to greet one another and introduce themselves, in these areas 
they did not. Each group of car passengers kept to themselves and did not approach or 
engage any other parties. This, coupled with the fact that headlights were off and the air 
of anxiety was heavier, leads me to believe that the legal ramifications of drug and 
alcohol consumption are more impactful than the social ramifications that would come 
from being found to have socialized privately with the opposite gender.  
Private Space 
In private spaces I was given access to, the level of Omani-expat socialization was 
significantly higher than observed in public spaces, and more meaningful given both the 
intimacy and level of conversational exchange. Sudanese, Omani, Indian, Burundian, 
Yemeni, South Sudanese, Filipino, American, South African, and Trinidadian 
nationalities, among others, drank and conversed together, mostly bonding of music 
tastes. Some of these private gatherings involved smoking hashish. I was invited for such 
socialization to only one family house in Shatti, where the activity was confined to one 
room, and five apartments rented by unmarried expatriate men, Indian and American, and 
three unmarried Omani males. 
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Though I was invited to several ‘boat-parties’, I didn’t attend. These gatherings 
seem to be characterized by high levels of Omani-expatriate interaction. Several boats 
would anchor close together off the coast, I heard several times people say it was Bandar 
Al Khiran, and its passengers would drink, talk, listen to music, and dance for the entire 
afternoon, sometimes into the evening. Women would be in attendance, but they would 
not be Omani. I would assume the conversation would be similar to that observed in the 
parties thrown in the residences. 
House Gathering I, Qurum. My first house gathering was in Qurum, at the upscale villa 
of an Omani male. The décor was high end, with a very large salt-water fish tank serving 
as the division between the dining room and living room. There were four stories, and the 
fourth floor was mostly an outdoor veranda with an ocean view. It had several comfy 
seats, a fire pit, a giant fan for comfort, and a sizeable bar area. The size of this outdoor 
space gave me the impression that it was used frequently for entertaining, especially the 
presence of a bar and the fan, which would mean that even in the heat, the veranda is 
used. There were, in addition to the male Omani homeowner, two Omani sisters, 1 Omani 
female who was also half Kenyan, 1 Sudanese male, and one Moroccan female. The 
music being played was that globalized variety, including American and British Top-40 
pop music you’d tend to hear on the radio. Everyone knew each other and became 
acquainted with each other through past social gatherings and socializing events at Left 
Bank. 
Everyone was dressed in western, globalized attire. The Omani sisters were 
dressed modestly, with blousy, long-sleeved tops. Though definitely not immodestly 
dressed, the Omani-Kenyan woman was dressed in a t-shirt and wrapped sarong or 
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wrapped skirt. Alcohol was available but because it was Ramadan so the Moroccan girl 
declined a drink. The two Omani sisters, despite facial piercings that would indicate a 
Western outlook, also didn’t drink. When drinks were declined, the Omani male said 
“What you’re only good Muslims during Ramadan?” To which everyone giggled and 
there was some playful defensive remarks made but the choice was not really judged, and 
was never brought up thereafter.  
Overall, the social gathering was incredibly pleasant and informal. We talked 
about sports, particularly windsurfing in Masira, because the Omani-Kenyan female just 
returned from windsurfing in Masira, and other neutral subjects relating to like trips and 
events of note, and tentative Eid travel plans. There was a significant amount of gossiping 
about individuals I didn’t know, but nothing that seemed important to record and so about 
what or who the group was gossiping about I do not recall. 
House Gathering II, Qurum. My second private gathering was also in Qurum. The 
owner of the house was an older Omani male that everyone seemed to be trying to 
impress, or towards who everyone was overly respectful. I came as the plus-one of 
Participant 1, a Sudanese male, and there were two other European individuals present, a 
couple, I assumed, though I didn’t catch from which European state the originate, and 
couldn’t gather from their more globalized expatriate accents. The Omani homeowner 
has a yacht and routinely invites younger friends out for yacht parties in Bandar Al 
Khiran. This is the reason I assumed Participant 1 was eager to be in his good graces, in 
addition to his investments in entertainment ventures, a distant ambition of Participant 1.  
Upon arrival to his modest one-story home, we went out for a late dinner to Tokyo Taro 
at the Falaj Hotel. The Omani male was incredibly polite, gracious, and generous, buying 
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the meals of all four of his dinner guests. We were sitting at the sushi bar instead of a 
table made conversation with anyone not sitting right next to you difficult, but he 
routinely directed questions towards me to make me feel included. In addition to the 
food, sake was ordered and consumed. When we returned to his home we smoked shisha 
and watched television. There was a South Asian housekeeper there, who prepared the 
shisha for us. He did not ready the shisha himself, but instead his housekeeper of Asian 
origin readied two shisha pipes for us. The interaction between the Omani homeowner 
and his housekeeper actually seemed very fond and warmhearted. She joked on him, he 
joked on her, and I witnessed no condescension on his part.  
There were two couches and a large recliner chair, in which the Omani man sat. 
This reminded me of my father, who referred to our reclining chair as his recliner, or 
‘The Old Man Chair.’ The European couple there quickly fell asleep on the couch. It was 
a cozy and comfortable environment but the air of it still felt noticeably formal for some 
reason, and not on the part of the homeowner, who was incredibly relaxed and informal, 
as if we weren’t there or as if we were all old friends. The Omani male put on a show 
from Pakistan that I can only assume was Pakistan’s Got Talent or Pakistani X Factor, 
something of that sort. He put it on because he had watched this particular clip before, 
found it to be hilarious, and wanted to share it with us. It was a group of Punjabi and/or 
Sikh men who began to beat each other with wooden planks and other various sturdy 
objects, it ended with one of the performers having an incredible amount of weight 
stacked upon his body. I understood why the Omani man found this performance to be 
outrageous and amusing, and have since tried to find this clip on YouTube but have not 
been successful.  
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House Gathering III, Madinat Qaboos. I attended another socializing event at a private 
house in Madinat Qaboos, just around the corner from KFC, and Al Fair. The homeowner 
was again Omani, and three of his male cousins were present. There was one Sudanese 
male, an Iranian male, a Spanish male, one Serbian female and three Venezuelan females 
also in attendance. Again, the music chosen to be plated was European and American pop 
or Top 40 tunes heard on English radio stations.  
The house was a large, single-story home with a walled courtyard. The décor 
inside was more modern, in an aesthetic sense, and western than anticipated. 
Nevertheless, it wasn’t particularly well-kept, and felt like a bachelor pad. The living 
room or sitting room was more or less tidy, but the kitchen was a mess. Under the sink 
was a substantial pile of empty vodka bottles, maybe 15-20 empty containers of liquor, 
indicating to me that heavy consumption was a regular occurrence. That being said, 
alcohol was available, and I assume obtained through illegal means rather than by permit, 
not only because clearly the house has run through its allotted alcohol rations, but also 
because alcohol was brought to the house by a non-Omani employee of the male 
homeowner. All those present at the gathering drank alcohol. Hashish was also provided 
and many present engaged in its consumption. It was melted with a lighter and mixed 
with loose tobacco leaf to coat, then rolled into a cigarette.  
I felt a sexually-charged undercurrent to the gathering once it got started. A highly 
flirtatious environment developed especially when the Venezuelan females, accompanied 
by the Iranian male, arrived. There seemed to be a lot of posturing amongst the men, with 
the Omani male homeowner being treated as someone in whose good graces you’d like to 
be. He was divorced, with one child, and was a man of means, because of his family. 
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With the increasing consumption of alcohol a verbal argument occurred between the 
homeowner and the Sudanese male when the Sudanese male overstepped and extended 
an invitation to the house without first consulting with the homeowner. There was 
repetition of the word ‘respect’ and ‘this is my house’ to which the Sudanese guy 
profusely apologized and kept reiterating that it was a misunderstanding. Upon this, both 
the Sudanese male, with whom I came, and myself left, though in the driveway the 
homeowner came out, made an attempt to be less argumentative and more understanding. 
I sat in the rental car while this conversation continued. The Omani hugged the Sudanese 
guy but at that time the atmosphere was too awkward so we left.  
Discussion 
 
In terms of expatriate-Omani socialization, the level of daily interaction is highest in the 
workplace or place of study. This can be seen as an outcome of state development, in that 
expatriates are brought in for work, and, unless they are dependents, all expatriates must 
be employed to live in Muscat, and their residency is tied to employee sponsorship. In 
addition, the fact that professional or formal relationships are the most common between 
expatriates and Omanis can also be attributed to the culture of gossip and reputation, as 
well as cultural familiarity and understanding. 
A Sudanese participant stated that he studied with mostly Omanis at a government 
school, but that there were a handful of other nationalities present, including Egyptians, 
Jordanians, and other Sudanese children. The reason this participant of Sudanese origin 
attended an Omani government school is because he has Omani citizenship, obtained by 
his father’s contributions to state development and fulfillment of other citizenship 
requirements, including language proficiency. It is interesting to note that his stated 
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fellow students were also Arab or Arabic-speaking nationalities. This is evidence of 
conformation to the state’s identity-building project.  
A Filipina participant stated that she attended the Philippine School Muscat, but 
that nearly half of her classmates were non-Filipino, including Pakistanis, Sudanese, and 
Indian students. She stated that she socializes mostly with her former expatriate 
classmates, and only interacts with Omanis in the workplace. This was echoed by a male 
Filipino participant as well, and I would characterize this as evidence of adaptation to the 
state’s identity building project in that these separate schools are intended to segregate 
the expatriate population from the Omani population, and that is the outcome for these 
particular participants.   
For the majority of participants, the interactions had with the ‘Other’ in the work 
environment were pleasant. Participants of both non-national and Omani origins stated 
that there was a high level of respect and cultural understanding from both sides. 
Language and knowledge acquisition were cited by Omani participants as positive 
outcomes of this socialization. A male Omani participant stated that he works with a lot 
of expatriates, most of them Sudanese, and stated that they are knowledgeable, 
competent, and that everyone works effectively as a team regardless of their regional or 
national origins. He conveyed that working with expatriates was a learning opportunity 
for him personally. In addition, other Omani participants expressed admiration for a merit 
driven work culture. An Omani petroleum engineer works mostly with American 
expatriates, and cited promotion based on performance and the respectful nature with 
which they interact as positive facets of working with Americans. This is evidence of the 
influence of expatriates upon the local work culture, as well as a conformation to the 
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state’s identity building project when it comes to both the emphasis on the Omani 
tradition of hard work, and a cosmopolitan approach to diversity in the workplace. 
A female Omani participant stated that working with expatriates is pleasant and 
stated they respect the Omani culture, and this mutual respect was reiterated by 
expatriates of Western origins as well. This is evidence of adaptation or conformation to 
the state’s identity project which emphasizes respect and hospitality, but is generally 
reserved for specific expatriates, particularly those of Western origins.  In terms of work 
culture, the expatriate responses were mixed. Asian expatriates expressed that they feel 
frustrated and overlooked for promotion, while others, including Arab and European 
participants, said that they have been influenced negatively by their work environment in 
that they are now more acclimated to the lax and unprofessional work culture in Muscat.  
A Bahraini participant stated that his Omani colleagues are incredibly friendly, and that 
he socializes with former Omani coworkers with regularity, but that when it comes to 
work ethic Omanis tend to be inefficient and ineffective. Another Arab participant, an 
Egyptian, expressed his concern about returning to the work environment of Egypt, 
conveying that he is becoming acclimated to the work environment of Muscat which is 
much less demanding than in Egypt. 
When asked if non-national participants have ever been treated differently for 
being foreign, the responses were quite interesting, and again validate the presence of an 
expatriate hierarchy. Arab expatriates stated either that they haven’t been treated 
differently, or that they are generally treated better once their regional affiliation was 
noted, usually through language proficiency. Western expatriates also stated that they 
either haven’t been treated differently, or that they believe they’ve actually been treated 
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better because they are European. Asian participants, as mentioned, stated that they have 
been treated differently, not just in the workplace but also in public spaces.  
This racial-class hierarchy of course runs counter to the state-promoted cultural 
value of tolerance and respect, and is in operation in both professional and public spaces 
as well as private and informal spaces and from an early age onward. The participant who 
is both Omani and Filipino discussed the teasing he faced in the government school for 
his half-Asian heritage. The racism he encountered was so unbearable that he transferred 
to The American International School, the students of which accepted his biracial 
background without prejudice, unlike his previous fellow Omani classmates. This transfer 
to an international school is evidence of the participants’ renegotiation of the state’s 
identity project, in that he, as an Omani citizen on his father’s side, having been 
informally classified as not a real Omani by his countrymen, decided with his parents’ 
support to attend a more Western and cosmopolitan school where his pedigree was not in 
question. However, this participant stated that while his group of friends is diverse the 
majority of his friends are “full-blooded Omanis”, also indicating a conformation to the 
state’s identity-building project, considering the legal definition of citizen and allowance 
for intermarriage. Though not fully accepted by all, there are Omanis that accept or have 
come to accept his blended background and shared nationality. 
Omanization leaves many expatriates, particularly Asian expatriates, resentful of 
Omanis in the workplace, often describing them as lazy and incompetent employees who 
only received their position because of their nationality. Much like the discourse in the 
United States regarding Affirmative Action, expatriates of all origins describe Omanis as 
both unqualified and lacking incentive to perform well, even, as Filipino Participant 19 
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conveyed, “pacified by their government.”  Asian participants interviewed expressed 
resentment for, firstly, being excluded from consideration for managerial positions, and 
secondly, having to work for someone they consider less qualified and capable than 
themselves. 
A Portuguese female participant, however, saw Omanization as a positive 
endeavour, but expressed her concern that Omani employees were not being adequately 
trained or even given tasks in their positions, which she saw as incredibly ‘sad’. Even 
still, this is evidence of a stereotypical view of the Omani worker, influencing individual 
and collective identity, which is counter to the longstanding hardworking citizen 
narrative. 
 A female Omani participant stated that she felt like she was treated differently by 
expatriate coworkers, and believed they saw her as incompetent. Additionally, she 
expressed resentment towards the fact that expatriates preferred to hire or work with 
those of the same national origin, avoiding Omani workers altogether. This negative 
stereotype of the Omani population, the result of labour nationalization and migration 
management, is directly contradicting the national rhetoric of a diligent and hardworking 
Omani identity, and is influencing the decisions of private-sector employers. This is 
potentially made worse by the requirement of Omanis to wear national dress at work, 
making more visible the distinction between Omanis and non-Omanis in the workplace. 
Some Omani participants conveyed their own frustration at the local work culture, 
characterizing it as inefficient and unprofessional. A well-travelled female Omani 
employed in both the public sector and private sector stated that in her government job 
she has many Omani colleagues, but that at the radio station, she is the only Omani 
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employee, and this is because the supervisor are unhappy with the unprofessional work 
ethic of the Omanis they had previously employed. The unprofessional work ethic of 
Omanis was shared by expatriates more frequently than Omani participants, but she too 
relayed that her expatriate employers prefer to hire other expatriates because of their 
experiences with Omani employees behaving unprofessionally. Her statement 
demonstrates private-sector employers are negotiating the state’s nation-building project, 
particularly Omanization policies. 
This participants’ response also demonstrates that, broadly, there is a dissent, 
unconscious or conscious, against the state’s national identity project in that Omanis are 
not conforming to the hard-working narrative of Omani culture. However, her response 
also conveys that she is conforming to this same state narrative. This participant has two 
occupations and is expressing her own disapproval of the work ethic of fellow Omanis, 
demonstrating that she herself is conforming to the hardworking Omani narrative. 
Outside of the workplace, social interaction between Omanis and expatriates is 
quite limited, with the exception being Omanis characterized by participants as 
westernized, or having had a lot of western exposure. Several Omani participants stated 
that they had few or no expatriate friends with whom they socialize. A male Omani 
participant who works mostly with Americans stated that he has many expatriate friends 
with whom he socializes regularly, evidence of his conformation to cosmopolitanism. 
Another Omani male’s response demonstrates his more traditional social lifestyle but also 
a subdued adaptation to the cosmopolitanism of the city itself. He stated that he prefers to 
socialize with his family in the countryside, but while in the city most of his friends are 
Omani males of rural origin, but also has a couple non-Omani Arab friends.  
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One female participant stated that though she doesn’t have any expatriate friends, 
she is open to having them, indicating a willingness to engage rather than remain socially 
segregated. Her response is an indication that she is negotiating the state’s identity 
project, both its emphasis on cosmopolitanism and friendliness as well as the traditional 
Arab social and cultural expectation, particularly its constraints on women. However, 
another female Omani participant, who has extensive residency in Western states, 
chooses not to engage socially with expatriates, preferring the company of other Omanis 
because of the shared cultural understandings that can go unspoken in social 
conversation. I’m not quite sure what to make of this participants’ response while 
considering her background. Because she makes this decision based on the perceived 
ease of social interaction and conversation, I would consider this response evidence of 
unconscious conformation to the state’s identity project, particularly the element of 
traditional Arab culture and social structure.  
As mentioned, there is limited interaction between expatriates and Omanis outside 
of the work environment, some expatriates stated that, although they interact mostly in 
the workplace, that they did occasionally socialize with Omanis, or had Omani friends. 
Those who stated they socialized the most with Omanis included Western, Arab, Asian, 
and African non-nationals alike. A Portuguese male stated that he socialized with 
Europeans, as well as with a couple Omani families on occasion. A British participant 
stated that he socialized with a lot of Omanis because in the UK he went to school with 
Omanis and they extended their warm hospitality to him upon arrival, but stated that most 
of his Omani friends are very westernized. This information signals that these Omani 
friends are negotiating the state’s identity project in that they are adhering to traditional 
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values of hospitality and cosmopolitanism, but are also more western than perhaps 
intended by the state. 
His wife, an Indian with extensive Gulf residency, also stated that she has 
“Omani-Omani” girlfriends but that they too have had a lot of western exposure, hinting 
at the idea that they are not conforming to the traditional social and cultural expectations. 
A Filipina participant stated that she has some local Omani friends from her previous 
place of employment, as well as former Pakistani classmates who had since obtained 
citizenship. The fact that, when she said this, she asked, “does that count?” signals that 
though the state has defined the Omani citizen and has declared these former classmates 
citizens, that her definition of Omani is still based on ethnicity and lineage. This is 
evidence of negotiation of the state’s identity project. 
A Sudanese participant, who held Omani citizenship, also stated that since he 
went to school with mostly Omanis that he has many Omani friends, some of whom 
make an effort to speak his language. This is evidence of conformation to the state’s 
identity project in that Omanis are accepting this Omani citizen of Sudanese origins as a 
fellow citizen and embracing that diversity. However this may not be the case either. 
When asked if he has ever been treated differently, this participant stated that he had not 
been treated different for not being “Omani Omani”. However, during a conversation 
between this participant and an Omani male participant, a differentiating (and, as I 
interpreted it, racist) remark was made about this Sudanese participants African origins. 
These two participants, however, were friends that socialized together frequently, and the 
remark was laughed off. I can only speculate as the reasons for laughing off the racially 
differentiating comment. It could be a way to deflect the comment to which offense was 
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taken in an attempt to avoid conflict or an upset to the friendship. It could have also been 
interpreted as a light-hearted joke that was not intended to offend, and chalked up to 
ignorance. Or, it could have been, given their familiarity with each other, an intentionally 
offensive joke wherein the intention was interpreted as positive. As an expatriate myself 
in an international high school, I heard this type of friendly joking often, between Israelis 
and Arabs, or Hindu and Muslim Indians, for example. It was a way of marking such 
differences as trivial by making light of contentious political or ethnic issues by pointing 
out these differences amongst friends. The fact that this Sudanese participant stated that 
he had never been treated differently leads me to believe that the comment was this latter 
possibility, or that this participant willfully dismissed or ignored such interactions. 
Though the response of Sudanese Participant 1 is difficult to analyze, the 
responses to whether or not participants had been treated differently in social situations 
because they were non-nationals is further evidence of the existence of a racial-national 
hierarchy of expatriates. As mentioned, Arab participants said they were treated the same, 
or better once it was discovered that they were Arab, and European participants stated 
that they have been treated better than other expatriates of Asian or South Asian origins, 
for example. However, the Portuguese florist, stated that Omani men shout mean things 
at expatriates when drunk counters this trend a bit. It could be because of his occupation, 
perhaps a point where regional origins because a sort of a substitute for class. This 
treatment in public, however, could’ve come after an ill-informed assessment of physical 
appearance, as he was short with a darker complexion than a stereotypical Western expat. 
Similarly, a Filipino participant stated that Omani men will yell at her in Tagalog in 
public spaces. She said, however, that she’s used to it by now, and speculated that she has 
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been treated differently because of the language barrier more than anything. This 
justification on her part seems to be a coping mechanism, or way to adapt to the local 
social environment and her position within it.   
Considering specific locations, outdoor sports and recreation clubs are avenues of 
social interaction. Team sports and group exercise, like soccer and yoga classes, were 
mentioned as activities in which there is social interaction, but the extent of this 
interactions is limited, likely due to the physical nature of this type of activity. 
Participants of Omani, Asian, Western, and Arab origins all stated they engaged in 
organized sport with expatriates and Omanis alike. However, some of these team sports 
and other community clubs were more exclusionary, or at least inward facing. For 
example, the Filipino community’s basketball tournament was only for the Filipino 
community.  
The women’s only swimming club, too, is exclusive to women affiliated with 
Sultan Qaboos University, and is segregated not only by time but also space, in that the 
women’s swimming club has its own separate facility. This is due to the local culture and 
its emphasis on modesty and the segregation of the sexes. Likewise, the fact that two 
Omani participants are engaged in volunteer-oriented clubs serves as evidence that the 
promoted cultural value of community and self-sacrifice is in part effective.  
In terms of bars and lounges in the zoned leisure areas, interaction between 
Omanis and migrants seemed limited. Even if both were occupying the same space, little 
interaction was observed. Groups of Omani males would be present but would not be 
interacting with other patrons. The regional and national origins of customers observed in 
the majority of these locations were mostly Western and Arab. It’s important to note, 
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though, that rarely was an Omani woman seen in these public spaces, because, although 
there would not be any formal penalty for their presence and engagement, the informal 
consequences, relating to local social structure and culture, if they were to be seen by 
others. I would characterize this as conformation to the state’s identity project. 
The state’s influence upon these public spaces is significant. It is in these western-
catering establishments where one can buy and consume alcohol without formal penalty. 
Non-Muslim and/or nonreligious city residents enjoy the consumption of alcohol in 
addition to the social environment. In addition, it was conveyed that the expatriate 
community renews itself every few years, which alters the environment or atmosphere of 
these spaces. This can be attributed to the state’s employment and residency policies. In 
response, individuals adjust their spatial practices. A French participant stated that he 
used to go to Left Bank, for example, but with the renewal of the expatriate population, 
the perceived classiness of the venue changed and he no longer frequents this public 
space. This is an adaptation to the state’s identity project. The music played in the public 
venues and private spaces demonstrates the influence of globalization and the influence 
of western culture in particular. Partiality for American and European pop and Top-40 
hits was strong. In addition, it was conveyed by participants that more and more Omanis 
are frequenting the bars, indicating a shift in lifestyle in the direction of westernization. 
This is evidence of a renegotiation of the state’s identity project in that there is an 
increasing preference for cultural products of a non-Omani nature. The observed 
engagement in sexual behaviours in select public spaces is also a significant indication of 
a reconstruction of the state’s identity project. Homosexuality was acceptable and 
prostitution pervasive in certain bars and clubs, signaling a shift away from traditional 
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social practices. Such activities would not be deemed acceptable in certain public spaces, 
like outdoor recreation areas or shopping malls, but in spaces like Cornucopia or Rock 
Bottom being openly gay or approaching prostitutes, for men anyway, is perfectly normal 
and even expected in such spaces.The observed engagement in sexual behaviours in 
select public spaces is also a significant indication of a reconstruction of the state’s 
identity project.  
The most extensive or meaningful Omani-expatriate interactions occurs in private 
spaces, the home, the car, the boat in the middle of the bay, the isolated construction site. 
In these private spaces is also where most transgressions occur. The influence of the state 
is notable in that many of the activities in which people would like to engage are confined 
to the private sphere, both because drinking out is expensive and, participants stated, 
house gatherings are more talkative and social than a night out. Why? It was conveyed 
that individuals feel more relaxed in private space because of the privacy it affords. 
Omanis and expatriates alike express concern about gossip and tarnished reputation, and 
feel like they cannot engage freely in public because they are ever mindful of this 
informal social constraint. In addition, remaining in private spaces means that one can 
avoid the roadblocks set up by the Royal Oman Police, and avoid formal penalties for 
consumption of alcohol. It isn’t just the consumption of alcohol and illicit substances but 
also socialization between the sexes. In this private spaces women and men socialize 
freely and, quite often, flirtatiously. Socialization in public-private spaces and private 
spaces is both dissent against and adaptation to the state’s identity project in that the 
activities in which people are engaging in illicit or unapproved activities, but the spaces 
chosen for such activities are beyond the public realm.  
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It is notable that these house gatherings are usually in the homes of expatriates 
and not Omanis, attributed to the traditional social structure, where children do not leave 
the family house until they are married. It was conveyed that though Omanis and 
expatriates frequently socialize together in private spaces, the Omani friends are usually 
westernized, having grown up or traveled abroad extensively. The prevalence of house 
gatherings was also attributed to the uncertainty and spontaneity of the expatriate 
lifestyle. Individuals are more prone to gather without much planning or notice, because 
there is the pervasive feeling of instability and uncertainty in regards to employment and 
residency. This, too, can be attributed to the state’s influence and is an adaptation to 
expatriate living characterized by uncertainty. 
Having discussed socialization and social space in Muscat, the following chapter 
will discuss how such socialization and the state’s national identity project is influencing 
culture and identity for Muscat residents. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
IDENTITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 
The following chapter relates to the issue of culture and identity in the context of 
Muscat, particularly those influences that challenge the national identity project. This 
chapter will first explore substate Omani identities, followed by a discussion of cultural 
exchange resulting from migration and urbanization. This chapter will then conclude with 
a discussion of participant identities and how they have been influenced by globalization, 
migration, and cultural exchange. 
The Influence of Tribal and Regional Affiliation upon the Nation-building Project 
Tribal membership is still an incredibly strong element of identity amongst Omani 
participants, and all those interviewed, whether or not they had been born or raised in 
Muscat, mentioned in interviews their regional origins without solicitation. Omani female 
Participant 12 said tribalism, 
“…is the major integral part of society. Like everything is ruled by tribes by default...like 
you’re getting married, ‘What tribe is he from? Let’s go ask about his tribe.’ They’ll ask 
about his tribe and come back and say ‘yea we like…red light yellow light green light.’ 
We’re very much a tribal society.”  
Geographic origins is also clearly important in the negotiation of identity amongst 
Omanis. When asked how many tribes exist in Oman, Participant 12 said, “I have no 
idea, but we could reach 2000, 3000, 4000. There’s so many tribes it’s ridiculous like 
‘where is that? I’ve never heard in my life the name of this tribe.’” This regional tribal 
affiliation extends also to family names. Participant 12 added, “And then you know them 
from their surnames, like the tribe is in their surnames so you know exactly where they’re 
from basically. ‘Oh you’re from this family from this side of this side?’” I conveyed to 
her that I interviewed an individual with the surname Busaidi, to which she replied, “I’m 
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also Busaidi. There are two roots of Busaidis one in the east in Ibra and the actual one is 
from Nizwa, just south of Nizwa so that’s the origin of all Busaidis.” But Participant 12 
indicated that internal migration is altering the place-based element of tribal identity, 
saying, “But then with time everyone dispersed somewhere else.” 
At the conclusion of every interview, because of my outsider status and lack of 
comprehensive understanding, I would ask participants if there was anything I didn’t ask 
that they thought I should have, or if anything they thought were important elements 
relating to identity and socialization wasn’t discussed. To this question, Participant 12 
said, “migration of Omanis from the interior to Muscat because it’s the hub but not 
everyone here comes from Muscat. So focus on the migration that happens every 
weekend.” Relating to weekend leisure and holiday activities amongst Muscat residents 
she said,  
“For example in Eid the streets are empty and that’s because nobody’s in Muscat 
nobody…very few of the population of Omanis have families who are originally from 
Muscat. Everyone has settled here but their forefather so everyone meets in their towns 
so a big percent of Omanis not from Muscat. Very few tribes are actually from here. The 
majority just migrated here. Most of the jobs are here, the ministries the government 
sector jobs are here. They have to move. So most people to work.”  
 
This point is perfectly supported by the information conveyed by Participant 11, who is 
from village of Sumail in the Dhakaliyya region and a member of the Busaidi tribe, and 
migrated to Muscat for public sector employment. He stated that he leaves Muscat every 
weekend to visit his family, and prefers that more communal, collectively-oriented social 
structure and rural lifestyle more than the alienating and solitary urban culture of Muscat. 
Likewise, Participant 12, the female radio DJ, also spends religious holidays in the 
interior, telling me  she spent the second day of Eid in Manah because “the family home 
is out there. I expressed interest in this making an off-hand comment saying it was cool, 
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but she begged to differ: “I don’t know if it’s cool…you have different mindsets. It’s like 
someone from a rural area and then you go to the city and it’s so sparkly with lights and 
they still have the same mentality so it’s hard to conform while you’re there for a few 
days.” 
Relating to the identity of the newly urbanized young generation of Muscat, 
Participant 12 stated, “The new generation, our generation, the younger ones say I’m 
from Muscat but you ask ‘where did your tribe come from?’ and they’ll say ‘oh this or 
that place.’” For example, Participant 10, a female English translator, said “I’m originally 
from the as Sharkiya region.” Likewise, Participant 2, the petroleum engineer who was 
born and raised in Muscat, considers Muscat to be his home but still says he is from the 
Sharkiya region. This is because his family’s roots are in Sharkiya, and tribal affiliation is 
implied also in historical tribal territorial occupation.   
I asked female Participant 12 if people notice differences between tribes, and 
what those differences might be, and language was a giveaway. She responded, “Well 
North and South is different. Like completely different like even dialects are different…” 
Her response to this question also indicates a serious transformation of language and 
communication resulting from Oman’s urbanization. Discussing the regional dialects she 
said, “…because like I could know a person like, nowadays we all speak the same dialect, 
Muscat dialect…so you wouldn’t know a person unless they speak to their mom or 
grandfather and the other dialect comes out and you’re like, ‘oh.’” I asked again, what 
she thought were the biggest differences between tribes from the North and the South and 
she without hesitation again said language, but added, 
“And people from the south are more traditional in the sense that they stick to their 
culture more of what the previously generations…like for instance some of them are 
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against women driving women, or working. You’re supposed to be married off very 
quickly, that type of thing. But you have some people who are progressing.”  
 
This comment reminded me of a relevant interaction I witnessed while out with Omani 
and expatriate acquaintances. To get her insights, I shared with Participant 12, “I was out 
with friends and one guy said “stupid Dhofari” and I thought it was rude but everyone 
was joking and giggling about it.” She replied, “That’s the main reason because they call 
them backwards in comparison to us but how can you blame them if they stick to their 
traditions?” Participant 12 stated that when people from the North come to Muscat they 
aren’t treated any differently, and their propensity for tradition improves their success in 
the city, adding that, “they’re richer than the North because they have business and so on 
and they actually are more united in terms of helping each other than they are in the 
North. But these are of course stereotypes so it’s not the case with everyone.” This 
indicates a shift in Muscat towards an individualistic rather than collective or communal 
mentality. 
The influence of the state’s historical education and Omani collective memory is 
also a factor in the social interactions between different tribes in the Omani territory. 
Participant 12 said,  
“There’s always been riff raff between North and South. There was a rebellion in the 60s 
and so most people hate them because they wanted to cut off and become communist all 
together so everyone has this hidden rivalry between the north and the south and because 
you hear from your grandparents what they wanted to do and you’re appalled, like, ‘how 
dare they.’”  
 
The fact that she too expressed that she’s appalled is indicative of the success of the 
state’s use of historical education in the promotion of collective unity and loyalty to the 
state of Oman.  
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When Participant 17, who is half Filipino, was asked whether or not his identity 
has changed over time, he said,  
“I think so. Growing up, I didn’t really see myself as an Omani because most of the 
Omanis rejected me. I felt, and still kinda feel like an outsider in my own city, so I’ve 
always had a bit of an identity problem. I kept switching from Omani pride to Filipino 
pride throughout many years until I finally decided that I’m not really either. I just see 
myself as me.”  
Despite governmental permission for his parents’ intermarriage, the negative social 
stigma on impurity remains strong. Arab society is patrilineal, and his father is Omani. 
Participant 17 has Omani citizenship, and has lived in Oman is whole life. He speaks 
Arabic, and wears dishdasha when occasion warrants. But even though Yousef fits many 
of the characteristics of the constructed Omani national identity, he is not considered by 
other Omanis to be Omani.  This is likely due to the persistent influence of tribal 
affiliations, especially when it comes to the marrying of two families but more likely due 
to racism and the expatriate hierarchy. 
Cultural Exchange: Globalization, Urbanization, and International Migration 
Omani female Participant 10 said she has been influenced but expatriates “A little 
bit but not that much because I don’t have direct contact with them.” Oman petroleum 
engineer Participant 2, when asked if he has been influenced by the cultures of 
expatriates said, “No. I’m me since I was born. And not only me but my family. My 
family. You choose who you want to be. I can choose to be you, to live like you, it’s all 
up to me. It’s not because the influence we get from foreigners. When a man changes it’s 
because he wants to change.” This was echoed by Omani Participant 11 from the interior 
who stated,  
“It depends...but when you believe on one thing and strongly believe in one thing you 
cannot be influenced by any other culture. But we also have to understand and learn other 
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cultures. It’s okay to learn to know but not by being influenced by them…you can take 
advantage take good things so add this things to you.”  
 
Indian Participant 7 is sure she has been influenced by the Omani culture, but 
isn’t exactly sure how. She said, “I think I have as spent most my life here I grow up here 
moved to Oman when I was 7 so big part of me.” Likewise, Participant 13, a British chef 
who has resided almost his entire life in Muscat said, “I don't know I grew up in Oman so 
I don't know any different.” However, Yemeni software consultant, Participant 14, who 
has also grown up in Muscat, stated,  
“Well I’ve been living in Oman for over 18 years and during this time I have met a lot of 
Omanis and other people from all over the world as well. By interacting with other 
people from different backgrounds and different cultures for so many years has changed 
me in many ways. For example, back in school I sued to wear dishdasha and kuma and I 
used to speak with the Omani dialect with most of my friends, my family sometimes, and 
almost everyone to the point I forgot that I was from Yemen. Then I started hanging out 
with people from different nationalities and it has impacted me in so many ways. I always 
ask people that I meet for the first time to guess where I’m from, and they would never 
guess that I’m from Yemen! Maybe because the way I dress, my accent, and my 
personality as well.” 
 
Omani-Filipino Participant 17 had a similar response. When asked if he thinks his culture 
has been influenced by the cultures of both Omanis and expatriates. He said, “Of course. 
Everyone is a product of their surroundings and environment. I’ve grown accustomed to 
Omani etiquette like shaking everyone’s hand, being hospitable, and having overall 
respect for personal space and privacy.” When it comes to the influences of expatriates, 
Participant 17 said the influence is mostly western. He stated, “I’ve also, however, been 
highly influenced by my western friends from Europe and America. I’m a bit all over the 
place when it comes to my cultural influences.”  
Omani female Participant 4, an architect, mentioned that the presence of a large 
foreign population has both strengthened and weakened her own cultural identity, stating 
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that she has picked up both good and bad habits. For clarification, I asked which good 
habits and which bad habits she has picked up from other cultures, and she responded,  
“A bad habit that I have gained is mainly that I tend to use more English than Arabic and 
actually feel more comfortable expressing myself in English. A good thing I adapted is 
being my immigrants developed my ability to relate to other and understand their origins 
and be more considerate and aware about the differences between us. Also I tend to be 
direct and polite instead if sugar coating or beating around the bush, something seen a lot 
in Oman among the locals.” 
  
Relating to language, Filipina Participant 18 said she was a mixed of cultures, and 
for clarification I asked “which culture’s do you feel influence you the most? You’ve 
been here almost your entire life, do you feel Omani?” She responded,  
“No, I'm not Omani. Filipino. But most locals, even at airports, shops and food places, 
would agree that I could well be an honorary Omani for having been here for that long 
and for being able to speak a few Arabic words with the proper pronunciation, learned 
from almost a lifetime of hearing them. Oh, and I've also picked up a few Hindi/Urdu 
words since I've been here - as with most of my Filipino classmates who've been here 
since forever as well. On a different point of view, I think we, as Filipinos, did rub off on 
some of our non-Filipino classmates. They now know a few Tagalog words and crave 
some Filipino foods, too.” 
 
Portuguese Participant 3 said she has certainly been influenced by her residency 
in Muscat. When asked, she said, “I’m sure, yes. I think I’m more tolerant. Culture wise I 
find everything normal and I’m very offended when people say ‘those Arabic people’. 
I’m like, ‘No! You can’t say that’ haha so I think I’m more open towards everything in 
general.” I asked her if she can think of any other ways her culture has changed, asking if 
she finds herself speaking and communicating differently, to which she replied, “I am 
Portuguese so I speak with my hands already ahahaha. The gestures they represents 
different things the waving hand means in Portugal doesn’t mean wait it means 
something offensive.” 
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British Participant 8 conveyed that he has fundamentally been influenced by 
Omani society, especially with regards to social behaviour and hospitality. He said,  
“I love this country. I know this is a place I will come back to. Even when I leave and I 
go to England this is a place I’ll holiday to. I know people will always invite me and for 
me I’m gonna make sure I don’t buy a two bedroom place I’ll buy a 3 bedroom or 4 
bedroom place so that when people come to the UK from here I’m gonna show the same 
hospitality to them. Anyone who I know or worked with. I will always have an open door 
to my house. That’s something I would’ve never said 7 years ago, and I feel very strongly 
about that.” 
French architect Participant 5, too, conveyed that he’s been influenced by the social 
norms of Omani society. He said that the culture of gossip and reputation,  
“… seeps down to the whole society… so, eventually, you’ll start being like that as well. 
It sticks to you. You can’t help it because you are who your friends are…The thing is it’s 
something that eventually seeps towards you and you end up doing things you wouldn’t 
do in Europe, like for example if I’m outside having a drink, here in Oman you look left 
and right and myself I wouldn’t do that...because you know it just happens you start 
behaving like that...in the West you’re not raised to be that way but here its constraining. 
That’s why I can’t live here permanently…and that’s why you have expat ghettoes, they 
don’t feel someone watching or someone with a prohibitive eye.” 
 
Likewise, British Participant 8 added to his statement about the influence of Muscat’s 
culture upon his own, citing awareness of expected behaviours, gossip, and the desire to 
be respectful as key factors in his cultural adaptations. He said,  
“The difference is I understand where I am. I don’t want to be going out and wearing 
hardly anything in a Muslim environment. It is like everyone talks here like ‘oh, did you 
see that person?’ they talk an awful lot so that’s…gossiping and judging. So this is the 
thing…I used to not give a shit. I don’t care. Talk, whatever. But after a couple years it 
starts to nibble at you. You go you know what I’m not gonna do this cuz I don’t want 
people talking. So we’ll go to the beach and she [referring to his wife, Participant 7] is 
wearing a bikini and I’ll think is this…‘Can you cover up a bit more?’ just because I’m 
here. But when we’re in Brazil…wear whatever you want I’m not bothered.” 
 
Longtime Muscat resident Participant 7, his wife, defended her transgressive 
choices, saying,  
“First about bikinis. It’s a bikini it’s not meant to cover up a lot. I think he [referring to 
her husband, Participant 8] has gotten more conservative in terms of his demeanor. He’s 
gotten like you know… For me I’ve always been aware that people talk, that’s just how it 
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is. You can let it get to you or not. And for me I’m an outspoken person. I like having a 
good time. Not being a mess, you know running around but I like being open and if 
there’s something to be said just say it.”  
 
However, the clothing choices of Participant 3, a Portuguese female, has been influenced 
by location culture, even when not physically in Oman. She said,  
“Um I dress differently now. I’m covered all the time. When I go home, also because I 
feel cold, but I look in the street and think people aren’t dressed appropriately so I 
changed regarding that.” Likewise, Filipina Participant 18 said, “as far as Omani culture 
goes, dressing appropriately when out and about has been a norm for me.” 
When it comes to national dress, the majority of male participants with Omani 
citizenship, whether Omani or Sudanese, stated that they sometimes wear national dress 
but really only when it is required. Sudanese Participant 1, when asked if he wears 
dishdasha said, “Um. For me, I used to when I used to go to high school. I used to wear 
that because I was in the government school. I used to wear the dishdasha but since then I 
never wear that.” When I asked why he conveyed that it’s simply not his style, and he’s 
not really into traditional culture. Omani Participant 2 stated that he sometimes wears the 
dishdasha. I asked why he sometimes wears it but other times chooses not to. He replied, 
“I prefer to wear dishdasha when I go to official thingy. But when I’m out with friends 
clubbing or whatever I don’t.” I asked him if he is treated differently when wearing it, 
and he stated that he’s treated the same but says women might be given more respect 
when wearing abaya. He told me that just how one is required to wear a suit to court in 
the United States, “When you go to official things, you wear a dishdasha.” I asked what 
if he went to the ministry in a suit, and he said they’re usually okay with it. Participant 2 
said,  
“cuz um I remember once I went in my coverall. I was fixing my car, and my father said 
‘you need to take this to the ministry’. I told him I have to change, shower. He said just 
go like this tell them you were on duty. So I went there. But usually they will say ‘why 
are you not wearing dishdasha?’ especially if you go to the police.” I asked if people 
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know he’s Omani when wearing western clothes, to which he replied, “Can I be honest 
with you? We have features. I’m Omani but we have features. They know I am Omani if 
I’m wearing trousers or dishdasha. If I got to a ministry in dishdasha they know I am 
Omani so things will be better. You can’t go there wearing [western clothing]. It’s 
official. Say you go to the court in the US you have to wear a suit. Without a suit they 
won’t know.” 
Participant 16 discussed the thought process behind his clothing choices. 
Although of Sudanese heritage, is an Omani citizen because of the length of residency in 
Oman of his parents, and their contributions to state development. Because of this, he is 
allowed or required to wear Omani traditional dress, depending on the space. Participant 
16 works in the IT department for a company that is majority publicly-owned. Because it 
is publicly owned, he is required to wear the national dress to work. However, in addition 
to his primary occupation in IT, Participant 16, as previously discussed, is trying his hand 
as a restauranteur, and recently opened an American-style steakhouse in Madinat Qaboos, 
a well-known western expatriate neighbourhood.  During our interview at his restaurant, 
he stated that he just changed out of his national dress into western clothing. I asked him 
why he chose to change. He confided in his interview that he wears the dishdasha in 
professional environments because of the automatic respect it is afforded. He wears 
‘regular,’ or western-styled clothes when he doesn’t want to be recognized as an Omani. 
He said that when he wears the dishdasha he is not treated like a “regular person” but is 
treated better. Participant 16 said,  
“Oman has this mentality of, unfortunately, if you wear a dishdasha, you have more 
power and more presence. Your presence isn’t scary, but it’s more present…more 
noticeable. You’re gonna be noticed. But if you wear regular clothes, you’re treated like a 
regular guy. Don’t ever judge a book by its cover.”  
The tastes of participants interviewed were varied, but the cuisine did not 
necessarily reflect the expatriate population of Muscat, which means the impact of 
migration upon food culture is limited, or at least is less impactful than globalization at 
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large. Sudanese Participant 1, when asked what he favourite cuisine was, said, “Thai food 
baby!” Portuguese Participant 3 stated, “I love the rice. The biryani.  I know it’s not 
Omani. But for the Omani food I would say the hawala and the homali…the dessert is 
very good.” Omani Participant 10 and Bahraini Participant 15 both said Lebanese food 
was their favourite. British Participant 13 and longtime Muscat resident had a diverse 
palate, citing “curry, sushi…and shawarma” as his favourite foods. Yemeni Participant 
14 said seafood but then quickly exclaimed with excitement “oh and pizza!”  Omani 
Participant 12 stated that she likes to frequent an Indian restaurant in Ruwi, Woodlands, 
saying it was the best in Muscat.  Omani-Filipino Participant 17 said “I’ve loved French 
fries since I first started chewing.” And, though he’s not American, Sudanese Participant 
16 opened an American-style steakhouse in the Madinat Qaboos nieghbourhood. He 
conveyed that he enjoyed that style of food but also believed it to be a good business 
venture because he thought others would enjoy it as well.  
The restaurants cited frequently in interviews and/or included on participants’ 
mental maps include different McDonald’s franchises, the Mexican restaurant Pavo Real 
located in MQ, Al Maeda and Zaher El-Laymoun in Seeb, which both serve Lebanese 
cuisine, Lai Thai restaurant in Al Khuwair, and two Italian restaurants, Tuscany in Shatti, 
and O Sole Mio in Al Khuwair. The restaurants frequented by participants, if they reflect 
the impact of migration upon local culture, would imply that the expatriate population is 
largely comprised of Americans, Lebanese, Thai, Japanese, and Italian individuals. 
However, this is not the case, as we know, based on the data available regarding the 
composition of the foreign workforce. The restaurants chosen therefore reflect both 
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individual preference and economic and cultural globalization, not so much a high level 
of influence on part of the foreign residents. 
In addition, several Omani restaurants were either mentioned during interviews or 
included on mental maps. These include Kargeen café, in MQ, and Al Aktham restaurant 
in Al Khuwair. Grand Fish Market is an Omani seafood restaurant that’s a favourite of 
Participant 10, reflecting the continuity of traditional foods among younger Omanis, in 
spite of the great global variety now available in the city. Likewise, I went to Omani 
restaurants with Omani friends for iftar, and these restaurants included Al Angham 
located in the Royal Opera House, and Bait al Luban on the Muscat corniche. I also went 
to Zaher El-Laymoun in the Wave for iftar. Participant 1, Participant 2, and I went to the 
Cave, a collection of diverse eateries, in wilaya Muscat, situated between Matrah and 
Qurum, for fruit juices and post-interview conversation. It is significant that the 
restaurants chosen as the meal to break fast were Omani because it indicates a 
steadfastness and preference for local, familiar food. This could also be because the set-
up for iftar at these restaurants was buffet-style, an attractive and relatively ‘traditional’ 
approach to iftar dinner. In any case, the preference for local restaurants during this 
religious tradition indicates that the cultural element of food, when it comes to religious 
custom, is maintained. However, sushi was also a food preference for many. After 
Ramadan, I went out for sushi with a diverse little group, including an Omani and 
Sudanese Participant 1, who was born and raised in Muscat, to Tokyo Taro situated 
between Ruwi and Matrah. This also shows the influence of globalization and 
urbanization as being greater than the influence of expatriates on food preferences. 
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Omani Participant 2 relayed that he isn’t necessarily influenced by the cultural 
practices of others when it comes to eating. I asked Participant 2, ‘you haven’t seen 
something and said ‘this is positive, I like this type of music or food and changed?’ He 
said,  
“Well you see something and you feel that it’s right, you do it. That’s how it is, as a 
human being. You are in a place and you see everyone is eating with a fork and a knife, 
ok?  And you eat with your hands. So for example you love to eat with your hands, we 
love to eat with our hands. But sometimes there are some things you can’t eat with your 
hands. See I eat pizza with my hands. I don’t care where I am. Even if I’m in a restaurant 
I just *blach* but uhh see spaghetti, you eat with a fork and knife so you can just roll it 
and you know.”  
I asked him how he eats fish and rice, to which he responded “Fish and rice I eat with my 
hands” which is how that Omani meal is traditionally consumed. 
Music is another cultural element that reflects cultural and identity changes, and 
these can be attributed to globalization generally as well as local interactions. When 
asked what genre of music is his favourite, Sudanese Participant 1 began beat boxing and 
said, “Hip to the hip to the hip hop.” British Participant 13 also said he listens mostly to 
rap and hip hop, as does Participant 14, a Yemeni resident of Muscat since childhood, 
who added trance to the list of music genres preferred.  Bahraini Participant 15 had quite 
different musical preferences than others interviewed, citing his favourites genres as 
Blues, Classic Rock, and Heavy Metal. Omani Participant 2, when asked about his 
musical preferences said, “Anything. Classical, opera, R&B, Arabic. Thai. Anything, 
anything good.”  
Participant 11, the pious Omani of rural origins, responded with laughter and said, 
“This question is maybe I’m different I have different taste because I usually listen to 
Islamic music…not to other music. So Islamic music is preferred.” I asked where his 
favourite singers are from, and he said, “UAE, also from Malaysia, from Saudi Arabia.” 
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Portuguese Participant 3 conveyed that her music tastes have been influenced since she’s 
lived in Muscat. She said, “Actually…Arab music I started listening to a bit more. And 
this summer on holiday I rediscovered Lebanese young lady, very nice. I remember some 
the lyrics in Arabic, traditional lyrics.” 
Also reflecting regional and local influences, Participant 10, an Omani female, 
said, “I listen to Arabic English Indian music. In Arabic I listen to Gulf music, Lebanese 
music.” As for her English language music, evidence of global cultural influences, she 
said, “In English I listen to for example an old one…Celine Dion. Nobody listens to 
Celine Dion maybe.” Participant 17, who is half Omani and half Filipino, is another 
interesting example of the influence of globalization upon the cultural element of music. 
Participant 17, as mentioned, is half Omani and half Filipino. He is a passionate rap 
“enthusiast.” He said, “I love rap so much that it’s becoming a part of my life and it’s 
kinda forced its way into my friends’ lives, too. A lot of them hate the music I listen to bit 
can’t avoid it.” The residence of Participant 17 is the go-to hangout spot for him and his 
friends, and he relayed to me that he used to require friends to freestyle rap before 
entering his room, but since stopped the requirement because of push-back from his 
friends. Additionally, Participant 17’s interests reflect globalization and modernization 
explicitly. I asked how he got into rap music to which to replied “YouTube.” Participant 
17 is partial to rap from the San Francisco Bay area of California, and invited me to 
watch a pay-per-view rap battle in the early morning hours. Several of his friends said 
that they would be watching it also.  
The influence of cultural globalization is apparent in the response of one 
participant. Participant 12, an Omani female with extensive experiences living abroad 
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said, “My favourite type of music is jazz but not many people listen to it.” I asked how 
she got into jazz, and she said she was introduced to it during her times spent in the 
United States. She said,  
“The first time I discovered jazz I was in New Orleans on Bourbon St. and I was just like 
“oh, it’s so cool. Let me just download more” and I just got hooked. Before that I didn’t 
have a specific type of music I just listened to what my parents listened to so then I kind 
of came up with my own tastes and things when I was independent and alone.” 
  
Trying to see whether or not she has influenced others with her musical tastes, I 
asked Participant 12 if she tried to get her friends into jazz. She replied,  
“Oh, no. I feel like music is something personal and over here everyone is into pop…I’m 
a presenter as well so most of the people request all popular songs and it’s all bubblegum 
pop. US and UK pop, One Direction for instance. And if I try to educate someone I feel 
like I need to educate someone on the type of music they should listen to that they’re like 
“what is this? Change it!” so I feel like…and I love to listen to different types of world 
music…African music and Indian music and everyone finds it very eclectic and weird so 
they’ll say ‘your music is weird.’ Because I work in radio we’re the ones that break a new 
song into the market so it’s like ‘have you listened to this song?’ ‘Uh yea it’s been 
playing on the radio for the last four weeks.’”  
 
Her diverse musical preferences are evidence that her state-funded experiences studying 
and living abroad have been very influential in altering her personal culture. In addition, 
her response indicates limited exposure, or at least, preference, for world music. The 
preference of her friends for US and UK popular music shows the impact of 
globalization, specifically the cultural hegemony of the West.  
In addition to music, the movies and visual media consumed by participants also 
reflects the influence of globalization upon local culture, particularly American culture. 
When asked what he tends to watch, Sudanese Participant 1 said, “Fresh Prince of Bel 
Air uh what else I’ve been watching. Power. Um. BET, BET Awards, BET Hip Hop 
Awards, MTV and all the other shows.” Bahraini Participant 15 stated “I enjoy all types 
except for typical Rom-coms and most musicals.” Participant 15 also conveyed that 
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English language movies have had a significant impact on his culture. He said, “I think I 
have been influenced more by Western culture than by Omani or Bahraini culture.” I 
asked him why he thinks that’s the case to which he replied,  
“When I grew up my mom made a point to get us Disney movies in the original English 
language, even though Arabic was available. I think part of the reason I embraced 
western culture faster than Arabic culture was because I started getting comfortable with 
the English language at an early age. My school also had most subjects in English, so it 
quickly became my dominant language, as in I think in English. We also used to go to 
cinema at least once a week as I was growing up and watched mostly Hollywood based 
films. A mixture of all of this made me comfortable with western culture I guess.”  
  
The impact of globalization, pop culture, and language is also noticeable in my 
informal conversations with participants. Many used American vernacular popularized in 
the media, particularly with Participant 1 and his social circle. Words and phrases like 
“feel me?”, “nah mean?”, “turnt” and “bounce” are evidence of American cultural 
hegemony and the popularity of African American culture in the city. In addition, on 
multiple occasions I heard both Gulf Arabs and Arab Africans refer to each other using 
the N-word. When I asked why they use the word in reference to each other, they justified 
its use by saying they had Zanzibari and/or African ancestry. 
Likewise, Omani participants cited Hollywood productions as their favourites. 
Omani-Filipino Participant 17 said, “When it comes to movies I prefer Sci-Fi and zombie 
related genres.” When asked why he likes these types of movies he said, “Sci-Fi because 
I enjoy the imaginative imagery and plot lines, and I’ve enjoyed zombie flicks since I was 
a kid.” Omani radio DJ Participant 12 said her favourite movies genre is, “Rom com but 
then my favourite movie of all time is the Godfather...like a paradox.” Action and 
historically-oriented films in particular were enjoyed by Omani participants, like 
Participant 2, who said, “I like drama, true stories. Troy, Gladiator. History movies.” 
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Religious Omani Participant 11 also prefers American films, saying, “I’m not like to 
watch TV in public but movies I like Gladiator, I like this movie and the movie which has 
good actor like Sylvester Stallone and Arnold also. I like action movies.” Recalling his 
musical preferences being strictly Islamic in nature and in the Arabic language, and also 
recalling his voiced preference for the traditional lifestyle of the village, I asked 
Participant 11 if he watches any Bollywood or Egyptian movies, he said “No. none. 
Arabic movies no except to watch historical movies...like educational.” Omani 
Participant 10, an English translator said she frequently goes to the cinema for 
entertainment, but doesn’t care for action movies as the other participants do, saying, “I 
go to action movies because my friends like action movies but if it was up to me I like 
more drama and romance movies.” When asked if she watches Egyptian or Bollywood 
films, she replied,  
“For Egyptian I go to comedy movies I like Egyptian comedy movies. Bollywood movies 
most of them are romance movies but not action ones…Indian action movies are an over-
exaggeration of action, and Hollywood I mean, all drama and true stories…like war 
stories, I like it.” 
Bahraini events coordinator Participant 15, in addition to his use of English as his 
dominant language, credited religious freedom as another element that made him relate 
more to Western culture. He said,  
“…so when I lived in Canada I felt more comfortable than home, in the sense that I also 
didn’t have to pretend I was religious more than I was or pretended I believed in things I 
didn’t actually believe in, religion wise, because they are more accepting of varied 
beliefs.”  
I asked if he was religious, why he felt the need to pretend to be pious in Bahrain, and if 
he feels the need to pretend to be religious in Oman, to which Participant 15 replied, 
“I’m not religious. I didn’t have to pretend to be fully religious in Bahrain but I still had 
to make it look as if I was fasting in Ramadan, and pray when I’m at my uncle’s house 
and they were doing a group prayer for instance. My parents aren’t very conservative and 
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they know I don’t pray otherwise….but not fully practicing is one thing and telling them I 
don’t believe in religion is another. That would just create unnecessary issues between us. 
In Oman it really depends. The only time I would do anything religious here is if I was 
invited to an Omani’s house and all the men would go to the mosque.” 
Filipino Participant 19 made a similar comment. When asked whether or not he 
wanted to live in Muscat permanently, he said, “No. I want to live in a free, normal 
country.  Besides, we can't unless we become Omani Nationals, convert to Islam.  That's 
a big no for me.” He also stated that religious beliefs in Muscat are both positive and 
negative, in the context of the Philippines, saying,  
“Plus I think because of the religion and strict implementation of it, the society does not 
seem normal as we were accustomed to growing up.  We grew up in a culture that is pro 
American and feel like I'm being choked up in a restrictive society.  But the pros is that 
because of this strict laws nobody gets out of line, like you have in our countries.”  
However, some expatriates converted to Islam during their residency, like the basketball 
teammate of Participant 19, as well as Portuguese Participant 9, who converted to Islam 
just before Ramadan, even though “he was so attached to the church.” He said the Quran 
keeps him calm, and that he regularly prays at the mosque in Azaiba, his residential 
neighbourhood. Despite this conversion, Participant 9 stated that he loves to decorate and 
bake for Christmas, and that he friends love to see his Christmas tree, but justifies this 
paradox because “it’s about tradition not about religion. The Christmas tree is not 
religious, it’s a tradition.” 
Influence of Globalization and Transnationalism upon Identity 
Omani female Participant 12 said her identity has changed because of her time 
abroad. She responded to my question, “Yea. I think it’s the main why reason I changed 
but I moved when I was young so I don’t know how I would’ve turned out if hadn’t gone 
abroad...so many lived happened in my life and changed me and made me who I am so 
I’m not sure if the circumstances were different would I be the same person with the 
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same ideologies or not. It’s quite difficult.” Participant 12 went on to say, “When I’m 
abroad I really do notice the difference what makes me unique and what I miss about here 
so my identity...I feel like I notice my identity more there.” Female Participant 10 also 
conveyed that she’s more aware of her identity as an Omani because of the presence of 
migrants. She stated, “It’s more awakened...it doesn’t affect it negatively but I’m more 
aware of it.”  
In terms of identity and culture, it is clear that the expatriate experience is more 
binding than national origin, or length of residency in Oman. That’s what I assume 
anyway from the fact that expatriates of diverse origins socialize together more than they 
do with Omanis. But national identity also gains more importance to the migrants than it 
may in the country of origin. South Africans, for example, were keen to introduce me to 
other South Africans given my residency there through high school. Their shared origin 
was highlighted, and that bond was significant though not as significant in who would 
hang out with whom. When I asked if people felt more South African in Oman, the 
answer was a nuanced ‘yes’. That larger national identity was more pronounced outside 
the country of origin. Most when asked would identify as Sudanese if their family 
originated from Sudan, regardless of place of birth, citizenship, or length of residency. 
However, most identified Muscat as their home, and felt an attachment to the city, more 
so than other locations ‘back home’. 
Participant 6 is also more aware of his Egyptian origins living in Muscat. He said, 
“You can say that I’m always Egyptian when I’m here. You know when you’re living in 
a country and your life is going on you don’t think much about Egypt and what’s going 
on there. But when you move on as an expat you always think about your country and 
how is it…so you can say that you’re more aware of your identity when you’re outside. I 
don’t consider myself an Omani I love Oman as a country but I’m not Omani. But since 
you’re staying here for a long time there a few words you can pick from Omani accent 
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you can use it…so you find yourself using it as well since you’re staying for a long time 
but again it doesn’t make you Omani. You’ll find people asking you ‘how is Egypt, how 
are things there? I would like to go for a visit.’ So you feel proud and advise people of 
places to go.”  
 Feelings of inbetweenness and non-belonging are incredibly pervasive amongst 
the expatriate community. When asked where he is from, Participant 16 initial response is 
Sudan, though he has grown up in Muscat, and holds Omani citizenship. He said he feels 
more Sudanese than Omani, saying “Yes I’m Omani but the thing is…I wasn’t raised in 
Sudan but I’m still until this day in contact with my cousins…..I never like, um… singled 
them out no matter what. Every year I go to Sudan twice. I’m the only one who visits that 
much. I’m from Omdurman.”  Indian Participant 7 implied that she has a fluid identity, 
saying, “I think when you’re an expat you learn to have an alter ego. You play your part. 
You talk their language and you come back here and you’re more yourself.” She went on 
to say, “At the end of the day being an expatriate isn’t that easy. You have to check 
yourself a lot when you first get here but after a while it becomes second nature. And I 
think after leaving the Middle East and a place like this you become more socially aware 
and in tune with what people need.” Her British husband, Participant 8, when asked if he 
thinks his identity has changed since living in Muscat said, “Yea I think so. Definitely. 
I’m not so much a lad...like I think more like serious. More hanging around people in my 
sort of situation, professional circles.” Participant 5, an architect from France, had an 
insightful response to the question whether or not he’s more aware of his identity living 
in Muscat. He said,  
“Yes the way I put it is that...we all identify ourselves. I definitely wasn’t aware how 
French I was until I moved from France. And that’s when I realized being an American 
or a Frenchmen is not about the passport or your origins. It’s the culture in which you 
were reared. You then acquire habits and ways of thinking that you didn’t realize you 
have, until you’re not in that setting. Then you realize because you’re comparing them to 
others. My daughter, she was born in France but raised the UK by both me and her 
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mother a French national and speaks French and she tells me I speak English with a 
funny accent. I said, ‘what do you mean?’ She said I’m foreign. I said of course I’m 
foreign. She says ‘yea but still.’ And I said, ‘well you’re not British either.’ She said ‘I 
don’t want to be British.’ I said ‘where are you from then?’ ‘I’m from London.’ I said, 
‘that’s not what your passport says.’ She said ‘well it should be.’ Like her I realized how 
French I was when I moved to the UK and how Western I was when I moved here. I 
realized do like my glass of wine, little things like that. Same thing out here. Like I never 
used to worry about buying alcohol, until I came out here and had to get a license. So you 
check to see how much you have on your license. You’ve got friends asking you if you 
could spare a few, your Omani friends asking if you could spare a few.” 
The modernization of Omani society and the western development approach of the state 
is resulting in my western cultural preferences and behaviours. In clothing, music and 
media, dress, and language preferences there is evidence of convergence on western 
culture. Materialism and the consumer culture is quite strong in Muscat as well. 
Likewise, the liberal behaviours both observed and expressed by participants of Omani, 
Asian, African, and Western origins, in addition to the more unanticipated secular nature 
of their daily lives is also evidence of western influences. This isn’t to say that Muscat is 
becoming western. Indeed the nation-building strategy can’t be considered ineffective, 
and is influencing the city’s material, cultural, and social composition. Western 
expatriates, for example, find themselves conforming to the expectations of modesty, in 
dress and in social interaction in public spaces, as do Omanis. On top of these two 
competing forces, globalization and the state’s identity project, is the layer of the 
individual residents, who are involved in the production of space, reconstructing nation-
building project through acts of transgression, adaptation, and negotiation, and adapting 
elements of globalization to the local context. What’s emerging is an entirely new Muscat 
culture, one that is neither ‘traditionally Omani’ or westernized, and this is reflected in 
the adjective used to describe its culture and its residents: Muscati.  
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 
While the Omani state is promoting a unifying national identity, Muscat residents 
are reconstructing and renegotiating culture and identity in the capital city. Individuals 
are adapting and conforming to, mediating, and contesting both the state’s identity project 
as well as to the equally, if not more, influential social control that is the culture of gossip 
and reputation.. 
In popular understandings of migrant experience, the host population is typically 
conceived of as privileged, prejudiced, and exclusionary, whereas the immigrant or 
expatriate community is generally conceived of as underprivileged, exploited and 
excluded. However this host-migrant distinction is too simplified for nuanced 
understanding of host-migrant relationships and the diversity within and between these 
two broad categorizations. Similarly, the expatriate community is generally conceived of 
as a false dichotomy of ‘rich-white-Western and poor-brown-third-world’ dichotomy. 
Though this distinction, like the former, holds merit at a broader, more superficial level, 
this gross oversimplification ignores diversity of experiences. 
Given the existence of an expatriate hierarchy, an individuals’ origins and/or class 
has a significant impact on their reception, and hence their reactions to the identity 
project, and the local culture of gossip, as well as their influence upon the culture and 
identity of other city residents. But there are, as there always are, exceptions that do not 
follow to such neat patterns. The result is a unique local Muscati culture that is a mixture 
of global and local elements, and the varied influences of individual residents.  
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This chapter will first discuss the ways in which Western expatriates, being those 
who are of European origins, adapt to, mediate, and contest the Omani state’s identity 
project as well as the local culture of gossip and reputation, followed by the ways in 
which non-Western expatriates adapt to, mediate and contest both the state identity 
project and the local culture of gossip and reputation. Non-Western expatriates are 
broadly characterized as those immigrants from the developing world.  The ways in 
which Omanis adapt or conform to, mediate, and contest the national identity project and 
the local culture of gossip and reputation will then be addressed.  The culture of gossip 
and reputation refers to, as discussed in the previous empirical chapters, the social 
importance of an individual’s reputation, as an extension of familial reputation, and the 
widespread prevalence of gossip amongst Muscat residents regarding public actions that 
influence one’s reputation amongst the community 
Western Expatriates 
Westerners conform and adapt to the state’s national identity project in subtler 
ways, as the project, culturally and socially, is focused more on influencing the Omani 
population than the Western guests. More influential than the national identity project is 
the local culture of gossip and reputation, and white Western adaptation to the local 
culture of gossip results in an alignment with the state identity project in many ways. 
Because of the mutual influence, a tandem discussion is appropriate. 
The ways in which the national identity project influences Western expatriates is 
through spatial and social segregation. Specific areas in Muscat are designated as the 
residential areas for the Westerners and/or upper-class Omanis. Such neighbourhoods 
have larger flats and villas, updated amenities and smooth paved roads. Westerners tend 
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to remain in these neighbourhoods, and shop at the more expensive grocery stores, like 
Al Fair, which cater to Western guests by carrying familiar products. Some Western 
expatriates expressed that they reside on an expatriate residential compound, created to 
mitigate the social and cultural influence of the Sultanate’s foreign guests, and that they 
prefer not to leave their residential compound unless it is to visit one of the hotels for a 
drink. White westerners prefer to frequent the Integrated Tourist Zones, like the Wave 
and Shangri La Resort, and westernized leisure zones in close proximity to the large 
beachfront hotels, like Shatti and Shatti Al Qurum. This is conformation to the state 
identity project in that the state is attempting to control and limit their social and cultural 
influence upon the Omani population by controlling and limiting the spaces in which they 
feel free, and European and American expatriates are remaining within, or mostly 
remaining within, these zoned areas, effectively minimizing the extent of their 
westernizing influence.  
Western expatriates promote some of the state’s promoted national identity 
elements, specifically those conceptions of Omani cultures as one of tolerance, respect, 
and hospitality, no doubt a result of their socialization with Omanis and a reflection of the 
expatriate hierarchy. More than expatriates of non-Western origins, white Western 
expatriates emphasized and expressed awe of Omani hospitality, even if they recognized 
the mistreatment of other nationalities and races. In response, Western expats adapt to 
this hospitality by increasing their own displays of friendliness and generosity. 
In addition to the ways in which Western expatriates adjust their spatial practices 
to adapt to the state’s identity project and promote the state’s conceptions of national 
identity, they also adjust their socialization behaviours in an alignment with the national 
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identity project. It was conveyed by Western women that they have adapted to local 
culture and dress much more modestly in public than they otherwise would and that this 
more modest dressing sense remained even outside the country. Secondly, Western 
female participants expressed their conformation to the local culture with regards to 
male-female socialization. A Portuguese participant, for example, saw her friendly 
relationship with an Omani male as inappropriate once the larger group of expats through 
whom she met him had dissipated. She deemed it inappropriate because of the potential 
to perceive impropriety in the eyes of the public. 
In addition, though public spaces are available that accommodate to western 
tastes, it was conveyed also that Western expatriates prefer to have social gatherings in 
private spaces for the freedom it affords. Western expatriates do not have to worry about 
their actions and behaviours being seen or worrying about how they will be perceived by 
a public keen on gossip and concerned about reputation. Though they are adapting to the 
cultural of gossip and reputation, it is to the benefit of the state’s identity endeavour.  
Their western and perhaps haram activities are quarantined to private spaces, effectively 
limiting the influence of such behaviours upon the public. Similarly, Western expatriates 
contest the national identity project in their use of illicit substances, but mediate the 
culture of gossip and reputation as they choose occasionally to utilize public-private 
spaces for such activities. When it comes to illicit activities like prostitution, however, 
public spaces like bars and lounges are utilized, signaling contestation of the national 
identity project and the gossip culture. 
In addition to adaptation, Western expatriates mediate the national identity project 
and culture of gossip in several ways. Omani-expatriate socialization is typically confined 
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to professional interactions in the work environment, and those individuals who seek out 
friendly, personal relationships with Omanis are already mediating the identity project, 
one that hopes to limit collective solidarity between Omanis and expatriates. The private 
socializing events of wealthier Western expatriates are usually exclusive to other Western 
expatriates. It was conveyed by participants that there is rarely a new face in the mix at 
such events, and that if there are Omanis present, they are incredibly westernized 
individuals. This is mediation in that Omanis are being invited into the private spaces of 
Western expatriates, and could very well gossip amongst others about topics or events 
which the expatriate would prefer not be shared. However, western expatriates are taking 
such a risk in an attempt to socialize with the local population, including those with 
whom they have a professional working relationship.  
Though Western expatriates typically adapt to the state’s identity project in 
addition to the local cultural of gossip, Western expatriates can also contest the state’s 
identity project. For example, a French participant with West African heritage stated that 
he purposefully avoids expatriate compounds, or ghettoes, because they prevent dialogue 
between expats and Omanis. He stated that he prefers to go to locations wherein the local 
and migrant populations mix and interact. This increases the potential for cultural and 
social influence upon the Omani population, and is therefore not aligned with the state’s 
identity project.  
Non-Western Expatriates 
Non-western expatriates, like Western expatriates, tend to conform to the cultural 
of gossip and reputation that aligns with the national identity project. The ways in which 
the national identity project influences poor and/or non-Western expatriates is through 
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spatial and social segregation. Specific areas in Muscat are planned for higher density 
residency and the infrastructure in these areas are poorer, with more narrow streets, and 
no Integrated Tourist Zones. These neighbourhoods include Ruwi and Wadi Kabir, and 
these neighbourhoods are dominated by non-Western expatriate residency, notable South 
Asian and Asian. Non-western expatriates initially adapt to this spatial and social 
segregation and then mediate the national identity project, as they tend to remain in these 
neighbourhoods unless, after lengthier residency in Muscat, they increase their economic 
standing and move to a middle-class, but still non-Western, neighbourhood like Al 
Khuwair. This impacts the national identity project in that relocation to a less segregated 
neighbourhood increases cultural and social contact and influence. Non-western 
expatriates have adapted to this spatial and socioeconomic segregation, and don’t 
typically frequent those Integrated Tourist Zones or those areas in which amenities and 
establishments cater to wealthier Western segments of society, like Shatti. There is more 
nuance amongst the expatriate community in this regard, as Arab expatriates frequent 
these locations more often than South Asian or Filipino residents, for example. This is 
further evidence of how one’s race and perceived socioeconomic standing influences 
both reception and individuated influence upon the local culture. 
In addition to the ways in which non-Western expatriates adjust their spatial 
practices to adapt to the state’s identity project, they also adjust their socialization 
behaviours in an alignment with the national identity project. Generally speaking, 
socialization between Omanis and expatriates is basically limited to professional and 
formal, and so, because of the expatriate hierarchy in operation, socialization between 
Omanis and non-Western expatriates is more limited than social interaction between 
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Omanis and Western expatriates. And, taking note that this broad categorization includes 
migrants from the developing world including Africans, Arabs, Asians and South Asians, 
one can conceive of a sort of graded scale in terms of social interactions, with Arab 
immigrants socializing more with Omanis than South Asians, for example. A means of 
adaptation to this exclusionary mentality is broad sense of solidarity with other non-white 
expatriates based on shared experience, effectively aligning with the Omani-expatriate 
distinction made by the state. 
With regards to the culture of gossip and reputation, I noticed that non-Western 
female participants conform to the local culture with regards to male-female socialization 
in public, but socialize more openly with the opposite sex amongst their own 
communities or, in expatriate-dominated space like the hotels and Integrated Tourist 
Zones.  It was conveyed by non-Western expatriate women that they have adapted to 
local culture and dress much more modestly in public than they otherwise would, but I 
observed that in those public bars and lounges that cater to western tastes that outfits 
worn by non-Western women were decidedly less modest, such as short and sleeveless 
cocktail dresses, characteristic of a tactic of mediation that is both space and patron 
dependent. In addition to adapting and mediating local culture with regards to female 
modesty, other non-Western expatriate women, particularly one highly-educated 
westernized South Asian woman with long-term residency in the Gulf and Omani in 
particular, choose to contest the local culture of gossip, and not conform to the state’s 
identity project, wearing a bikini because “it’s not meant to cover much” and because of a 
dismissal of culture of gossip and its potential repercussions. Given her background as a 
well-educated, Westernized Indian Gulf resident, this example in particular is 
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characteristic of the research endeavour: a realization that responses to both the national 
identity project and the local culture of gossip varies all the way down to the level of the 
individual. 
More interestingly, the creation and existence of community-specific clubs and 
organizations, like the Philippine Community Muscat, is evidence of a mediation of the 
state’s identity project. As migrants marginalized and discriminated against by the host 
population, a sense of a solidarity based on national origin emerges and such clubs serve 
as social capital. Though there is an American Club with a clubhouse in Madinat Qaboos, 
these Western social clubs are neither as prominent nor as active as those amongst the 
Sudanese, Filipino, and Indian communities, for example. An outcome of this mediation 
of the local context is an alignment with the state’s identity project, in that they are 
generally keeping to themselves, hence limiting their social impact upon the ‘local’ 
population. 
Unlike Western expatriates who tended to promote the conceptions of Omani 
culture that align with the national identity project, non-Western expatriates, with the 
exception of Arab expats, contested the element of tolerance, respect and hospitality. 
Based on their dealings with Omanis, and therefore also a reflection of the expatriate 
hierarchy, non-Western expatriates regardless of their economic standing conveyed that 
they have experienced discrimination in both professional and non-professional 
interactions with Omanis.  
Lastly, nonalignment and contestation of the Omani state’s national identity 
project also comes in the form of alcohol and substance use. However, non-western 
migrants are mediating the culture of gossip and reputation in their usage, choosing to 
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engage in such activities in private spaces or in public-private spaces, like the car or the 
isolated construction site.  
Omani 
Omanis have adapted and conformed to many elements of the state’s national 
identity project. Islam plays a central role in the Omani national identity, and indeed the 
majority of Omanis are practicing adherents. Regardless of their level of religiosity, 
Omanis fast during the month of Ramadan and reference and recite Islamic phrases and 
scripture often. However, cosmopolitanism is another element of the national identity 
project to which most Omani conform. In addition to the role of Islam in national 
identity, religious tolerance is also emphasized, and Omanis generally conform to this 
element of national identity as well. There is no proselytization and religious beliefs seem 
to be viewed as a personal matter about which public discussion is inappropriate and 
perhaps rude. Such hospitality, tolerance, respect, and respect for personal privacy carries 
beyond religion, and expatriates of Western and Arab origins conveyed such claims, 
stating that Omanis were genuinely warm, welcoming, tolerant, and friendly in their 
behaviour and conduct in public space.  
Arabness is another key element of the promoted Omani national identity, and 
one to which Omanis most closely conform. Arabness is a general term I use to refer to 
many cultural and social elements, including the use of the Arabic language, adherence to 
a traditional Arab social structure that emphasizes family and family legacy, social and 
cultural values viewed as typical of Arab societies, and a sense of ethnic Arab identity. 
Omanis use the Arabic language more than any other in both public and private 
spaces and professional and personal conversations. The majority of Omanis listen to 
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music in the Arabic language, read Arabic news media, and watch Arabic-speaking 
television shows. Even in conversations with expatriates in English, specific Arabic 
words and phrases are peppered into the conversation, like inshallah, mashallah, and 
yaani, for example. In terms of dress, Omani males tend to wear the dishdasha and kuma 
in public and women wear the black abaya and hijab, which marks them as both Arab 
and Omani to each other and the public. 
Omanis also conform to the social structure that is characteristic of Arab societies. 
The importance of the family as the basis for society as well as personal achievement is a 
prominent feature in the minds of Omanis, and weighs heavily on their decisions and 
public behaviours. Unmarried Omani men and women remain in the main family house 
until, inshallah, they are married to an individual, whose reputation and status are 
approved of by the family. This family-home residency is absolutely the norm and is an 
expectation amongst the Omani population, particularly for women, who in most cases do 
not have a choice but to conform to this facet of Arab identity as well as the local culture 
of gossip and reputation. Omani women also tend to remain socially segregated from 
men, Omani and expatriate alike, and expatriates in general. There is generally limited 
socialization of Omani women outside of family, particularly in public spaces, as a 
tarnishing of their reputation is more damaging to the family name than a stain on the 
reputation of a male relative. 
In addition to the family as the basis for society, the paternal leadership element 
of the traditional social structure is also something to which Omanis conform. There is a 
genuine respect for and appreciation of Sultan Qaboos and the paternalistic leadership he 
provides. Qaboos is generally referred to in such a way, with both a distance and a 
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closeness, that it is reasonable to conclude that he is popularly viewed as the father-figure 
of the nation. 
Arab ethnicity is an element of the national identity to which Omanis conform. 
The fact that Arab expatriate participants expressed that once their regional affiliation is 
known they are treated more favourably by Omanis is evidence of this strong Arab 
collective identity amongst the national population. Most expatriates, regardless of 
national origins, stated that they mostly interact with Omanis in the workplace and 
characterized such relationships and only professional This regional ethnic affiliation, 
though, is superseded by national identity, as expatriates of all regional origins, including 
Arabs, stated that they felt a sense of exclusion or exclusiveness amongst Omani 
populations, regardless of the level of intimacy or length of friendship. The national 
solidarity amongst Omanis supersedes even a broader shared ethnic or cultural identity. 
Though Omanis tend to adapt and conform to the national identity project, there 
are cases of mediation of elements of the national identity. For example, though the 
majority of Omanis are religious and adhere to religious practices, the level of religiosity 
influences their level of adherence to the state’s identity project. An Omani male 
participant expressed that he drank a lot and often, but refrained from doing so only 
during the month of Ramadan. Likewise, Omani females at a private gathering were also 
not drinking alcohol during Ramadan, to which another Omani said, “What? You’re only 
good Muslims this month?” Still, they chose not to partake because of the importance of 
the religious tradition.  
There is also a mediation of identity amongst Omanis when it comes to religious 
tolerance and cosmopolitanism as well. It was conveyed that though Omanis respect 
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Christians they do not afford the same respect to Hindus. Though I speculate that the lack 
of respect of Hindus has more to do with race and national origins, it could be due to the 
polytheistic nature of the religion. If the latter is the case, this is mediation of the 
cosmopolitan element of the national identity in that Omanis are choosing to respect 
those religions more closely related to Islam and making a spiritual judgment on those 
they deem more idolatrous and farther from the right path. In addition, there is evidence 
of mediation of the cosmopolitan aspect of national identity. For example, an Omani 
participant who socialized extensively with expatriates of various origins, particularly a 
Sudanese participant, gave the impression of his conformation to the tolerant, 
cosmopolitan element of national identity, but made a language-use joke about the 
Sudanese participants’ African origins, effectively calling out his difference. Though in 
every other way this Omani individual exemplified tolerant cosmopolitanism and has 
friends of every regional origin, such comments can be a way of mediating that element 
with a need to differentiate us and them. 
With regards to Arabness, Omanis also mediate specific elements. Amongst the 
younger segments of the population is emerging a pidgin language referred to as 
Arabeesi, which is a combination of Arabic and English. Given that both English and 
Arabic are taught in schools, as well as the globalization of Western English-speaking 
media, Omanis are mediating language, not abandoning Arabic or opting to speak only 
English, but engaging both depending on best fit for the message intended to be 
communicated. Generally, it is the case that English is used when discussing pop culture 
topics or when the message of hip and cool is required. Topics pertaining more to local 
cultural context and/or references are typically discussed in Arabic terms. When it comes 
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to clothing and modesty, the choices made by Omani women indicate a mediation of 
traditional Arab culture and Westernization. Omani women can be seen wearing abaya 
and hijab, in line with traditional expectations of female chastity and modesty, but will 
have a bejeweled and gaudy abaya, an abundance of colourful and dramatic makeup with 
only half of their heads covered by the hijab, demonstrating their individuality and 
displaying their beauty. Omani women are navigating both global and local influences.  
Traditional Arab social structure is also mediated on occasion by exceptional 
Omani individuals. For example, an Omani male participant in his forties, having not yet 
married, decided to split his time evenly between his family house and a private flat he 
rented. It isn’t outright nonconformity or contestation of the traditional social structure in 
that he maintains half-time residency in the family house, eating meals, having his 
laundry washed, and socializing with his immediate family. However, at forty years of 
age, he is also mediating between the social expectations of Arab culture and the western 
influence and desire for personal privacy and autonomy. He hasn’t abandoned the former 
altogether, but is operating within both cultural frameworks. 
Relating to the traditional social structure of Arab societies, Omanis are mediating 
with regards to the role of women in family and society. Women typically have a central 
role to play in the Omani family, and are responsible for the majority of domestic tasks. 
However, with the globalized Western influence, the increase in wealth amongst Omanis, 
and the availability of cheap, and sometimes free, domestic labour from Asia, Omani 
women are stepping outside of private spaces and engaging in the workforce, which, 
traditionally speaking, is not the norm.  Women in the workplace is both accepted and 
applauded amongst Omanis, though their socialization outside of place of employment is 
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more scrutinized, an adaptation to the culture of gossip and reputation. Even though they 
are providing for the family monetarily, women are still expected to keep house and raise 
children more so then their husbands. This increase in female responsibility is a 
mediation of the influencing forces of both tradition and modernity.   
Lastly, with regards to traditional social structure, Omanis mediate both national 
Omani identity and tribal affiliations. Before the creation of the political territorial unit 
that is the Sultanate of Oman, marrying within a tribe or between a few select tribes was 
the requirement. This served many purposes, like maintaining specific alliances, for 
example. It was conveyed by participants that this tribal affiliation is still a very 
important and prominent feature of Omani social life. However, with the urbanization of 
Muscat and the rural exodus, tribes that were once geographically far-removed are in 
closer proximity, and meeting and mingling in the university classroom. Because of this, 
before marriage for example, families ask about the potential spouse’s tribe’s reputation 
and membership. Previously the tribal affiliations would take center-stage in that union. I 
characterize this minute shift in courting and marriage practices as a point between 
tribalism and nationalism; specific tribal origins matter a little less, and Omani nationality 
matters a little more, with nuance. In addition, this is also mediation of the culture of 
gossip and reputation, and tribe reputation is a matter of concern when it comes to 
marriage. 
 Though the majority of Omanis conform to the majority of the state’s identity 
project, or mediate its elements in various ways, there are some instances when Omanis 
contest or do not conform to elements of the national identity. When it comes to religious 
adherence, many Omanis do not pray regularly, if at all, and a lot of Omanis tend to 
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secretly eat during the day in Ramadan while claiming to be religious. It was also said, 
and observed, that many Omanis drink and use other illicit substances despite the Islamic 
proscription. This contestation of the national identity project is also evidence of a 
mediation of the culture of gossip and reputation, as these activities are reserved for 
typically for private spaces as well as public-private spaces, like the car and the isolated 
construction site. 
 With regards to the promoted cultural identity element of cosmopolitanism and 
tolerance, Omanis are non-conforming when it comes to specific demographics. Though 
expatriates of all origins mentioned the friendliness of the Omani people, this 
characterization could be entirely relational. It was previously mentioned that though 
Omanis respect Christians they do not afford the same respect to Hindus, and I speculated 
that this could be due to either its polytheistic nature or the colour and occupations of its 
adherents. If the former is the case, I said this is mediation of the cosmopolitan element 
of the national identity. I believe the latter to be the reality, and so it is contestation of the 
element of cosmopolitanism. Expatriates of low class and/or Asian, South Asian, and 
Sub-Saharan African origins are not afforded the same level of hospitality, respect, and 
tolerance that is given to white, western expatriates. Most Omanis, unless westernized, do 
not even associate or socialize with expatriates on the low rungs of the expatriate 
hierarchy, and treat them as nothing more than temporary labourers. Even though some 
foreign nationals are treated respectfully and some not at all, I would characterize this as 
mediation because true cosmopolitanism requires respect regardless of race, creed, or 
culture.  
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Clothing is a way of contesting the Arab elements of Omani identity. When it 
comes to national dress, some Omani men explained that they wear dishdasha only when 
it’s required, like visiting a ministry. In their downtime at home, around the 
neighbourhood, or out enjoying the nightlife, it was conveyed that they preferred to wear 
Western clothes and rarely wear dishdasha worn in Left Bank, for example. Several 
participants stated that the dishdasha conveys authority and commands respect in public, 
and the fact that such benefits are forgone in favour of trousers is contestation of an 
aspect of national identity. Use of the Arabic language is losing favour among some 
Omanis as well, marking a contestation of, or at least non-conformation to, this important 
element of Arab-Omani identity. Omanis expressed that they feel more comfortable 
communicating in English and have felt a shift away from using Arabic to communicate 
with others in public and private spaces alike. The popularity of English-speaking music, 
television shows, and movies, in addition to the formal English education, is accelerating 
the preference for the English language, and continuing to development a unique and 
localized Muscati culture. 
While the Omani state is promoting a unifying national identity, Muscat residents 
are reconstructing and renegotiating culture and identity in the capital city. Individuals 
are contesting, mediating, and adapting to both the state’s identity project as well as to 
the equally, if not more, influential social control that is the culture of gossip and 
reputation.  Because there exists an expatriate hierarchy, individuals’ origins and/or class 
has a significant impact on their reception, and hence their reactions to the identity 
project, and the local culture of gossip, as well as their influence upon the culture and 
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identity of other city residents. The result is a unique local Muscati culture that is a 
mixture of global and local elements, and the varied influences of individual residents. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Where do you work and what do you do? 
 
2. Where were you born? 
 
3. Where are you from? 
 
4. Do you have Omani citizenship? 
 
5. How long have you lived in Muscat? 
 
6. Do you plan to/ did you attend university? 
 
7. In what neighbourhood of Muscat are you living now?  
 
8. How long have you lived in this area, and why did you choose to live here? 
 
9. Have you lived in any other parts of the city? If so, where? Why did you choose to move? 
 
10. Do you live far from where you work/study? 
 
11. Where do you do your grocery shopping?  
 
12. What do you do for recreation and entertainment?  
 
13. Are there areas of the city that you try to avoid visiting?  
 
14. Are there areas of Muscat you feel more comfortable in? Why? 
 
15. Do you think there are distinct areas where noncitizens live? Where are these areas?  
 
 289 
16. Do you keep in touch with friends and family back home? 
 
17. What do you think about the culture in Muscat? Are there aspects you like more than 
others?  
 
18. How often do you interact with Omanis/foreigners? 
 
19. Have you ever been treated differently because you are/are not Omani? By who? 
 
20. Is Omani society welcoming of foreigners? 
 
21. What is your favourite type of food?  
 
22. What is your favourite type of music or movies? 
 
23. Do you think you have been influenced by Omani culture, or the cultures of other 
foreign-born people? 
 
24. Do you want to live in Muscat permanently?  
 
25. Do you consider Muscat to be your home? Why? 
 
26. Has your identity changed over time? 
 
27. Are you a member of any social clubs or groups? If so, which ones, and why did you join 
them? 
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APPENDIX B 
MENTAL MAPS 
 
 
Mental Map 6.1 
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 Mental Map 6.2 
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Mental Map 6.3 
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Mental Map 6.4 
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Mental Map 6.5 
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Mental Map 6.6 
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Mental Map 6.7 
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Mental Map 6.8 
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Mental Map 6.9 
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APPENDIX C 
PHOTOS 
 
 
Photo 5.1: The Sultan’s Image, Seeb near City Center 
 
 
Photo 5.2: The Sultan’s Image, Seeb near City Center 
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Photo 5.3: Modern Arab style villa, Al Khuwair 
 
 
Photo 5.4: Homogenised architecture to resemble forts; Al Hail, Seeb. 
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Photo 5.5: More humble abodes in the older neighbourhoods. Matrah 
 
 
Photo 5.6: Sultan Qaboos Grand Mosque 
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Photo 5.7: Tourist area of the Matrah Souq, Matrah 
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Photo 5.8: Lived space of the Matrah Souq; Matrah 
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Photo 5.9: The Wave Integrated Tourist Zone, Seeb 
 
 
Photo 7.1: Seeb Beach, Seeb 
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Photo 7.2: Seeb Beach, Seeb 
 
 
Photo 7.3: Seeb Beach, Seeb 
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Photo 7.4: Shatti Beach, Shatti 
 
Photo 7.5: Shatti Beach, Shatti 
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Photo 7.6: Oman Club, Al Khuwair, Philippine Club Basketball Practice 
 
 
Photo 7.7: Oman Club; AL Khuwair, Philippine Community Basketball Practice 
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Photo 7.8: Carrefour City Center Seeb 
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Photo 7.9: Carrefour City Center Seeb 
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Photo 7.10: Starbucks City Center Seeb 
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Photo 7.11: H&M clothing store, City Center Seeb 
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Photo 7.12: LuLu Hypermarket fish counter, Avenues Mall, Bowsher 
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Photo 7.13: LuLu Hypermarket produce section, Avenues Mall, Bowsher 
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Photo 7.14: LuLu Hypermarket produce section, Avenues Mall, Bowsher 
 315 
 
Photo 7.15: Al Khuwair Shopping Complex, Al Khuwair 
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Photo 7.16: Matrah Souq fabric and tailoring section, Matrah 
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Photo 7.17: Matrah Souq fabric and tailoring stall, Matrah 
 
 
Photo 7.18: Last call, Rock Bottom, Qurum 
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Photo 7.19: Expatriates at Left Bank, Qurum 
 
 
Photo 7.20: Yemeni expat and his dohka, Route 66, Shatti 
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